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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes transmission pricing, transmission congestion risks and their 
associated hedging instruments as well as mechanisms for stimulating investments in 
transmission expansion. An example of risk management in the case of a hydropower 
producer is included.  
 
 After liberalization and restructuring of electricity markets, risk management has 
become important. In particular the thesis analyzes risks due to transmission 
congestion both in the short- and long-term (investments) for market players such as 
generators, loads, traders, independent system operators and merchant investors. The 
work is focused on the northeastern United States electricity markets and the Nordic 
electricity markets.  
 
The first part of the thesis reviews the literature related to the eight research papers 
in the thesis. This describes the risks that are relevant for an electricity market player 
and how these can be managed. Next, the basic ingredients of a competitive electricity 
market are described including the design of the system operator. The transmission 
pricing method is decisive for hedging against transmission congestion risks and there 
is an overview of transmission pricing models considering their similarities and 
differences. Depending on the transmission pricing method used, locational or area 
(zonal) pricing, the electricity market players can use financial transmission rights or 
Contracts for Differences, respectively. In the long-term it is important to create 
mechanisms for investments in transmission expansion and the thesis describes one 
possible approach and its potential problems.  
 
The second part comprises eight research papers. It presents empirical analyses of 
existing markets for transmission congestion derivatives, theoretical analyses of 
transmission congestion derivatives, modeling of merchant long-term financial 
transmission rights, theoretical analysis of the risks of the independent system 
operator in providing financial transmission rights, an analysis of inefficiencies 
associated with ignoring losses when utilizing area (zonal) pricing, and an application 
of an integrated risk management model on the power system of Norway’s second 
largest hydropower producer. 
 
The most important research findings include the following issues. First, Contracts 
for Differences in the Nordic market appear to be over-priced. Second, a merchant 
long-term financial transmission rights model is possible to realize in mathematical 
and economic terms. Third, by including the proceeds from a financial transmission 
right auction the independent system operator can issue a higher volume of rights 
because there is a relationship between the congestion rent, the proceeds from the 
auction and the payments to the financial transmission rights holders. Fourth, ignoring 
losses in the Norwegian area pricing, can lead to inefficiencies. Next, an integrated 
risk management model is applicable on large-scale power systems. Then, an 
overview is presented of different contractual arrangements that can be used to hedge 
transmission congestion risks. Finally, empirical data from existing financial 
transmission rights markets demonstrate how these markets work.  
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1 Introduction 
The analysis of transmission congestion risks and mechanisms for transmission 
expansion depends upon the specific market design. The transmission pricing method 
and congestion management procedures will be decisive for the risks that a market 
player is exposed to. Likewise, the institutional design of the system operator and its 
relationship with the transmission system are important in attracting new investments 
in transmission. This thesis focuses on the northeastern United States (US) market 
design with locational pricing and the Nordic market design with area (zonal) pricing.  
1.1 Motivation 
Risk management is complicated in a restructured electricity market. Moving from 
regulated markets with no or very low price uncertainty, the electricity markets are 
now facing liberalization and restructuring. Electricity prices are no longer determined 
by the regulator, but by the market. Experience from the Nordic and California 
electricity markets demonstrates that the prices may exhibit extreme volatility. An 
electricity market player therefore needs risk management procedures. Electricity can 
be traded as any commodity on power exchanges like Nord Pool and the European 
Energy Exchange. However, compared to the financial markets, many electricity 
markets lack liquidity, have tremendous volatility, exhibit non-normal price 
distributions, and have market incompleteness. In particular, transmission constraints 
and the non-storability of electricity present complications. Because of the specific 
electricity market characteristics, the risk management ideas developed for the 
financial markets are not directly applicable to the electricity market. Risks can be 
managed by using financial derivatives and integrated hydropower scheduling 
models. Risk management requires frequent monitoring and assessment of all relevant 
uncertainties, and knowledge of how these affect the market value of the power 
portfolio of the market player and its associated probability distribution. Given this 
information, the market players can make decisions according to their attitude to risk. 
 
When supply and demand conditions change, market players experience volatile 
locational prices due to energy prices, transmission congestion and losses. To 
overcome problems associated with transmission congestion, financial instruments for 
hedging against locational price differences such as financial transmission rights 
(FTRs) and the Nordic Contracts for Differences (CfDs) can be utilized. These 
instruments can be a mechanism to share or mitigate risk. Transmission congestion 
creates a social welfare loss reflecting the opportunity costs of the transmission 
constraints. If the system operator collects the congestion rent, it could create 
incentives to manipulate dispatch and prevent transmission expansion in order to 
increase the rent. System operation is a natural monopoly and the system operator 
could redistribute the rents through a system of FTRs to those who are paying the 
transmission access charges to cover the fixed costs of the transmission network. The 
prime example of this implementation is the PJM (Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland) market in the United States. Long-term FTRs can also be awarded to 
investors in small-scale transmission expansion projects. 
 
The Nordic market has experience with restructuring since 1991 when Norway 
opened its electricity market to competition. In 1996, Sweden joined, followed by 
Finland in 1998 and Denmark in 1999-2000. Internationally, the Nordic power market 
is considered a success. The politicians, regulators and transmission system operators 
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in the Nordic countries want an efficient integrated Nordic electricity market. 
However, there are deficiencies such as the lack of locational price signals that 
involves non-optimal utilization of the Nordic power system and the international 
interconnections. During the last decade, there has been a lack of new investments in 
generation and transmission capacity at the same time as there has been a demand 
growth. The market design is of crucial importance when the electricity market is 
tested under stress conditions that include a scarcity of energy and capacity. It is also 
important to use market mechanisms during scarcity periods and the existing system 
should be used optimally before new investments are planned. This will benefit 
society in the long-run and will not result in over-investment. The experience from 
northeastern US electricity markets may tell us some lessons of how to deal with 
locational prices and transmission investments. 
1.2 Objectives and scope of work 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate risk management in the electricity market 
emphasizing the risks associated with transmission congestion. Many electricity 
markets have experienced under-investment in transmission and it is therefore 
important to create mechanisms for transmission expansion. As 99% of power 
generation in Norway is hydro-based and hydropower amounts for a substantial share 
of generation capacity in the Nordic market, it is therefore important to understand 
how to manage the risks of a hydropower producer. 
 
The work on this thesis first started out with the objective of integrating 
hydropower scheduling and economic risk analysis. This is reflected in one of the 
papers included in the thesis. It describes the testing of the Prodrisk model that was 
developed as a part of the project. The model was implemented on Norsk Hydro 
ASA’s power system and strategic contract portfolio, and was run in the weekly 
operation for half a year. However, the focus changed to risks associated with 
transmission congestion and how these could be managed by using financial 
derivatives. During the stay at Harvard, I started to study how it was possible to create 
incentives for merchant transmission investments. 
 
To summarize, the research has been focused on the following issues: 
• Evaluation of different market solutions for congestion management such as 
locational (nodal) and zonal pricing.  
• Optimal power flow model and how to calculate locational prices. 
• What trading strategies and tools for risk management associated with 
transmission congestion can or should be used? 
• How well do the markets for transmission congestion derivatives (Contracts for 
Differences and financial transmission rights) function in terms of efficiency? 
• How are the financial transmission right markets designed?  
• What are the financial and economic consequences of buying financial 
transmission rights for market players such as generators, loads and traders? 
• What are credit risks of the system operator when providing financial transmission 
rights? 
• How can financial transmission rights be used to create incentives for transmission 
investments? 
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• Can risks be managed by using both operations scheduling and the utilization of 
financial contracts in real cases such as the power system of Norway’s second 
largest hydropower producer? 
1.3 Limitations 
The study is limited to congestion management in the Nordic and US power 
markets and does not consider cross-border auctions that are used in continental 
Europe. The transmission risk management tools that are described are therefore only 
relevant for the locational and zonal pricing systems used in the US and Scandinavia 
respectively.  
 
An efficient financial transmission rights model assumes no increasing returns to 
scale, no sunk costs, locational prices that fully reflect consumers’ willingness to pay, 
network externalities internalized by locational prices, no uncertainty in congestion 
rents, no market power so that markets are always cleared by prices, complete futures 
markets, and an independent system operator (ISO) with no inter-temporal 
preferences regarding effective transmission capacity (Joskow and Tirole, 2002 and 
2003).  
 
Empirical data from markets for hedging instruments against locational price 
differences are still limited and immature so that analyses must be viewed in this light. 
There are also complications in the pricing of electricity derivates because of non-
storability and transmission constraints.  
 
When considering merchant electricity transmission expansion we limit ourselves 
to small-scale transmission investments that do not produce material changes in 
locational prices. In the context of the merchant transmission expansion model, the 
work does not consider the social welfare results as important as that electricity 
market players are hedged (with financial transmission rights) against possible 
externalities when there is a transmission expansion. Likewise, the financial 
transmission rights model is static and using it to analyze transmission investments 
will not consider the dynamic nature of these investments. 
1.4 Disciplines and methods used in the thesis 
To evaluate the issues raised in this thesis a multidisciplinary approach has been 
used. The issues related to financial transmission rights are solved by combining 
electrical engineering, economics, finance, and operations research as illustrated in 
Figure 1-1. A similar approach has been used when evaluating the Nordic Contracts 
for Differences. The integrated risk management model for hydropower scheduling 
and contract management uses methods from operations research and finance. 
 
Specifically these concepts and methods have been used: 
• Electrical engineering: optimal power flow model, congestion management, 
reliability 
• Energy and regulatory economics: transmission resource allocation, property 
rights, optimal use of scarce resources, incentives for new investments,  
liberalization of electricity markets, market power 
• Finance: pricing of electricity derivatives, value at risk, empirical analysis, 
hedging, optimal hedge,  financial engineering 
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• Operations research: linear programming, nonlinear programming, bi-level 
programming, stochastic dynamic programming, stochastic dual dynamic 
programming, simulation 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Disciplines used in the thesis to evaluate financial transmission rights and  
Nordic Contracts for Differences. 
 
1.5 Summary of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background and review of the literature relevant 
for the thesis. This includes risk management, electricity market design, transmission 
pricing, transmission congestion derivatives, and transmission investments. It 
discusses the rationale for risk management in the electricity markets and the 
complications in pricing electricity. The objective for restructuring electricity markets 
is to obtain short-run and long-run efficiency through competition among generators 
and loads. In the short-run, there should be an optimal utilization of generation, 
distribution, and transmission. In the long-run, there should be incentives for the siting 
of generators and loads and optimal expansion of the transmission network. The major 
hurdle in the development of competitive markets arises from the need for a system 
operator who has a role in managing the complex interactions in the network and 
maintaining system reliability. The system operator role is discussed in the context of 
locational pricing markets and the Nordic market. Likewise, the congestion 
management procedures are described. Locational and zonal pricing are presented 
including mathematical transmission pricing models, and a comparison is made 
among them. To hedge locational price risk, transmission congestion hedging 
instruments may be used and we present the possible derivatives. Finally, we discuss 
transmission investments and one possible approach for attracting new investments in 
transmission in locational pricing markets – long-term financial transmission rights.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a summary of the research papers and their findings. 
 
Given that transmission congestion involves locational price risks, Chapter 4 gives 
an overview of how these risks can be managed by utilizing financial derivatives. 
Electrical 
engineering 
Economics Finance Operations 
research 
Financial 
transmission 
rights and 
Contracts for 
Difference 
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Risk management strategies are illustrated for trades between two locations when 
transmission congestion is present. Risk management in three different markets is 
exemplified: the general forward market, the bilateral market, and the Nordic market. 
Cash flow analysis describes the conditions under which hedging is profitable and 
demonstrates that players can protect themselves against futures price differences. 
Taking into account that a riskless hedge may be non-optimal if the objective is to 
minimize variance, the optimal hedge ratio for forward contracts is calculated.  
 
Chapter 5 surveys the markets for FTRs around the world. It describes the features 
of the FTRs and the design of the different FTR markets. Here, we are especially 
interested in how FTRs can be acquired, their advantages and disadvantages, and their 
market performance.  
 
Chapter 6 demonstrates how MATPOWER, a MATLAB package can be used for 
optimal power flow (OPF) simulations. An OPF simulation calculates the 
active/reactive power generated and purchased at each bus and the nodal prices. The 
nodal prices are of special interest because they reflect the marginal value of 
generation and load at each bus (node). These prices are also called locational prices 
and are found to be the optimal prices, maximizing social welfare and taking 
transmission constraints and losses into account. They can provide the right incentives 
to market players and maximize social welfare. When transmission congestion is 
present, this creates market inefficiency, since cheap distant generation may be 
replaced by more expensive generation. There is particular interest in OPF as utilized 
by a centralized dispatcher, and the features that are relevant for the Norwegian and 
Nordic markets. Three cases are optimized and the work analyzes the economic 
consequences of different network topologies and transmission congestion.  
 
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to give an introduction to, and a pricing analysis of a 
CfDs, introduced on November 17, 2000 at Nord Pool. The CfD is a forward market 
product with reference to the difference between the future seasonal area price and 
System Price. By using available historical trading prices and spot prices for seven 
seasonal contracts and one yearly contract, it is possible to analyze the relationships 
between the contract prices and the value of the underlying asset. For the first seven 
seasonal contracts, it appears that the CfDs traded at Nord Pool are mostly over-priced 
relative to the underlying asset. Pricing theory for forward contracts explains this by 
the presence of a majority of risk-averse consumers who are willing to pay a risk 
premium for receiving the future price differential. Statistical analysis is utilized with 
regard to the contract prices and the underlying asset, and some interesting 
relationships are found. The analysis is preliminary because the CfD market is 
relatively new. 
 
Chapter 8 proposes a merchant mechanism to expand electricity transmission based 
on long-term financial transmission rights (FTRs). Due to network loop flows, a 
change in network capacity might imply negative externalities on existing 
transmission property rights. The system operator thus needs a protocol for awarding 
incremental FTRs that maximize investors’ preferences, and this preserves certain 
currently unallocated FTRs (or proxy awards) so as to maintain revenue adequacy. In 
this work, we define a proxy award as the best use of the current network along the 
same direction as the incremental awards. We then develop a bi-level programming 
model for the allocation of long-term FTRs according to this rule and apply it to 
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different network topologies. We find that simultaneous feasibility for a transmission 
expansion project crucially depends on the investor-preference and the proxy-
preference parameters. Likewise, for a given amount of pre-existing FTRs the larger 
the current capacity the greater the need to reserve some FTRs for possible negative       
externalities generated by the expansion changes.    
 
Chapter 9 studies the risks faced by the providers of FTRs. The introduction of 
FTRs in different systems in the USA must be viewed in relationship to the 
organization of the market. Often, private players own the central grid, while an 
independent system operator operates the grid. The revenues from transmission 
congestion collected in the day-ahead and balancing markets should give the ISO 
sufficient revenues to cover the costs associated with providing FTRs. This can be 
ensured if the issued FTRs fulfil the simultaneous feasibility test described by Hogan. 
This test on a three-node network is studied under different assumptions to find the 
maximum volumes, which can be sold, including contingency constraints. Next, the 
feasibility test is analysed when taking into account the proceeds from the FTR 
auction, and demonstrate that a higher volume might be issued. We introduce 
uncertainty under different scenarios for locational prices and calculate the maximum 
provided volumes. As a tool for risk management, the provider of the FTRs can use 
the Value at Risk approach. Finally, the provision of FTRs by private parties is 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 10 contributes to the understanding of how bus and area prices are affected 
by losses and congestion. Recent papers have described area pricing to include bus 
prices that are equal within in a price area or zone. According to present Norwegian 
practice, the bus prices within a price area differ by an amount that is due to losses. 
We use a full AC optimal power flow model to illustrate this. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that the combined effect of transmission congestion and losses may yield 
a substantial change in individual bus and area prices compared with a situation with 
no congestion or losses. 
 
Chapter 11 describes a risk management tool for hydropower generators and its 
application to Norway’s second-largest generation company and largest electricity 
consumer (Norsk Hydro ASA).  The tool considers both operations scheduling and the 
utilization of financial contracts for risk management. Financial risks are accounted 
for by penalizing incomes below a reference income. The risk management problem is 
solved by a combination of stochastic dual dynamic programming and stochastic 
dynamic programming. Simulations demonstrate that lower income scenarios improve 
when risk aversion is introduced. 
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2 Literature review 
This chapter aims to present a theoretical background and review of literature 
related to the papers in this thesis. It starts by describing risks that are faced by 
electricity market players and how these can be hedged by using financial derivatives. 
Because price risk is dominant, forecasting of spot prices is important and a brief 
overview of some models is presented. Next, we continue with the market design and 
system operator role that are the basic components in a competitive electricity market. 
Locational pricing and area pricing are discussed in the context of the northeastern 
United States (US) power markets and the Nordic market respectively. We also 
discuss financial transmission rights and Nordic Contracts for Differences as hedging 
instruments. An alternative locational hedging mechanism has been proposed by 
Rajaraman and Alvarado (1998). The basic idea is to use relatively few liquid futures 
markets, and construct a synthetic locational futures contract. The last part of the 
chapter discusses transmission expansion by means of long-term financial 
transmission rights and potential problems associated with this approach.  
2.1 Risk management 
In economic risk analysis, an economic value can be assigned to every possible 
outcome. In most cases, the economic value of an outcome is the net financial benefit 
associated with that particular outcome. In this context, risk might be defined as not 
getting an outcome within one particular range of values or greater than a threshold 
value. In finance, risk is the possibility of negative payoffs from derivatives, 
portfolios, and activities. 
 
The term “risk management” is used to describe any kind of action that controls or 
changes the risk. This may be an increase or decrease in risk. Risk management can 
generally be defined as changing the risk to meet the decision maker’s attitude toward 
risk. The objective of risk management is to ensure that contract positions, trades, 
insolvency, and operations do not expose the company to losses leading to financial 
default.  
 
Risk management in the electricity market is a relatively new area that has been 
introduced after the restructuring of the electricity industry. Market players face new 
uncertainties such as price uncertainty. The price of electricity depends on supply and 
demand, and the price formation is complicated by the fact that electricity is non-
storable and that supply must equal demand in real-time. Management of different 
types of risk as well as management of the total electricity portfolio1 puts great 
requirements on expertise. Effective risk management will give the market player 
information about uncertainty in future net benefits. The market players would 
therefore achieve a more conscious attitude towards their exposure limits. Rational 
human behavior is identified to be risk-averse2 (Arrow, 1971). A risk-averse agent 
seeks to reduce the uncertainties in net benefits. It will therefore be important to 
identify, assess, monitor, and control risks associated with activities within an 
electricity business company.  
                                               
1
 The electricity portfolio may include financial and physical contracts as well as electricity 
generation. 
2
 Risk-averseness can be defined as preference for a certain payment of some value to a 
random payment with expected value equal to the same. 
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2.1.1 The risk exposure of an electricity company 
The management of an electricity business company3 must assess its risk exposures 
and establish rules for the contract portfolio that is consistent with the risk profile of 
the company. Furthermore, all risks should be understood, measured, and controlled. 
Appropriate risk measures and tools are therefore important (see Wangensteen, 2003). 
For an electricity company, all of the revenue and cost items would vary with the 
outcome of different factors. The important variable is the associated risk exposure of 
the sum of the items. Generally, an increased expected profitability brings higher risk, 
including the possibility of severe losses.  
 
In finance, portfolio management has the objective to invest in a combination of 
assets that gives the highest expected return subject to the investor’s risk profile. In 
the electricity market this means buying and selling the contracts that give the 
company the lowest purchasing price or highest selling price based on a chosen risk 
preference. One of the strategies to reduce the risk in finance is to diversify, but this 
option is limited in electricity markets (assuming a single agent). The company must 
evaluate its total portfolio of contracts and activities and calculate how a single 
contract contributes to the total risk. When entering into a single electricity contract, 
the relevant risk is the risk associated with the total portfolio. 
 
     Risk hedging can be done by modifying physical (hydropower4) generation plans, 
or by using financial contracts. An electricity company should hedge when the benefit 
probability distribution is changed such that the benefit is greater than the hedging 
costs, or when it is cheaper for the company than the owner to accomplish hedging. 
Hedging results in less volatile profit but requires skilled competence to analyze the 
electricity market. Forward prices may be used for the valuation of assets and 
marking-to-market of electricity portfolios.  
2.1.2 Different types of risk 
The strategic, market, and technical risks are the three main sources of risks for the 
players in the electricity market (Wangensteen, 2003).  
 
     Strategic risk is often called political risk and it is associated with changes in 
regulations and legislation. For example there may be changes in energy legislation, 
changes in concessions for power plants, new rules for export/import to foreign 
countries, changes in the domestic interest rate level, changes in the currency rate, and 
solvency problems in important customer groups. 
 
     Market risk is the dominating risk and is associated with changes in prices 
resulting from uncertainties in supply and demand of electrical energy. The supply of 
electricity is influenced by many conditions. In a hydropower-based system 
precipitation and inflow will be very important. In addition the temperature conditions 
are of importance since it affects the consumption and timing and speed of snow 
melting. Multi-year water reservoirs and import agreements during dry years 
contribute to decrease this uncertainty. Export of power to foreign countries affects 
the expectation about the future electricity price. If there is surplus of thermal energy 
                                               
3
 Here the focus is on a generation or trading company, not a distribution company. 
4
 This hedging strategy requires storage capacity over time and can typically be done by 
hydropower generators. 
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in the foreign countries this could give decreased prices in a hydropower-based 
system such as the Norwegian one. Conversely, if the thermal energy producers are 
heavily taxed this would give an increase in the electricity prices in the Norwegian 
system.  
 
     The electricity demand depends on many uncertain factors that affect the future 
electricity price. Temperature development in the long-run will affect the demand 
growth. In the short-run the uncertainty about the temperature has great influence, 
because it can change the assumptions for possible bidding in the spot market. The 
general activity in the economy will influence demand. If the level is high, the energy 
demand is high and with it the electricity demand. If a part of the electricity intensive 
industry is shut down, it will give a large surplus of electricity and therefore decrease 
the prices for a substantial time. The technological development will also have 
significance for the demand for electricity. Investments in energy efficiency 
equipment will typically give a reduced demand for electricity. New energy effective 
technology can change the consumers’ demand pattern. Technological and financial 
developments can also change the demand and lead to competition between different 
energy carriers and energy forms.  
 
     The main components of market risk are price, basis (spot price minus futures 
price5), volume, counter-party, and liquidity risk. Price risk is associated with 
uncertainty in future price. Basis risk is due to the price difference between the spot 
price of the asset to be hedged and the futures price of the contract used (Hull, 2003). 
If the asset to be hedged and the asset underlying the futures contract are the same, the 
basis should be zero at the expiration of the futures contract. Volume risk is associated 
with uncertainty in the future volume. Counter-party risk is associated with the 
counter part being uncertain payer or supplier. Liquidity risk is the risk that a firm 
may not be able to, or cannot easily, unwind or offset a particular position at or near 
the previous market price, because of inadequate market depth. 
 
     In order to understand market risk we must model changes in price, understand the 
volatility for individual markets and the correlations between different markets. At a 
higher level, one can face the risk of poorly liquid markets that makes price discovery 
and hedging difficult.  
 
     Market risk is a major problem for participants that generate electricity subject to 
inter-temporal constraints. These are power plants where decisions taken at one time 
interval can restrict decisions taken after that. Storage hydro systems, plants with 
ramp-rate constraints, and plants with start-up costs are some examples of plants with 
inter-temporal constraints. 
 
     Technical risk is associated with outages of generation and transmission facilities. 
Distribution companies will be exposed to this risk. Technical risk does not affect the 
electricity market and the contract portfolio extensively because outages have short 
duration and occur infrequently.  
 
                                               
5
 This is the usual definition. However, the alternative definition basis = futures price – spot 
price is sometimes used. 
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2.1.3 Derivatives 
As most risk management is done by utilizing financial derivatives, we explain the 
basic types here. The two basic building blocks are forward and option contracts. 
Forward-based products include spot contracts (physical contracts), forwards, futures, 
and swaps. Option-based products include options, caps, floors, and collars, as well as 
hybrids, and options on futures, forwards, and swaps. One can also differentiate 
between standardized contracts, traded at exchanges, where clearing is often offered 
and OTC contracts, which are traded on a bilateral basis. There are four types of 
standardized contracts traded at power exchanges in Europe and elsewhere: spot 
contracts, futures, forwards, and options.  
2.1.3.1 Spot contracts 
The spot contract is normally an hourly contract, but can be even shorter, like the 
half-hourly spot contract traded at the Amsterdam Power Exchange. The spot contract 
has physical delivery and is the underlying reference price of most derivatives. The 
spot contract is not traded on a continuous basis, but through an auction conducted 
once a day. 
 
    The spot contract is a contract giving the buyer the obligation to receive a specified 
amount of MWs of electricity over the period, and the seller the obligation to deliver 
the same amount of power at a specific geographical location that might be anywhere 
in the transmission network or at a single hub.  
2.1.3.2 Forward-based contracts 
The electricity forwards and futures are normally traded on a continuous basis, 
which is also the case for forwards in most of the traditional financial markets. Their 
reference price is the spot price. A forward contract commits the buyer to purchase 
(and the seller to deliver) an asset at a specified time in the future at a pre-arranged 
price. They can be privately negotiated between two parties or traded at an exchange.6 
They often involve delivery of the underlying asset.  
 
    Futures are standardized forward contracts, traded on organized exchanges. The 
main difference between the futures and forwards is the daily marking to market and 
settlement of futures. Forwards are settled when the contracts reach their due dates. 
 
    A swap is a series of successively maturing forward contracts. Two parties agree to 
exchange a series of cash flows based on a liability or asset. Swaps are commonly 
negotiated on interest rates, currencies, commodities, and equities. Usually, a quantity 
of a commodity or a notional amount (a principal sum of money) is used to calculate 
the payment stream, but is not itself exchanged. Electricity swaps based on price 
indexes in different regions of the world may prove popular as restructuring evolves. 
In the Nordic market Contracts for Difference is an example of a swap. 
 
There are several types of OTC forward-based contacts and their payoff structure 
may be complicated. An indexed contract may be used by the industry to hedge 
against uncertainty in the electricity price that makes up a substantial part of the cost 
and similarly the price of the output that makes up a substantial part of the revenue. 
                                               
6
 This is the case at Nord Pool – the Nordic power exchange. 
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The contract specifies that the electricity price paid by the buyer is determined by an 
index that is referred to the output. Likewise, an electricity producer may be interested 
in a cross-market contract. This contract makes it possible to hedge against the 
simultaneous uncertainty in fuel and electricity prices that a thermal producer faces. 
The amount of fuel to hedge is however unknown, since it depends on the future 
dispatch and can therefore not be hedged with normal forwards or futures. Instead, 
there are products linking fuel price with electricity price to offset this spread risk. 
The cross market contracts can be swaps or options on this swap. The most common 
cross-market contract is a spark spread option. A long-term OTC contract with fixed 
quantity, but floating price is called a floating contract. The buyer pays the spot price 
in each period. The contract has the same cost structure as if the buyer is continuously 
buying electricity in the spot market.  
2.1.3.3 Option-based contracts 
Options are contracts that give the buyer the right, but not the obligation to 
purchase or sell the underlying asset at an agreed upon price in the future. Option 
buyers (long position) pay sellers (short position) a premium7 for this right. Call 
options give buyers the right to buy the underlying asset from the seller at the 
prearranged strike or exercise price. Put options give buyers the right to sell the 
underlying asset at the exercise price. Some options are traded on organized 
exchanges, while others are traded over the counter. There are basically two types of 
traded options in power markets, namely European options with futures or forward 
contracts as the underlying and Asian options with spot contracts as the underlying. 
 
Options that are “in-the-money” - the strike price is less, in the case of call options, 
or more, in the case of put options, than the market price of the underlying asset - can 
be exercised at a profit. Options that are “out-of-the-money” would be allowed to 
expire unexercised. European options can be exercised only at the specified exercise 
date, while American options may be exercised at any time up until the exercise date. 
 
Caps and floors are simply series of consecutively maturing option contracts. A 
cap is a series of call options, and a floor is a series of put options. They are always 
negotiated OTC. Purchasing a call option or cap has a desirable payoff profile, but 
involves paying a premium. Risk managers sometimes fund the cost of acquiring a 
cap by simultaneously writing a floor. This combination of a long cap and a short 
floor is known as a collar.  
 
A considerable component of risk in power trading is volume risk. Hence, many 
OTC contracts have flexible underlying volumes of electricity. These contracts are 
called swing options, because the buyer has the option to change its withdrawal from 
the contract over a certain period of time subject to an energy constraint. A typical 
example of a flexible contract is the load factor contract. It has a fixed amount of 
                                               
7
 Option premiums are determined by supply and demand drives. Mathematical models are 
available for pricing options. Holding other variables constant, premiums will increase with 
volatility in the price of the underlying asset, and the length of time remaining to expiration. A 
call option premium also increases with an increase in the price of the underlying asset, but 
decreases with higher exercise prices. A put option premium will correlate negatively with the 
price of the underlying asset, and positively with exercise price. 
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energy and may be an annual contract with a specified utilization time. The flexibility 
inherited in the contract is found by dividing the utilization time by the total time.  
 
Another type of flexible contract is an interruptible contract, where the buyer has 
the right to curtail supply at predefined number of occasions. It was introduced as a 
part of demand-side management programs and is an alternative to build more capital-
intensive industry. The contracts are priced according to the frequency of the potential 
curtailments and how far in advance the notification must occur. 
 
The swing option and the interruptible contract may be used to hedge volume risk, 
but they do not take into account the real source of uncertainty in supply and demand 
caused by the weather. This can be done by using weather derivatives that are 
structured as swaps, futures, and call and put options based on weather indexes. 
Commonly referenced weather indexes include, but are not limited to, heating degree 
day (HDD), cooling degree day (CDD), precipitation, and snowfall. 
 
Real options are non-traded assets or liabilities for which the payoff profile 
replicates that of an options contract, may be embedded in traditional operations or 
contracts. For example, the decision to construct a new peaking power plant has the 
characteristics of a call option. The price of constructing the plant is equivalent to the 
option premium, and the price of operating the plant is equivalent to the strike price. 
Recognizing real options can help utilities understand tradeoffs between contracting, 
financial hedging, construction opportunities, and purchasing insurance. 
2.1.4 The dynamics of the spot price 
As in basic economic theory, the competitive price of electricity is determined by 
the intersection of demand and supply curves. To be able to price electricity 
derivatives and forecast prices we must have spot price models. The non-storability of 
electricity makes the utilization of models from finance more challenging.  
 
The traditional models in finance are usually represented by stochastic differential 
equations. The most famous is the Black and Scholes model. In this model the stock 
price, St, in time period t follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM): 
 
t t t tdS S dt S dWα σ= +                                                                                                 (2.1) 
 
where dWt is an increment of a Wiener process. The Wiener-process8 is a particular 
type of Markov stochastic process with a mean change of zero and a variance rate 1.0 
per year.  The deterministic part is represented by the first term where α is the drift in 
the spot price (expected return of rate). The second term t tS dWσ  is stochastic 
including the volatility σ. The equation is solved with Ito calculus (stochastic 
differential equation calculus) and has the solution:9 
                                               
8
 It has been used in physics to describe the motion of a particle that is subject to a large 
number of small molecular shocks and is sometimes referred to as a Brownian motion.  
9
 tdW  in a small time increment can be modeled as tW tε∂ = ∂  where   is a standard 
normally distributed stochastic variable. Equation (2.1) then has the solution 
2
( )
2
0
t t
tS S e
σ
α σε− +
= . 
Literature review                                                                                                          13 
_____________________________________________________________________
  
 
2
( )
2
0
tt W
tS S e
σ
α σ− +
=                                                                                                        (2.2) 
 
The first term in Equation (2.1) is deterministic, while the last is stochastic. Empirical 
data show that the volatility of the spot price varies over time, and therefore a time 
dependent volatility may be needed.  
 
One characteristic of electricity prices is mean reversion, meaning that they appear 
to move around some equilibrium level. A drift term must be included to model this. 
The term is negative if the spot price is higher than the mean reversion level µ and 
positive if the opposite is the case. The new model is then:10 
 
( )t t t t tdS S dt S dWβ µ σ= − +                                                                                      (2.3) 
 
The magnitude of mean reversion β  determines how fast the price will revert to its 
mean level. The level of mean reversion will depend on the time to reflect that 
electricity prices tend to revert to different levels over the year (e.g. seasonal 
fluctuation). The electricity price also varies over the course of the day with high 
prices during peak load and low prices off-peak. 
 
Other characteristics of electricity prices are jumps, which occur infrequently but 
may be large. The jumps come from substantial load fluctuations. Whenever demand 
is low the spot price is insensitive to changes in demand. However, when the demand 
is high, small changes in demand can have substantial impacts on the spot price, 
because demand is on the vertical part of the supply curve. The discontinuities in the 
supply curve translate into spikes in the spot price. To account for discontinuity in the 
price, common practice is to add a jump component to a process driven only by a 
Brownian motion. A possible model is: 
 
( )t t t t t t tdS S dt S dW S dqβ µ σ ϕ= − + +                                                                        (2.4)         
 
where the last term represents the price jumps. The stochastic variable qt accounts for 
the frequency of occurrence of jumps and ϕ  is a stochastic variable describing the 
magnitude of each jump. The jump feature could be modeled with a Poisson process, 
and the stochastic variable ϕ  could be time-dependent. Refer to Gibson and Schwartz 
(1990), Eydeland and Geman (2000), and Clewlow and Strickland (2000) for a further 
introduction to the field. 
2.2 Electricity market design 
Wilson (2002) identifies issues that complicate electricity market design. First, 
electricity is costly to store. Second, the transmission of electricity is carried out from 
generators to demand in meshed networks that can be affected by transmission 
constraints. Third, transmission property rights are difficult to define because of loop 
                                               
 
10
 The most commonly used mean-reverting stochastic differential equation is the Ornstein- 
Uhlenbeck process. 
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flows. Fourth, the supply of generation through the transmission network must meet 
demand in real time, and reserves must be present to meet random demand shocks. 
 
The objective of restructured markets has been to achieve overall short and long-
run efficiency through competition. Competition is generally considered to work 
potentially in electricity generation and retail supply, because of cost-efficiencies. 
Competition is important because it gives the right incentives and prices. However, 
the transmission and distribution systems are natural monopolies that have increasing 
costs if two or more companies operated in parallel with the current one.  A company 
is then able to produce with decreasing unit costs as the output increases. The 
transmission and distribution systems have externalities due to loop flows determined 
by Kirchoff’s laws and other network effects. A competitive wholesale market is 
usually obtained by combining vertical separation of generation, transmission, 
coordination, and retail supply with an adequate regulatory framework and 
institutional design. 
2.2.1 The electricity markets 
There are four markets that characterize a complete electricity market: the forward 
transmission market, the spot energy market, the forward energy market (or market of 
bilateral contracts), and the forward reserves market (Wilson, 2002). According to 
Wilson’s classification the spot market includes a real-time balancing market while 
the day-ahead market corresponds to the Nordic spot market definition. The complex 
interactions in these markets complicate a design of optimal incentives for the use of 
the transmission system and generation capacity in the short-run and transmission 
expansion and generation expansion in the long-run.  
 
Congestion management requires coordination and this can be accomplished 
through the continuous spot market. In restructured electricity markets this function is 
taken care of by the system operator who manages the complex short-term 
interactions in the network and maintains system reliability. The system operator 
needs to be independent of existing electric utilities and other market players to avoid 
issues such as market power and strategic bids. Hogan (1999a) and Borenstein (2002) 
argue that the system operator must be allowed to offer economic dispatch (or pool 
service) based on marginal cost pricing. This is a centralized way of organizing the 
electricity market and assigns broad authority to the system operator. Market players 
may participate in the pool service, which effectively minimizes generation costs 
through a merit-order ranking of bids from generators. The pool service determines 
the market clearing price as the last dispatched generator. An alternative 
discriminatory auction mechanism is a pay-as-bid auction. However, it might lead to 
less competition and higher prices than the uniform-price auction (see Wolfram, 
1999). 
 
The task of the system operator is to manage real-time and day-ahead operations 
including longer-term horizons. By having available pre-arranged generation reserves, 
system stability can be achieved. The system operator obtains balance using the 
submitted offers and time differentiated categories of reserves. 
 
The definition of a spot market is a market for immediate or very near delivery. 
According to most of the international literature this is an approximate real-time 
market. The spot market in the Nordic region is actually a day-ahead market, but still 
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called a spot market. A pure spot market would not be possible in the electricity 
market, because the system operator needs to plan a feasible schedule. Likewise, not 
all power plants can change their output within minutes, and therefore the generation 
side needs notice in advance. 
 
The Nordic market includes an electricity exchange or market operator, Nord Pool, 
which is responsible for receiving bids for purchase and offers for sales and match the 
bids so that the market is cleared. Market player participation is voluntary. One 
important activity of the exchange is the operation of the spot market which is the 
common market for the synchronous Nordic power system. Nord Pool is also 
responsible for the financial contract market. 
 
In the pool-based markets a British contract for differences is a bilateral contact for 
hedging fully or partly against a single volatile spot price, and provides a hedge where 
parties mutually insure each other covering the difference between the contract price 
and the spot price (assuming a single spot price11). Bilateral contracts are of a physical 
or financial type. In mature electricity markets up to 80% of the transactions are long-
term, 20% are day-ahead and less than 10% are spot (Wilson, 2002). In the Nord Pool 
market, the ratio between day-ahead12 trades and long-term contracts was 
approximately 0.10 in 2002. Similarly the ratio between annual consumption and 
long-term contracts was approximately 0.03. 
 
Another way of organizing the electricity market is to decentralize it (Wilson, 
2002). In this case, the system operator manages transmission through transmission 
access and auctions of tradable transmission rights and counterflows to relieve 
transmission congestion. The system operator ensures that all schedules are 
simultaneously feasible and each market player self-schedules under discretion to 
meet contractual obligations. A decentralized system operator would manage 
transmission and reserves with little intrusion into energy markets. The system 
operator should permit a sequential optimization of the four electricity markets with 
voluntary participation of market players. The decentralized market has separate 
markets for energy, transmission rights and counterflows, and reserves and therefore 
sacrifices tight coordination (Wilson, 2002).  
2.2.2 The design of the system operator 
The system operator is a natural monopoly, but is also characterized by 
organizational and institutional issues such as governance, incentives, regulation, and 
economic objectives (Rosellon, 2003). The forward transmission market, the spot 
energy market, the forward energy market, and the forward reserves market present 
challenges to the system operator in achieving optimal incentives for expansion of 
transmission and electricity supply and reserves including an optimal use of 
generation in the spot electricity and forward markets. 
 
There are three possible system operator structures according to Wilson (2002) to 
reach equilibrium for the four electricity markets. The first structure is a decentralized 
independent system operator (ISO), separated from the transmission owner. The 
decentralized ISO seeks to the least possible extent intervention in the four markets. 
                                               
11
 To hedge against locational price differences an FTR may be used. 
12
 In 2002, 32% of consumption was traded in the day-ahead market. 
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The second is a centralized ISO that manages and coordinates the four markets. The 
third is an integrated company (Transco13) that owns the transmission system and 
operates it. A combination of any of the three structures is also possible.  
 
A decentralized ISO performs sequential optimization in the four markets with 
voluntary participating market players. Wilson (2002) argues that decentralization is 
better when incentives for cost minimization and efficient scheduling of each player’s 
pool are more important than coordination in electricity markets. On the contrary, 
Hogan (1995) argues that any decentralized market can be centralized through 
adequate definition of access and pricing. 
 
The centralized ISO performs a simultaneous minimization of the reliability, 
generation, transmission, and reserves costs in the four markets. It is also in control of 
the real-time dispatch and reserve options are mandatory. The ISO can call upon the 
generators to schedule up or down generation to reduce power flows. 
 
The Transco structure is similar to a centralized ISO but with the central dispatcher 
also being the owner of the transmission system. 
 
Variants of the decentralized ISO model are found in Australia, Scandinavia, 
California 1998-2000, Texas, and the United Kingdom’s new system of 2001. The 
centralized ISO model has been applied in the United Kingdom 1989-2001 and is in 
use in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland (PJM). 
As a part of the standard market design (SMD) in 2002, The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC, 2002) required transmission companies to join a 
regional transmission organization (RTO) in order to obtain a vertical separation of 
generation and transmission. The Transco structure is applied in the United Kingdom 
and Spain. 
 
In the Nordic region, the system operator role is assigned to the transmission 
system operators (TSOs). They are responsible for keeping their control area 
electrically stable (frequency of 50 Hz) and for security of supply within their region. 
The TSOs are both owners and system operators of their respective grids.14 The 
Nordic market design includes Nord Pool and the TSOs. The exchange and system 
operator roles are related in that inter-regional congestion in the day-ahead market is 
handled by the exchange, while intra-regional real-time congestion15 is handled by the 
TSOs. Hence the Nordic market design integrates both the TSOs and the exchange in 
system operation.  
2.3 Transmission pricing 
The electricity transmission network has an important function in facilitating trade 
of electricity between geographically dispersed markets. Because many generators are 
interconnected via the transmission network, together they can provide improved 
reliability and lower overall generation costs (Hsu, 1997). The complexity of 
analyzing electricity networks stems from Kirchoff’s laws which govern the power 
                                               
13
 An independent company that combines ownership of the grid and responsibility for system 
operations in managing the use of the grid. It may be a for-profit or not-for-profit entity. 
14
 In Norway 80% of the grid is owned by the main system operator Statnett. 
15
 Nord Pool also facilitates a real-time market for Sweden and Finland. 
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flows. The network topology and characteristics together with the joint interaction of 
transmission congestion, losses, and energy prices from injections and withdrawals of 
electricity contribute to the formation of electricity prices at different locations. The 
correct pricing of electricity transmission is crucial in providing signals to the market 
players for efficient short-run use and long-run capital investments. In the short-run, 
demand functions are given and the objective is to optimize the use of generation, 
distribution, and transmission capacity. In the long-run, the objective is to create 
incentives for the siting of generation and transmission expansion. 
 
In electricity transmission systems there are mainly three short-term cost 
components that must be considered; the congestion cost, the cost of losses, and the 
cost of ancillary services such as reactive power (Bjørndal, 2000). Congestion cost is 
the cost resulting from scarcity of transmission capacity. Transmission congestion 
affects the economics of the network in that cheaper generation is replaced by more 
expensive generation in order to reduce power flows. In the deficit and surplus areas, 
the optimal price of electricity is equal to the local marginal cost of generation, or to 
the local willingness to pay. The price of transmission usage between any two 
locations is defined as the difference in locational prices between those two locations. 
Marginal losses may give considerable price differences for some of the locations and 
small deviations from the uncongested case can make even larger effects. These 
differences could have a significant effect in the siting of generators and loads. 
Generators provide ancillary services16 such as regulation17 and frequency control, 
spinning reserves, supplemental reserves, backup reserves, voltage control, and black 
start. It appears that, in many regions, the first four of these services can eventually be 
provided by many suppliers or customers through competitive markets. The latter two 
services, by contrast, have locational characteristics that limit potential competition; 
so it is likely that they will continue to be provided through non-competitive 
institutional mandates. 
2.3.1 Transmission pricing methods 
There are different methods for pricing transmission: locational (nodal) pricing, 
zonal pricing, uniform pricing, and Chao-Peck pricing. Locational pricing (Hogan, 
1992) maximizes social welfare taking into account transmission constraints and 
losses, and is performed by a centralized ISO. In this case, the price of electricity at 
each location equals the marginal cost of providing electricity at that location. An 
alternative solution is zonal18  pricing where several buses are grouped into zones, and 
the price differentials between the zones are calculated from more or less simplified 
models. In this case social welfare is reduced and there is lack of price signals for the 
siting of generators and loads. Hogan (1999b) argues that locational prices are based 
on the principles of economic dispatch and “are self policing and self auditing,” while 
zonal pricing implies deviations from optimal and reliable dispatch. Green (1998) 
shows that by applying uniform pricing, inferring that location means nothing, welfare 
is reduced even if transmission constraints are managed through efficient redispatch. 
This also gives incorrect incentives in the long-run. An alternative to these approaches 
                                               
16
 The Norwegian hydro-based power system includes the following ancillary services: 
primary reserves (frequency control), secondary reserves (manually controlled), reactive 
power, frequency activated load shedding and generation shedding. 
17
  Regulation may be provided by load as reduced demand. 
18
 In the US, zonal pricing is a term that is commonly used. In the Nordic system area pricing 
is used for essentially the same concept. 
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is to use Chao-Peck pricing (Chao and Peck, 1996) which entails explicit congestion 
pricing. The use of scarce transmission resources is priced, in contrast to locational 
pricing which prices the use of energy (Stoft, 1998).  
 
In a locational pricing system, the congestion fee for transferring electricity 
between two locations is calculated as the difference in locational prices times the 
quantity transferred. In a zonal pricing system, the fee is calculated as the difference 
between the zonal prices times the quantity transferred (within Norway it is defined as 
the difference between the area price and the System price). The ISO (in a locational 
pricing system) or the TSO (in an area pricing system)19 receives a surplus during 
transmission congestion periods and when losses are present, because net payments 
from loads exceed net payments to generators. 
 
In the long-run, the most important objective of transmission pricing is to provide 
the right incentives for the siting of new generation and loads. Additionally 
transmission network owners should expand the network optimally given the right 
incentives and compensation. Assuming constant or decreasing returns to scale in the 
transmission system, the long-run efficiency could consist of a sequence of optimal 
short-run pricing decisions as pointed out by Hogan (1992). However, the 
transmission system has typically a nonlinear or lumpy cost function. Therefore, the 
long-run efficiency may not be attainable in a decentralized market-based system, but 
obtained through different regulatory mechanisms with central investment decisions 
(Bjørndal, 2000).  
2.3.2 Economic dispatch and optimal prices 
An efficient pricing scheme in the scheduled electricity market has been the 
economic dispatch, which can be formalized as: 
  
Max producer and consumer surplus                                                                         
s.t.  power flow equations                              (2.5) 
       transmission capacity constraints 
  reliability and security constraints 
       active and reactive power generation limits 
   
The objective function consists of the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses 
which in turn equals social welfare. The power flow equations describe how 
electricity distributes from net injections in the network. To prevent over-load of a 
transmission line, transmission capacity constraints are added. There are two types: 
thermal constraints and voltage constraints. The thermal constraints deal with power 
flows that heat up the transmission line. Voltage constraints deal with reactive power 
flows. The reliability and security constraints may include restrictions on voltage or 
generator and transmission line outages (also called contingency constraints). Power 
balance must be maintained to guarantee continuous supply, even after a disturbance 
in the system such as the failure of a generator or the outage of a transmission line. 
The contingency constraints concern the ability to prevent cascading outages as a 
result of disturbances in the power system.  
                                               
19
 Note that this depends on how the TSO is regulated. For example in Norway the TSO has a 
revenue cap on its revenue. 
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A solution of this nonlinear program results in a set of first order conditions that 
yields the generated and consumed electricity at each bus. The Lagrange multipliers 
associated with the power flow equations are the locational or nodal prices. They 
reflect the marginal generation cost and marginal benefit to load at each bus. They 
also give the marginal valuation of the production costs (such as fuel costs, operation 
costs, and water values) and the marginal value of losses and congestion in the 
network by marginal generation/load at each bus. Ideally, locational prices should be 
calculated both for active and reactive power (Hogan, 1992). However, there are no 
markets for reactive power so it is provided as an ancillary service. 
 
The power flow equations are generally highly nonlinear and the maximization 
problem is non-convex. Under normal operation of a power system, it is possible to 
consider only active (real) power and assume no losses. Likewise, voltage magnitudes 
are kept close to rated levels and phase angles are small such that it is possible to 
approximate the real power flow equations by convex functions. If the objective is 
well-behaving the above problem is convex (at least locally) which is a necessary 
condition for the existence of an efficient market mechanism to replicate social 
optimum as discussed by Chao and Peck (1996). The locational pricing generalization 
is mathematically complex to do in practice but it is implemented in the northeastern 
US power markets. 
 
The power flow in a meshed grid distributes in such a way that every change in 
generation, load or transmission capacity affects the flow in the entire network. This 
phenomenon is known as loop flows. It may mean that power flows from a high price 
bus to a low price bus as illustrated in Figure 2-1. Loop flows imply that certain 
transmission investments might have negative externalities20 on the capacity of other 
(perhaps distant) transmission links (see Bushnell and Stoft, 1997). Moreover, the 
addition of new transmission capacity can sometimes paradoxically decrease the total 
capacity of the network (Hogan, 2002a).  
 
One active transmission capacity constraint may affect the locational prices at all 
other buses. Likewise, a change in generation or load will affect the marginal losses in 
the entire network. The electricity price therefore changes from location to location 
because of losses and transmission constraints.  
 
The analysis of locational pricing makes several simplifications (Hsu, 1997). 
Generation is assumed to be dispatched optimally such that the price equals marginal 
cost which in turn exceeds the average cost. Then the operating revenues will be 
greater than the total costs. The economic dispatch should be distinguished from unit 
commitment which looks forward to expected demand. The unit commitment problem 
considers plant characteristics such as startup costs, ramp rates, and minimum 
downtime in addition to the variable generation costs. Conversely, the economic 
dispatch only considers the next time interval (for example an hour) with available 
generation. The multi-period coupling in unit commitment greatly complicates the 
scheduling problem. Additionally, demand and generation cost functions are assumed 
                                               
20
 Network externalities, which can be good or bad, describe the benefit or cost imposed on 
other market players when one market player changes supply or demand or the transmission 
capacity of a line. 
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to be constant in the short-run. However, demand functions may be uncertain even in 
the short-run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Locational price example with loop flow (Singh, 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Nordic transmission pricing 
The Nordic region has area pricing where buses are grouped into areas that are 
bounded by potential transmission constraints. Each area has a spot price and the 
unconstrained spot price for the Nordic power market is named the System Price. 
Norway utilizes marginal loss charges for 168 buses. 
 
Bottlenecks may have temporary or structural causes. Temporary bottlenecks occur 
relatively rarely and may be the result of maintenance work, technical faults or 
particular market conditions. Structural bottlenecks are a result of the level of 
expansion of the grid and the localization of generation and consumption within the 
grid. Structural bottlenecks tend to occur over longer periods of time or at regular 
intervals. It is important to differentiate between temporary and structural bottlenecks 
when selecting methods of managing congestion even though it is often difficult to 
distinguish between the two types of bottlenecks. 
 
In the literature, market splitting is also used for the term area pricing. Market 
splitting entails the partition of nodes into different pre-defined price areas on either 
side of the transmission constraint. Market splitting is characterized as an implicit 
auction where transmission capacity is allocated simultaneously with electricity trade 
at Nord Pool. It is a simple, inexpensive, and efficient method for managing structural 
bottlenecks. Market splitting is also utilized on the cable interconnections of 
Skagerak, KontiSkan and Øresund managed by Nord Pool.  
 
1 2
3
Unit A Unit B
450 MW
$20/MWh $30/MWh
180 + 60 = 240 MW
All lines have equal impedance
Optimal Dispatch:
Unit A = 270 MW
Unit B = 180 MW
Prices:
Node 1: $20/MWh
Node 2: $30/MWh
Node 3: $40/MWhminimize 20 q1 + 30 q2
subject to
q1 + q2 = 450,
(2/3) q1 + (1/3) q2 ≤ 240,
q1 ≤ 400,  q2 ≤ 400.
270 MW 180 MW
(2/3) x 180 = 120 MW
(1/3) x 180 = 60 MW
(1/3) x 270 = 90 MW
(2/3)
 x
 270 
=
 180
 MW
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On the contrary, in continental Europe the allocation of energy and transmission 
capacity occur in two steps. The right to utilize transmission capacity on a link in a 
certain direction and period is auctioned to market players in explicit auctions while 
the energy is traded in the spot markets. Auctions between Jutland and Germany are 
conducted by Eltra and E.ON Netz (transmission system operators in western 
Denmark and Germany respectively) annually, monthly, and daily. Capacity 
purchased in the annual and monthly auctions may be resold before contract delivery. 
Unused capacity is subject to the “use-it-or-lose-it” principle and released in daily 
auctions. It may happen that the electricity flows in the direction opposite what was 
anticipated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Players involved in congestion management (Grande and Wangensteen,  
2000). 
 
The various players involved in congestion management are illustrated in Figure 
2-2 (Grande and Wangensteen, 2000). In the Nordic model the electricity exchange, 
the TSOs and market players work together. For efficient operation and a well-
functioning market these must have clearly defined responsibilities. The network 
owner’s principal responsibility is to build, operate, and maintain the network. The 
system operator21 manages non-predictable imbalances and unexpected events during 
real-time that cannot be relieved by trade in the market. The system operator is 
responsible for definitions of transmission capacities and optimization of physical 
operation. Intra-area congestion is managed through counter trades by the system 
operator. The system operator function is assigned to the network owner. In the 
Nordic system the market operator (Nord Pool) is responsible for managing inter-area 
congestion through area pricing in the day-ahead market. The market players are 
entities that operate in the wholesale and/or retail market. The market players bid into 
predefined spot areas which become price areas when transmission congestion is 
present. In a counter trade arrangement they may be called upon by the system 
operator to provide electricity or curtail load. The regulator determines guidelines and 
bylaws for the regulation of monopolies within the power business. Generally, this 
will cover grid issues such as cost recovery through network tariffs and the settlement 
of disputes concerning network tariffs (Nord Pool, 2002b). 
 
The Nordic market consists of 5 control areas: Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark-East, and Denmark-West. Area pricing is used for congestion management 
                                               
21
 In Norway Statnett is both transmission system operator (TSO) and network owner (approx. 
80 % of the main grid). 
F 
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Area A Area B
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within Norway and among the control areas. Norway is divided into several areas 
while Sweden, Finland, Denmark-East, and Denmark-West are separate areas. 
Counter trades are used for transmission constraints within each area and to ensure 
real-time balance between supply and demand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Area price calculation (Grande and Wangensteen, 2000). 
 
In area pricing the market is first cleared ignoring all transmission constraints. This 
calculation results in the System Price pS and the amount of power traded as 
illustrated in Figure 2-3. If the amount of power exchanged F is greater than the 
transmission capacity, the buses in the network are partitioned into areas on either 
side of the bottleneck. In the case of two defined areas, the surplus area is the low 
price area while the deficit area is the high price area. The exchange of power 
between the areas is fixed to meet the maximum transmission capacity. Two new area 
spot prices are determined based on the initial bids in the spot market in each area and 
maximum transmission capacity. Congestion between two areas leads to a higher 
price in the deficit area, reducing net demand, and a lower price in the surplus area, 
increasing net demand. The surplus22 to the network owners equals the difference in 
area prices times the amount of power exchanged between the areas and is named the 
congestion fee.23 Various area allocations have different impacts on the electricity 
market players’ revenues and costs and may result in conflicts of interest.  
 
For counter trades the first stage is the same as for area pricing. If the amount of 
exchanged power is greater than the maximum transmission capacity, the system 
operators check where generation or load can be curtailed or increased to relieve 
congestion. The generators that are scheduled up (or loads that are reduced) or down 
(or loads that are increased) are compensated in a separate market, the regulation 
power market, where generators and loads submit adjustment bids. The system 
operator selects the less expensive bids for increases and decreases and pays the 
participants the equilibrium price in the regulation power market. Counter trade 
                                               
22
 Network owners have a regulatory cap on revenue in Norway such that the surplus will not 
represent a real profit. 
23
 In Norway the price difference between the area price and System Price is called 
“Kapasitetsavgift” (capacity fee). 
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involves an expense for the system operator because it has to buy and resell power 
according to the adjustment bids. It therefore has no incentives for creating 
transmission congestion. During counter trade, there will be only one spot price in the 
market. However, regulating objects used for rescheduling will receive a different 
price. 
 
While market splitting is a part of the spot market settlement, the counter trade 
arrangement is applied in the operational phase. The different timing of the congestion 
management procedures with these two arrangements is shown in Figure 2-4. The 
area prices are calculated based on aggregated supply and demand bids in each area. 
Prices are therefore settled without physical references to trades within each area. The 
spot market settlement is done 12 hours before the first hour of operation (12 am). In 
the preoperational phase the exact production plans and the bids on the regulating 
power market are given to the system operator. This information is the basis for the 
counter trade. The counter trade is carried out in the hour of operation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Congestion management in the time scale (Grande and Wangensteen,  
2000). 
2.3.4 Chao-Peck prices 
Unlike locational pricing which prices energy, Chao-Peck prices price the use of 
scarce transmission resources. The Chao-Peck prices are based on the definition of 
transmission capacity rights, which entitle the owner the right to inject one unit of 
electricity through a specific line in a specific direction (Bjørndal, 2000). The issued 
set of transmission capacity rights is consistent with power system constraints and is 
tradable. A trading rule is established to control the exchange of rights by specifying 
the rights that traders must acquire so as to accomplish an electricity transaction. 
Power flows are distributed according to the power transfer distribution factors 
(PTDFs). The PTDF mnijH  is the fraction of a transaction from bus m to bus n that 
flows over a transmission line connecting bus i and bus j. If the price of transmission 
capacity on line ij is ijη (assuming a lossless network), then the transmission cost of a 
trade of unit of electricity between buses m and n is calculated as mnij ij
i j
Hη∑∑ , where 
the summation is over all buses. 
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The Chao-Peck prices ( ijCP ) associated with a congested transmission line 
between buses i and j can be calculated from the locational prices as 
( ) /ij j i ijCP P P F= −  where P  is the locational price at the respective buses and ijF  is 
the flow factor (similar to the PTDF). The flow factor is the ratio of power that would 
flow over the line ij if 1 MW was injected at bus i and withdrawn at bus j. Likewise, 
the Chao-Peck prices can be calculated from shadow prices associated with the 
transmission capacity constraints in the economic dispatch as well as the shadow 
prices associated with the power flow equations. The Chao-Peck prices are therefore 
consistent with the locational prices. 
 
There are three properties of Chao-Peck prices that are different from locational 
prices: 
• Uncongested transmission lines receive a price of zero.  
• Congested lines always have a positive price in the flow direction. 
• The number of positive prices equals the number of congested lines. This number 
is usually far less than the number of buses in the power system.  
 
Chao-Peck pricing is based on a decentralized market design without a central 
agency that collects information to solve the economic dispatch. Chao and Peck 
(1996) suggest that congestion prices could result from agents that are maximizing 
congestion rents simultaneously as generators are allowed to break even. However, a 
trade between two locations may affect all lines in the network and therefore the 
agents may have to purchase several rights. As transmission line owners may have 
substantial market power, Stoft (1998) offers some solutions to these problems. First, 
there could be restrictions on the ownership of a line. Second, the line owners could 
be required to sell the entire capacity of lines and therefore supposedly drive the price 
of unused rights to zero. Finally, Stoft suggests introducing a centralized initial 
auction and a successive bid-ask market for the continuous trading of transmission 
capacity rights until real-time to determine prices. 
2.3.5 Transmission pricing and market power 
There are a number of reasons why locational prices do not reflect marginal costs, 
such as market power, regulatory interventions, the absence of a complete 
representation of consumer demand in the wholesale market, and discretionary 
behavior by system operators under extreme conditions when the network is 
constrained (Joskow and Tirole, 2003). Here we can discuss the issue of market 
power. The definition of market power usually entails that a generator in a monopoly 
position is withdrawing output in order to drive the price up. 
 
To illustrate the market power concept an example is used from Wangensteen 
(2003), Figure 2-5, where there is a generator located in a load pocket with limited 
demand connected through a transmission line of capacity K to a large market with 
price Ps which is unaffected by the generation in the load pocket. We assume 
locational pricing and observe that in an import-constrained situation the generator 
can withdraw output and receive a higher price than when the transmission constraint 
does not bind. A hydropower producer in a two-period setting that wants to exercise 
market power could produce more than the competitive case in the first period so as to 
induce the import transmission constraint in the second period. Then it will produce 
less than the competitive case and receive a higher price (see Figure 2-5). Its total 
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profit for the two periods will then be higher than the competitive case and market 
power is exercised. 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Impact of a transmission constraint on local demand. 
 
Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft (1998) demonstrate that it can be profitable for 
generators to withdraw output so as to constrain a transmission line that would have 
been unconstrained under perfect competition. Oren (1997) presents an example of a 
three-node network where two strategic generators are located on each side of a 
transmission constraint. The problem is solved by using a Cournot game by Stoft 
(1998) and its corresponding interpretation is given by Joskow and Tirole (2000). 
They find that produced quantities from generators at two different buses can be 
turned into “local complements” and create incentives to withdraw output at one bus 
in order to constrain the output of the other generator resulting in higher prices. Hogan 
(1997) demonstrates that strategic generators owning generation at buses A and B in a 
three-node network might increase output at bus A relative to the competitive 
benchmark if loop flows reduce the total net demand at bus 2 and increase the price. 
Neuhoff (2003) considers the effect of market power in separated and integrated 
markets for transmission capacity and spot electricity in three cases: the unconstrained 
case, the partially constrained case, and the fully constrained case. Neuhoff concludes 
that market power is mitigated, if the transmission and electricity markets are 
integrated in a locational pricing system or a market-splitting system. Neuhoff’s 
empirical findings support Hogan (1997) in that separate electricity and transmission 
markets are inefficient under uncertainty. Harvey and Hogan (2000) compare market 
power under nodal and zonal pricing and find that market power is always weakly 
lower under locational pricing than zonal pricing (two buses grouped into a single 
zone).  
 
According to Harvey and Hogan (2000) there are at least four reasons why 
locational pricing is often superior to zonal pricing in competitive terms when the 
potential for the exercise of locational market power exists. First, zonal pricing can 
create market power in the hypothetical zonal dispatch that does not exist in neither 
locational nor inter-zonal pricing. Second, market power can arise in zonal redispatch 
that does not exist in the actual power market under either nodal or inter-zonal 
pricing. Third, by reducing demand response in the constrained region, zonal pricing 
can make the exercise of market power profitable that would be unprofitable in both 
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locational and inter-zonal pricing. Finally, zonal pricing including the redispatch 
mechanism can reduce supply elasticity across unconstrained interfaces making 
profitable the exercise of market power that would be unprofitable under locational 
pricing. 
 
Johnsen (2001) analyzes market power due to transmission constraints in the 
Norwegian electricity market. He uses a two-period model to demonstrate that market 
power leads to less storage in the first period than in the competitive case. A 
monopolist will find it profitable to produce more than the competitive output in the 
first period so as to induce import transmission constraints in the second period, 
raising the electricity price. Empirical results from the western part of Norway with a 
high concentration on the supply side support the model. Additionally, in a 
hydropower-based system transmission investments have two effects. First, increased 
export capacity in the first period leads to lower reservoir levels. Second, larger 
import capacity in the second period reduces the possibilities for the exercise of 
market power. 
2.3.6 Mathematical transmission pricing models 
Several models can be used to calculate transmission prices (Wangensteen, 2003; 
Hogan, 2002b) 
 
• DC-models: The transmission network is described as a DC network.24 These 
models can have both losses and congestion. 
• DC-equivalent models: The transmission network is described as an AC network 
with a DC-like approximation.25 The models ignore losses, but can have 
congestion. 
• AC approximation model: The transmission network is described as an AC 
network and the losses are approximated by a term proportional to the square of 
the power flows.  
• Full AC-model. The transmission network is correctly described as an AC 
network. 
 
The DC-models are relevant in case of modeling of transmission prices in a DC 
network. The DC-equivalent models are extensively used in transmission pricing of 
networks that ignore losses. The AC approximation model was first described by 
Transpower New Zealand (Hogan, 2002b). It includes one-half of losses for every line 
flowing in or out of the bus. The problem is then nonlinear, but captures some of the 
interaction between the losses and congestion. Likewise, additional power flows are 
needed to compensate for losses. The full AC model is used when the joint interaction 
of losses and transmission congestion is important. 
 
In the original Schweppe formulation (Schweppe et al., 1988) the locational prices 
are calculated taking into account losses by assuming that losses are balanced at the 
                                               
24
 A DC network has only resistance, while an AC network has both resistance and reactance. 
25
 It is assumed that there is sufficient reactive power net load at each bus to fix per unit 
voltages equal to 1 and that the voltage angle differences across lines are small. The DC-load 
equivalent flow refers to the real power part of the nonlinear AC load flow model. There is a 
weak link between the reactive power and real power halves of the complete problem. 
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swing (reference) bus.26 The model takes the DC load flows without losses and then 
computes the total losses and prices them in effect at the swing bus. However, losses 
do not create any line flows. The locational prices depend on the swing bus price,27 
losses, and congestion. 
 
In the optimal power flow (OPF) and the economic dispatch models, the choice of 
the swing bus is independent of the locational prices and the dispatch.28 We use the 
full AC model and the DC-equivalent model in this thesis.  
 
In OPF calculations it is convenient to separate the variables in three categories 
controls, states, and constraints (Weber, 1997). The control variables represent 
quantities that can be arbitrarily manipulated, within their limits to minimize costs. 
These may include active and reactive generator outputs, transformer tap ratios, and 
transformer phase shift angles. The states correspond to quantities that are set as a 
result of the controls, but must be monitored. Examples are system voltages and 
angles that are of interest at the solution. The constraint variables are the Lagrange 
multipliers of the constraints in the OPF. These give marginal values of changes 
associated with the constraints. 
2.3.6.1 An alternative optimal power flow model 
An alternative OPF model can be formulated as (Wangensteen, 2003): 
 
Max ( ) ( )
s.t.
( , ) 0
( ) 0
B C−
=
≤
L G
L G
P P
g x,P P
h x
                                                                                                  (2.6) 
 
where B is the load benefit and C is the generator costs. LP  and GP  represent active 
load and generation vectors at each bus and x  is a state vector representing voltage. 
( , )L Gg x,P P  denotes the power flow equations and ( )h x
 
denotes the transmission 
capacity constraints. Constraints on generation capacity are inactive and therefore 
omitted. The model is applied on a DC network and the current from bus i to bus j is 
described as 
( )i j
ij
ij
V V
I
R
−
=  where V is the voltage and R the resistance. Similarly, the 
net power injected at bus i is calculated as ( , , )k Li Gig x P P = Gi LiP P− =  
( )i i j
i ij
j j ij
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R
−
=∑ ∑  where the summation is over the buses connected to bus i. The 
transmission capacity constraints are expressed in terms of the voltages and the 
resistances as 
max
( )( ) 0j i jk ij
ij
V V V
h x C
R
−
= − ≤  where 
maxijC  is the maximum 
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 Personal communication with Professor William Hogan. 
27
 In the case that the swing bus has limited generation (i.e., a finite price elasticity), then the 
choice of the swing bus could affect the dispatch and the prices (Hogan, 2002b). 
28
 However, the choice of the reference bus for pricing, which need not be the same as the 
swing bus, does affect the decomposition of the prices (Hogan, 2002b).  
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transmission capacity over line ij. Constraints on voltage could also be included and 
would have impact on reactive power. Here we focus on active power.  
 
The associated Lagrangian is: 
 
( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )L B C= − − −T TL G L G L GP P λ µ P P λ g x,P P µ h x                                        (2.7) 
 
where λ  and µ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the power flow 
equations and transmission constraints respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
yield: 
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                                                                       (2.8) 
 
Utilizing that / 1i Gig P∂ ∂ =  and / 1i Lig P∂ ∂ = −  we find the optimal locational prices as 
( ) ( )
L GP P
B C∇ = ∇* *L Gλ = P P . The locational prices equal the marginal benefit to load29 
which in turn equals marginal cost at each bus. Likewise the locational prices will be 
affected by the transmission capacity multiplier µ  through the relationships in 
Equation (2.8). 
2.3.6.2 Optimal power flow model and locational prices 
In the “classical” optimal power flow model, the objective is to minimize generator 
costs30 of meeting load for a power system while maintaining system security. The 
objective in the OPF can be obtained from the Wangensteen model by assuming that 
load is constant, which results in a cost minimization. The costs of the system may 
depend on the situation, but generally, they are attributed to the generation costs. 
From the OPF viewpoint, the maintenance of the system requires keeping each device 
in the power system within its desired operation range in a steady-state situation. This 
will include active and reactive power limits, line flow limits, voltage limits, and 
contingency constraints. Topics such as transient stability, dynamic stability, and 
steady-state contingency analysis are not considered (Wood and Wollenberg, 1996). 
 
We use the formulation of Finney et al. (1997) where we assume no binding 
generation capacity constraints: 
 
, , ,
min ( )
s.t.
( , , , ) 0 ( ) (power balance)
( , , , ) 0 ( ) (line and voltage constraints)
V
C
V
V
θ
θ
θ
=
≤
G G
GP Q
G G
G G
P
F P Q λ
G P Q µ
                                        (2.9) 
                                               
29
 Marginal willingness to pay. 
30
 The objective function can take different forms such as minimum losses. 
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where C is the cost function, GP  and GQ  denote the vectors of real and reactive 
generation, and V  and θ  are bus voltage magnitudes and angles. Real and reactive 
loads are assumed to be inelastic. The equalities 0F =  represent the real and reactive 
power balance equations which must be satisfied. 0≤G  represent constraints on bus 
voltages and any other constraints such as thermal and stability limits on power flows. 
λ  and µ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the power balance equations 
and the line and voltage constraints respectively.  
 
A relationship between the locational prices λ  and the cost function C at the 
optimum (denoted by *) is found as: 
 
*
*
TT TC C C ∂ ∂ ∂
=  ∂ ∂ ∂ L L
λ = -
F P Q                                                                                   (2.10) 
 
where LP and LQ are real and reactive load vectors. Similarly µ  reveals the marginal 
change in costs with respect to the line and voltage constraints. 
 
By introducing a reference bus (denoted by subscript r) it is possible to decompose 
the locational price into a component for generation and losses and a component due 
to transmission congestion. The above problem then has the equivalent representation: 
 
, , ,
min ( )
s.t.
( , , , , , ) 0 ( )
( , , , , , ) 0 ( )
( , , , , , ) 0 ( )
V
r r r
r r
r r
C
V V
V V
V V
θ
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
=
=
≤
G G
GP Q
Gr Gr
G G
G G
P
f P Q λ
F P Q λ
G P Q µ
                                      (2.11) 
 
In this formulation the variables without subscripts ( , , , )V θG GP Q  do not include 
variables for the reference bus. The first set of equality constraints, 0=f , explicitly 
identifies the power injection equations associated with the reference bus. Under the 
satisfaction of certain regularity assumptions (Gribik et al., 1990) this problem is 
solvable. By using the dual formulation of the problem, Equation (2.11), the equality 
constraints can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( )
T T T
V r V V
T T T
r
V
θ θ θ θ
∇ + ∇ ∇ =
∇ + ∇ ∇ =
f λ F λ+ G µ
f λ F λ+ G µ                                                             (2.12) 
 
where now V  and θ  are the Lagrange multipliers of the equality constraints in the 
dual. Solving these equations for λ  gives: 
 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T T T
V V V V
rT T T T
θ θ θ θ
− −∇ ∇ ∇ ∇       
+       ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇       
F f F G
λ = λ µ
F f F G                                         (2.13) 
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If the reference bus can be said to have prices 
r
λ  for real and reactive power that 
depend only on real and reactive power generation and losses and not transmission 
congestion, then the generation and loss component and the congestion component of 
all other locational prices can be identified as: 
 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
and( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
C
T T T T
V V V V
r CT T T T
θ θ θ θ
− −
+
∇ ∇ ∇ ∇       
=       ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇       
GL
GL
λ = λ λ
F f F G
λ = λ λ µ
F f F G
                     (2.14) 
 
When no congestion is present, the price of electricity at a bus only depends on 
generation and losses. As pointed out by Finney et al. (1997) the choice of the 
reference bus must be such that it has no congestion component. A natural choice is 
the bus with the lowest generator costs and available generation capacity. 
 
An alternative to implement the above model is to use a software package such as 
MATPOWER where a full AC-model can be utilized. Nonlinear programming 
solution methods are used to calculate the locational prices. 
2.3.6.3 Hogan’s model and locational prices 
The economic dispatch problem as formulated by Hogan (2002b) is: 
 
, U
Max ( )
s.t.
B
∈
−
Y u
d g
                                                                                                         (2.15) 
= −Y d g
     
                                                      (2.16)                     
( , ) 0TL + =Y u τ Y                                      (2.17)     
( , ) 0≤K Y u                           (2.18) 
 
where d  and g  are the vectors of load and generation at the different locations. The 
variable Y  represents the vector of real power bus net loads, including the swing bus 
s and the vector of remaining net loads ( ( , ))T T
s
Y=
r r
Y Y Y . ( )B −d g  is the net benefit 
function,31 and τ  is a unity column vector, (1,1,....,1).T =τ  All other parameters are 
represented in the vector of control variables ( , , )T T= Qu Y t α  where QY  is  the reactive 
power, t  is the transformer tap ratio and α  the ideal transformer phase angle shift.32 
The objective Equation (2.15) includes the maximization of benefit to loads and the 
minimization of generation costs. Equation (2.16) denotes the net load as the 
difference between load and generation. Equation (2.17) is a loss balance constraint 
where ( , )L Y u  denotes the losses in the network. In Equation (2.18) ( , )K Y u  is a 
vector of power flows in the lines, which are subject to transmission capacity limits. 
The corresponding multipliers or shadow prices for the constraints are ( , , )
ref tranP λ λ  
for net loads, reference bus energy (or loss balance), and transmission constraints, 
                                               
31
 Function B is typically a measure of welfare, such as the difference between consumer 
surplus and generation costs (Hogan, 2002b). 
32
 Control variables could be generator voltage, phase shift transformer tap position, switched 
capacitor settings, reactive injection for static VaR compensator, load shedding, DC line flow 
and load tap changer transformer tap position (Wood and Wollenberg, 1996). 
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respectively. When security constraints are taken into account (n-1 criterion) this is a 
large-scale problem, and it prices anticipated contingencies through the security-
constrained economic dispatch. The basic idea in the n-1 security-constrained dispatch 
is to identify a potential set of contingencies typically representing a loss of a single33 
line or generator so that the dispatch still would be within security limits after the 
outage.  
 
Hogan’s model assumes three simplifications (Hogan, 2002b). First, it is assumed 
that all transmission constraints are defined through the net loads at the buses. In 
practice, transmission constraints may have a different effect on load and generation.34 
The second simplification consists of focusing on the real power part of the problem. 
This is convenient in the case that there are no direct costs of producing reactive 
power and the dispatch of this is given to the system operator. Finally, generation 
operating reserves are ignored.  
 
The locational prices are the marginal generation cost or the marginal benefit of 
load which in turn equals the reference price of energy plus the marginal cost of losses 
and congestion. With the optimal solution * * * *( , , , )d g Y u  and the associated shadow 
prices, we have the vector of locational prices P  as: 
 
* * * * * *( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )T T T
ref ref tranC B Lλ λ= ∇ = ∇ = + ∇ + ∇Y YP g d τ Y u λ K Y u                      (2.19) 
 
If losses are ignored, it is only the energy price at the reference bus and marginal cost 
of congestion that contribute. In the PJM market design the locational prices are 
defined ignoring the system losses (DC load flow), while in New York the locational 
prices are calculated based on an AC network with marginal losses. 
 
In the presence of transmission congestion, the system operator receives a rent 
because net payments from loads exceed net payments to the generators. Similarly, as 
long as pricing is based on marginal losses the grid company will have a 
merchandizing surplus on this activity.35 The system operator receives a 
merchandizing surplus MS that includes payments for transmission congestion and 
losses. It is calculated as: 
 
* * *
1 1 1
N N N
i i i i i i
i i i
MS Pd Pg P y
= = =
= − =∑ ∑ ∑                                                                                             (2.20) 
 
where the summation is over the number of buses N in the transmission network.  
 
2.3.6.4 DC-equivalent model and AC approximation model 
The DC-load model assumes no real power losses and reactive power loads. The 
basic assumptions are that the voltage magnitudes are equal to 1.0 since there is 
                                               
33
 Loss of multiple lines or generators simultaneously would be defined as a single outage.  
34
 This can be modeled by introducing different buses for generators and loads connected by 
a zero impedance line. Different prices for generation and load would also be obtained. 
35
 It is assumed that the grid company absorbs all costs, including losses and buys electricity 
in the market to compensate for losses hour by hour. 
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sufficient reactive power and the voltage angle differences across the lines are small. 
Similarly, the transformer phase angle settings are at zero angle ( 0)=α  and the 
transformer tap ratios are fixed ( 0)=t .  
 
We use Hogan’s (2002b) formulation. 
Define: 
nB: the number of buses, 
nL: the number of transmission lines,  
Ω: the diagonal matrix of line transfer factors, 2 2/( )k k k kx r xΩ = +  where r is 
resistance and x reactance for line k, 
R: the diagonal matrix of line resistances, 
A:  the oriented line-node incidence matrix with elements of 0, 1, -1   
            corresponding to the network interconnections, For example if line k originates  
at bus i and terminates at bus j, then aki = 1 = -akj, 
A : the matrix of absolute values of the network incidence matrix, 
C: nL vector of transmission line capacities, 
τ : nB unity column vector, 
d : nB vector of loads, 
g : nB vector of generation, 
r
Y : nB-1 vector of net active power bus loads, ( , )T TsY=
r
Y Y where Ys is the net 
load at the swing bus, = −Y d g , 
δ  :  nB vector of voltage angles relative to the swing bus, where the swing bus, s,
 has an angle that equals zero (δs=0), 
z : nL vector of line flows  
 
The DC-load economic dispatch can be formulated as: 
 
, ,
Max ( )
s.t.
B −
Y z δ
d g
                                                                   
TA= −Y z                                                     (2.21)                     
A= Ωz δ  
0
s
δ =                                  
≤z C                    
 
By eliminating the angles another linear equation for the DC-load formulation can be 
obtained36 with the matrix of power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) as:  
 
0(0, )H = ∇ YK u  
 
where 0u  is a choice of controls that yield full decoupling between the real and 
reactive power flow and no transmission losses (Hogan, 2002b). Under the DC-load 
                                               
36
 By combining two of the equations in the program, Equation (2.21), we get TA A= − ΩY δ  
and solving this for δ  and substituting it in the second constraint yields 
1( )TH A A A −= = Ω Ωz Y Y where H is the matrix of power transfer distribution factors. 
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approximations (0 )H H= where 1( )TH A A A −= −Ω Ω  with the swing bus dropped in 
defining A .37  Although the matrix A is sparse, the matrix H is dense and this means 
that almost every net load affects almost every line. Calculating the PTDFs for a 
particular line in a particular contingency is about the same amount of work as finding 
a DC-load flow for that contingency. For a given contingency the net loads and the 
angles are linked by a relatively sparse matrix TA AΩ  so that TA A= − ΩY δ . The 
matrix has only non-zero elements for buses that are directly connected. Given the 
vector of net loads, it requires no more work to solve for the vector of angles, than 
finding a particular solution for a set of linear equations. This generally requires much 
less work than solving for the full matrix inverse and is done quickly in advanced 
optimization algorithms that use sparse matrix techniques (Hogan, 2002b). Once the 
vector of angles is known for a given vector of net loads, it is easy to perform one 
matrix multiplication to obtain the complete load flow in z for each contingency. This 
illustrates the simplicity of evaluating a particular load flow, compared to calculating 
the full PTDF matrix, .H  
 
Based on these approximations the problem in Equation (2.21) can be restated as: 
 
Max ( )
s.t.
B −
Y
d g
                                                                   
0T =τ Y                                                     (2.22)                     
H ≤Y b  
 
where 0(0, )= −b K u . The matrix H for the full security-constrained dispatch is very 
large and dense, and solution methods utilize relaxation algorithms (see Hogan, 
2002b) so as to avoid unnecessary calculations of the matrix elements of H and only 
take into account binding constraints (Hogan, 2002b). Additionally, the DC load 
model is convex and the relaxation algorithm will ensure convergence to a global 
optimum.   
An alternative formulation is to use an AC approximation model. This is done by 
approximating losses by a term proportional to the square of power flows (Hogan, 
2002b): 
 
, ,
Max ( )
s.t.
B −
Y z δ
d g
                                                                          
21
2
TTA A R= − −Y z z                                                    (2.23)
A= Ωz δ  
0
s
δ =                                  
≤z C    
 
In this formulation the generation (generation less load) equals losses, 
2( ) ,T T R− =τ g d τ z  and the problem is no longer linear. However, it is possible to 
study the combined effects of losses and congestion. Note that the inverse 
                                               
37
 This is done to remove the singularity which is introduced because the overall energy-
balance relationship is included in the specific power flow conservation relationship. 
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linearization of the solution in terms of the net loads would differ from the pure DC-
load approximation. 
2.3.7 Comparison of models 
This section compares the Wangensteen model, the optimal power flow model and 
the Hogan model.  
 
The Wangensteen model is characterized by: 
• Objective function: maximum social welfare 
• Constraints: power flow equations and transmission capacity constraints 
• Control variables: active generation and load 
• State variables: voltage 
• Constraint variables: Lagrange multipliers associated with the power flow 
equations and the transmission capacity constraints 
• Reference bus: choose a fixed voltage for one bus 
• Load: elastic 
• Computational procedure: solve the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as a set of matrix 
equations or utilize a Gauss-Seidel procedure (see Wood and Wollenberg, 1996) 
• Practical use: educational purposes 
• Locational price calculation: price equals marginal cost which in turn equals 
marginal benefit to load, the prices are equal to the Lagrange multipliers 
associated with the power flow equations  
 
The modified optimal power flow model is characterized by: 
• Objective function: minimum generator costs 
• Constraints: power flow equations, transmission capacity, and voltage constraints 
• Control variables: active and reactive generation  
• State variables: voltage magnitudes and angles 
• Constraint variables: Lagrange multipliers associated with the power flow 
equations and the transmission capacity constraints 
• Reference bus: choose fixed voltage magnitude and angle for one bus 
• Load: inelastic 
• Computational procedure: nonlinear programming methods  
• Practical use: widely used in short-term power scheduling 
• Locational price calculation: price equals marginal cost which in turn equals 
marginal benefit to load, prices equal the marginal costs of generation and losses 
(proportional to the Lagrange multiplier associated with power balance equation 
for the reference bus) and the marginal costs of congestion (proportional to the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the transmission constraints) 
 
The Hogan model is characterized by: 
• Objective function: maximum social welfare 
• Constraints: bus net loads, loss balance constraint, and transmission capacity 
constraints 
• Control variables: active generation and load, reactive generation and load,  
transformer tap ratios, and ideal transformer phase angle shifts 
• State variables: voltage magnitudes and angles 
Literature review                                                                                                          35 
_____________________________________________________________________
  
• Constraint variables: Lagrange multipliers associated with the net load equations, 
the power flow equations, and the transmission capacity constraints 
• Reference bus: choose fixed voltage magnitude and angle for one bus 
• Load: elastic 
• Computational procedure: nonlinear programming methods  
• Practical use: locational pricing systems 
• Locational price calculation: price equals marginal cost which in turn equals 
marginal benefit to load, prices equal the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
net load equations which in turn equal the reference bus electricity price (equals 
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the reference bus energy constraint), the 
marginal costs of losses (proportional to the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
the reference bus energy constraint), and the marginal costs of congestion 
(proportional to the Lagrange multipliers associated with the transmission 
constraints) 
 
The similarities among the models are that all can be used in locational pricing 
systems. In these systems the prices are calculated as the marginal cost which in turn 
equals the marginal benefit to load. 
 
In the Wangensteen model, the locational price is not decomposed into terms that 
are proportional with the Lagrange multiplier associated with the transmission 
capacity constraints. The prices are equal to the multipliers associated with the power 
flow equations. However, when congestion is present they will be affected through 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions such that the locational prices will increase at electricity 
deficit locations where more generation must be scheduled and decrease in surplus 
locations where generation must be backed down. Similarly, in the OPF original 
formulation the locational prices equal the multiplier associated with the power 
balance constraint. 
 
On the contrary Hogan’s model expresses the locational prices as the Lagrange 
multipliers associated with the net load equations which in turn equal the reference 
bus electricity price (equals the Lagrange multiplier associated with the reference bus 
energy constraint), the marginal costs of losses (proportional to the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the reference bus energy constraint), and the marginal costs 
of congestion (proportional to the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
transmission constraints). Likewise, the modified OPF model can re-expressed so that 
the locational prices equal the marginal costs of generation and losses (proportional to 
the Lagrange multiplier associated with power balance equation for the reference bus) 
and the marginal costs of congestion (proportional to the Lagrange multipliers 
associated with the transmission constraints). 
 
The Wangensteen model is used for educational purposes and considers elastic 
load. The OPF model has been widely used in electrical engineering and dispatch of 
power systems. Load is assumed to be inelastic. Hogan’s model is an economist’s 
version of the OPF model and considers elastic load. It also gives an expression for 
the locational prices in terms of an equilibrium equation.  
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2.3.8 Solution methods for economic dispatch and optimal power flow model 
The OPF and the economic dispatch models are very large mathematical 
programming problems that must be solved periodically. Available solution methods 
are: 
• Lambda iteration method 
• Gradient methods 
• Newton’s method 
• Linear programming method 
• Interior point method 
 
These will not be discussed here, but Wood and Wollenberg (1996) provide an 
overview of these methods. 
2.4 Transmission congestion derivatives 
This section describes the financial derivatives that can be used for hedging against 
transmission congestion under different transmission pricing systems. It describes 
financial transmission rights in locational pricing systems, Contracts for Differences 
in area pricing systems, and futures contracts in locational or Chao-Peck pricing 
systems. 
2.4.1 Financial transmission rights 
Stochastic locational prices resulting in uncertain congestion charges create a 
demand by risk-averse market players for locational price hedging instruments. One 
such instrument is financial transmission rights (FTRs). The congestion rents that the 
ISO collects are redistributed to the market players through FTRs (Hogan, 1992). 
 
Because electricity flows according to Kirchoff’s laws and is difficult to trace, it is 
difficult to define and manage transmission usage. The first transmission capacity 
definition was a contract path fiction, which then evolved into flow-based paths. 
However because such a transaction involves the purchasing of several hedges against 
flowgates38 (Hogan, 2002a), an alternative approach is the point-to-point definition 
with implicit flows. Likewise, Joskow and Tirole (2000) have demonstrated analytical 
superiority of FTRs over physical rights. 
 
An FTR gives the holder its share of congestion rents that the ISO receives during 
transmission congestion. The amount of issued FTRs is decided ex ante and allocated 
by the ISO to holders based on preferences and estimates of future transmission 
capacity. The difference between the congestion rent and payments to FTR holders 
may be positive, resulting in a surplus to the ISO. The surplus is redistributed to FTR 
holders and transmission service customers. On the contrary, if payments to FTR 
holders exceed the congestion rent, the ISO reduces payments proportionally to FTR 
holders or requires that the transmission owners make up the deficit. The allocation of 
FTRs typically occurs as an auction, but FTRs may also be allocated to transmission 
service customers who pay the embedded costs of the transmission system. The 
                                               
38
 A modeled transmission line or transformer that can become limiting during system 
operation. A flowgate may consist of the total interface between control areas, a partial 
interface, an interface within a control area that consists of a single line or transformer, or a 
defined set of any of these facilities. 
 
Literature review                                                                                                          37 
_____________________________________________________________________
  
design of the auction is decided by the ISO and depends on the market structure. 
FTRs entitle (or obligate) the holder to the difference in locational prices times the 
contractual volume. The mathematical formulation for the payoff is: 
 
FTR = Qij(Pj -Pi)                                                               (2.24)          
 
where Pj is the bus price at location j, Pi is the bus price at location i and Qij is the 
directed quantity specified for the path from i to j. An FTR obligation may be viewed 
as an injection Qij of electricity at bus i and a withdrawal of Qij at bus j. If the 
contractual volume matches the actual traded volume between two locations, an FTR 
is a perfect hedge against volatile locational prices. 
 
FTRs can take different forms such as point-to-point FTRs and flowgate FTRs both 
of obligation and option type (Hogan, 2002b). Flowgate FTRs are constraint-by-
constraint hedges that give the right to collect payments based on the shadow price 
associated with a particular transmission constraint (flowgate). Hogan (2002b) argues 
that point-to-point obligation FTRs have been demonstrated to be the most feasible 
hedging instrument in practice. However, for point-to-point option FTRs the 
computational demands are more substantial, but they have been introduced in PJM in 
2003. Flowgate rights have been used in California39 and Texas. Point-to-point 
obligations can be either balanced or unbalanced, where the balanced type is a perfect 
hedge against transmission congestion and the unbalanced type is a hedge against 
losses (represented as a forward sale of energy). 
 
The flowgate rights approach has been proposed by Chao and Peck (1996 and 
1997) and is based on a decentralized market design. Stoft (1998) demonstrated that 
having liquid futures markets for k “Chao-Peck prices” would completely hedge 
against transmission risk in k flowgates. The flowgate proponents claim that the point-
to-point approach does not provide effective hedging instruments because the point-
to-point FTR markets may work inefficiently in practice. Oren (1997) argues that they 
result in price distortions and inefficient dispatch. Therefore, the proponents propose 
the alternative of using a decentralized congestion management scheme that facilitates 
the trading of flowgate rights. The idea behind flowgates is that since electricity flows 
along many parallel paths, it may be natural to associate the payments with the actual 
electricity flows. Key assumptions include a power system with few flowgates or 
constraints, known capacity limits at the flowgates and known power transfer 
distribution factors (PTDFs) that decompose a transaction into the flows over the 
flowgates. In practice, however, this may not be the case. The physical rights 
approach has been abandoned and a financial approach has been proposed in the 
literature (Hogan, 2002b). The payoff from the FGRs is determined by taking the 
associated flowgate shadow price times the flowgate amount and totaling them for all 
lines k that are affected by the transaction between buses m and n (Equation (2.25)).  
 
                                               
39
 The flowgate in California has both a physical and a financial aspect. 
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The flowgate amount can take negative, zero or positive values. 
 
In general, parties that want to be fully hedged should purchase a mix of FGRs that 
matches the distribution of flows from its transaction.40 In a transmission network, the 
flows will be determined by the line impedances, and more than one flowgate 
(transmission constraint) may be affected. Flowgate rights proponents assert that 
trading is easy if there are few commercially significant flowgates, resulting in a 
limited set of FGRs and if the PTDFs change infrequently (Chao et al. 2000). This 
seems difficult to ensure in a dynamic power system where unanticipated transmission 
constraints may become binding (Hogan, 2000 and Ruff, 2001). Furthermore, they 
argue that a more efficient congestion market will enable a more efficient energy 
market.  
 
The allocation of point-to-point obligation FTRs usually takes place in auctions, 
where the benefit function of the buyer or seller is maximized. The benefit function is 
assumed to be concave and differentiable and is optimized subject to all relevant 
system constraints. The auction determines the allocated amount of FTRs to market 
players and market clearing prices. It is also a mechanism for reconfiguration of 
FTRs. 
 
To further stimulate reconfiguration and liquidity FTRs can be traded in secondary 
markets. It may happen that an FTR between two locations is non-existent. Then it 
may be possible to combine other FTRs to synthetically construct the non-existent 
FTR. FTRs may have duration from months to years.   
2.4.1.1 Revenue adequacy and simultaneous feasibility 
A central issue in the provision of FTRs by an ISO is revenue adequacy. To 
maintain the credit standing of the ISO who is the counter party, the set of FTRs must 
satisfy the simultaneous feasibility conditions that are governed by the transmission 
system constraints. Revenue adequacy means that the revenue collected with 
locational prices in the dispatch should at least be equal to the payments to the holders 
of FTRs in the same period. Each time there is a change in the configuration of FTRs, 
the simultaneous feasibility test must be run to ensure that the transmission system 
                                               
40
 This assumes that all constraints that could have been binding in the dispatch have been 
designated as flowgates, and that the ISO has made FGRs available for all flowgates. If some 
constraints have not been designated, but become binding, then there is no mechanism by 
which parties can purchase a perfect hedge. Some proposals for FGRs take this into account 
by not charging holders for the non-predicted constraints and instead socialize the costs. 
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can support the set of issued FTRs. If the set of FTRs is simultaneously feasible, then 
they are revenue adequate. This has been demonstrated for lossless networks by 
Hogan (1992), extended to quadratic losses by Bushnell and Stoft (1996), and further 
generalized to smooth nonlinear constraints by Hogan (2000). As shown by Philpott 
and Pritchard (2004) negative locational prices may cause revenue inadequacy. In the 
general case of an AC or DC formulation the transmission constraints must be convex 
to ensure revenue adequacy (O'Neill et al., 2002; Philpott and Pritchard, 2004). 
 
The FTR market is operated in parallel with the spot market, and to ensure revenue 
adequacy the net demands from the FTRs must satisfy the power flow equations, the 
loss balance constraint and the transmission capacity constraints. A security-
constrained optimal power flow model is utilized and contingency constraints may be 
numerous. However, practical experience from PJM and New York shows that 
software can solve this problem. Under a spot market and load equilibrium, revenue 
adequacy is obtained for point-to-point obligation FTRs, when the implied power 
flows from these are simultaneously feasible. Revenue adequacy is the financial 
counterpart of available transmission capacity (Hogan, 2002b). Mathematically we 
state the simultaneous feasibility test as: 
 
( , ) 0,
( , ) 0
f
k
k
T
t
L
=
+ =
≤
∑Y
Y u τ Y
K Y u
 
                                                                                            (2.26) 
where fk
k
t∑ is the set of point-to-point obligations.41 When including security 
constraints, this becomes a large-scale feasibility problem. The feasibility test is 
included in the auction formulation and pricing and trading of FTRs is done through a 
centralized period auction. Every FTR has an implied power flow, and the 
simultaneous interaction among the FTRs through the auction makes the FTR prices 
and the congestion fees hedged by these FTRs interrelated. 
 
The model grid that represents expected conditions may be an inaccurate 
description of the grid offered for dispatch, resulting in discrepancies between the 
congestion charges and the payoff to the holders of FTRs. Currently, the ISO 
redistributes excess congestion charges to the FTR holders in deficit payment periods 
and transmission service customers. Conversely, when there are deficit congestion 
charges, the ISO may reduce payments proportionally to FTR holders or require 
transmission owners to make up the deficit.  
 
Oren et al. (1995) and Oren and Deng (2003) argue that the simultaneous 
feasibility test is too strict. The argument is that because most tradable commodities 
trade in higher volumes than the underlying physical delivery, it is reasonable to 
                                               
41
 Generally we could decompose fk
k
t∑  into a set of balanced fk
k
τ∑ and unbalanced 
f
k
k
g∑ obligations such that f fk k
k k
gτ= −∑ ∑Y , see Hogan (2002b). The unbalanced obligations 
are injections of energy. 
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assume that this is also true for FTRs. However, the feasibility condition has 
importance in allocating new FTRs to investors as demonstrated by Bushnell and 
Stoft (1997). Oren and Deng (2003) propose that the revenue adequacy requirement 
should be relaxed to a seasonal or annual accounting, or a value at risk approach. 
2.4.1.2 Critique of the financial transmission rights model 
Joskow and Tirole (2002 and 2003) provide an extensive critique of the short-run 
FTR model and its ability to create proper incentives for transmission investment. 
They argue that the FTR model is based on strong assumptions of perfect competition 
that allows efficiency. The assumptions include:  
• no increasing returns to scale  
• no sunk costs 
• locational prices that fully reflect consumers’ willingness to pay 
• network externalities internalized by locational prices 
• no uncertainty in congestion rents 
• no market power so that markets are always cleared by prices 
• complete futures markets  
• ISO with no inter-temporal preferences regarding effective transmission capacity 
 
The FTR model then allows investment in transmission to compete with 
investments in generation and provides a solution to the natural monopoly regulatory 
problem (Joskow and Tirole, 2002). However, if some of the above assumptions are 
not valid, the FTR model no longer creates proper incentives to prevent transmission 
congestion. In particular this is demonstrated by Léautier (2000) under a pay-as-bid 
pool rule where generators holding FTRs have incentives to reduce transmission 
capacity to enhance local market power. Similar results are found for physical 
transmission rights (Bushnell, 1999; Joskow and Tirole, 2000). 
 
Joskow and Tirole (2003) have the following criticisms regarding the short-run 
FTR model: 
• Market power raises prices in constrained area so that prices do not reflect 
marginal costs. Generators in a constrained region tend to withhold output to raise 
their price. The higher market-clearing prices therefore overestimate the benefits 
from the financial transmission rights.  
• Existing and incremental transmission capacities are not well-defined and are 
stochastic.  
• Separation of transmission ownership and system operation creates a moral-hazard 
problem of type “in teams.”42 
• The initially feasible set of FTRs may depend on uncertain exogenous variables. 
 
Perez-Arriaga et al. (1995) point out that revenues from locational pricing only 
cover 25% of total costs. It is therefore necessary to combine FTRs with a fixed-price 
structure to recover fixed costs. 
 
According to Hogan (2003) contingencies outside the control of the ISO could lead 
to revenue inadequacy, but such cases are rare and non-representative. Most 
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 An outage can be claimed to result from poor maintenance (by the transmission owner) or 
from ill-judged dispatch (by the ISO). 
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contingencies are anticipated by running an N-1 security-constrained dispatch where 
the outage of a line or a generator is taken into account. Then the power flows after an 
outage would still be feasible in the dispatch. 
2.4.1.3 Market power in the financial transmission rights market 
Among researchers (Joskow and Tirole, 2000; Léautier, 2001; Gilbert, Neuhoff, 
and Newbury, 2002) there is consensus about the need to mitigate market power for 
any FTR auction to be efficient. Joskow and Tirole (2000) study a radial line network 
under different market structures for both generation and FTRs. They demonstrate 
that FTR market power by a producer in the importing region (or a consumer in the 
exporting region) aggravates their monopoly (monopsony) power, because dominance 
in the FTR market creates an incentive to curtail generation (demand) to increase the 
value of the FTRs. This is also in line with the conclusion in the FTR literature:  
generators can more easily exert local market power when transmission congestion is 
present (Bushnell, 1999; Bushnell and Stoft, 1997; Joskow and Tirole, 2000; Oren, 
1997; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983; Chao and Peck, 1997; Gilbert, Neuhoff, and 
Newbery, 2002; Cardell, Hitt, and Hogan, 1997; Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft, 
1998; Wolfram, 1998; Bushnell and Wolak, 1999). The behavior of the generators in 
the FTR market should then be regulated. 
 
Allocation of FTRs to a monopoly generator depends on the structure of the market 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2000). When the FTRs are allocated initially to a single owner 
that is neither a generator nor a load, the monopoly generator will want to acquire all 
FTRs. When all FTRs initially are distributed to market players without market 
power, the generator will buy no FTRs. When the FTRs are auctioned to the highest 
bidders, the generator will buy a random number of FTRs. Extending this analysis, 
Gilbert, Neuhoff, and Newbury (2002) analyze ways of preventing perverse 
incentives by identifying conditions where different FTR allocation mechanisms can 
mitigate generator market power during transmission congestion. In an arbitraged 
uniform price auction, generators will buy FTRs that mitigate their market power, 
while in a pay-as-bid auction FTRs might enhance their market power. Specifically, in 
the radial line case, market power might be mitigated by not allowing generators to 
hold FTRs related to their own energy delivery. In the three-node case, mitigation of 
market power implies defining FTRs according to the reference node with the price 
least influenced by the generation decision of the generator.  
 
In practical implementations of the FTR model, market power mitigating rules are 
designed (Rosellon, 2003). FERC has included market power mitigation rules in the 
standard market design (FERC, 2002). FERC indicates that insufficient demand-side 
response and transmission constraints are the two main sources for market power. 
FERC differentiates between high prices because of scarcity and high prices resulting 
from exercising market power. Using a merit-order spot market mechanism FERC 
proposes to use a bid cap for generators with market power in a constrained region 
and a “safety net”43 for demand side response. Regulated generators are also subject 
to a resource adequacy requirement. Chandley and Hogan (2002) claim that this 
mechanism is inefficient because the use of penalties for under-contracting (with 
respect to the resource adequacy requirement) would not permit prices to clear energy 
                                               
43
 Similar to the $1000 per MWh bid cap in the northeastern and Texas electricity markets 
(Rosellon, 2003). 
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and reserve markets. Moreover, long-term contracting should be voluntary, and based 
on financial hedging, not on capacity requirements. 
2.4.2 Nordic Contracts for Differences 
A risk management tool against transmission congestion risks in the Nordic market 
is Contracts for Differences (CfDs).44 These financial instruments make it possible for 
the market players to hedge against the difference between the area price and the 
System Price (the unconstrained price) in a future time period (Nord Pool, 2002). The 
contracts are available for all spot areas (except within Norway). The forward and 
futures contracts traded at Nord Pool are with reference to the System Price. 
Producers are paid the area price for production in their area. Consumers purchase 
electricity at their respective area price. Often, producers and consumers in different 
areas encounter situations of transmission congestion when the area prices differ from 
the System Price.  
 
Congestion fees for bilateral transactions in the Nordic countries are calculated 
based on the difference between the area prices times the transferred quantity. Usually 
producers pay the fee, but parties can also make other arrangements. 
 
The payment from the Nordic CfD is:  
 
CfD = Qi (APi –SP)                                                                                    (2.27)    
       
where APi refers to the area price in area i, SP is the System Price, and Qi is the 
contracted volume. Payments are calculated as the average of the difference between 
the daily area price and the System Price during the delivery period (a season or a 
year) times the contracted volume. From Equation (2.27) we see that each time the 
area price is higher than the System Price the holder receives a rebate equal to the 
price differential times the contract quantities. Otherwise, the holder must pay the 
negative difference.  
 
The market price of a Nordic CfD can be positive, negative or zero (Kristiansen, 
2004). CfDs trade at positive prices if the market expects that the area price will be 
higher than the System Price (a net import situation). CfDs trade at negative prices if 
the market expects an area price below the System Price (a net export situation). 
 
A perfect hedge using forward or futures contracts is possible only when the area 
price and the System Price are equal. If forward or futures contracts are used for 
hedging, this implies a basis risk equal to the area price minus the System Price. To 
create a perfect hedge against the price differential: 
 
1. Hedge the specified volume by using forward contracts. 
                                               
44
 Here, the term Contract for Differences is different from the corresponding term used in the 
British market. In the Nordic region, CfDs are used to hedge against the difference between 
the two uncertain prices (area price and System Price), not as in the British market, where 
they hedge the difference between the spot price and a pre-defined reference price or price 
profile. The Nordic CfD is a locational swap, while the British CfD is settled based on the 
difference between the spot price and the reference price. When referring to CfD in the Nordic 
market, the term Nordic CfD is used. 
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2. Hedge against the price differential – for the same period and volume – by using 
CfDs. 
3. Accomplish physical procurement by trading in the Elspot area of the holder of 
the contract. 
 
Norway has adopted an area price model to manage congestion in the day-ahead 
market. A charge equal to the difference between the System Price and low area price 
times the transferred quantity (capacity charge) is imposed in the low price area, and a 
charge equal to the difference between the high area price and the System Price times 
the transferred quantity is imposed in the high price area. Thus, withdrawals are 
charged in the high price area and compensated in the low price area. The opposite is 
the case for net injections. However, it is impossible to hedge against price differences 
within Norway, because there is only one contract with reference to the area Norway 
1 (Oslo). Shorter-term products and products for hedging directly against area price 
differentials are unavailable at the exchange. Nord Pool is considering listing CfDs 
with reference to Norway 2 (Trondheim) and CfDs with shorter delivery periods such 
as weeks or months (Nord Pool, 2003). Nord Pool is also considering the listing of 
CfDs with reference to the German EEX price. 
2.4.3 Locational price hedging using the futures markets 
The model for this approach has been developed by Rajaraman and Alvarado 
(1998). In theory, futures or forward markets could be used to hedge locational risks. 
In practice, there are relatively few liquid futures markets but many locational 
electricity spot markets. It is possible to manage or eliminate the locational risks by 
using these few futures markets, by taking a precisely determined position in the 
futures markets by time 0 and taking another precisely determined position later in the 
spot markets. The same idea can be used to realize arbitrage opportunities if they are 
present. The model may be applied in an electricity futures market based on a Chao-
Peck congestion pricing scheme where congestion is priced explicitly (Chao and 
Peck, 1996 and 1997; Stoft 1998). The basic idea is briefly explained here. 
 
The locational spot prices λ (N in total – one for each bus) can be described as: 
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(2.28) 
 
The matrix A has dimension N  times L+1 and η is the shadow price associated with 
the power flow equations and the transmission capacity constraints. The first column 
of A describes the effect of transactions on losses. In particular, each element in the 
column is equal to one plus the percentage of losses involved in incremental 
transactions that occur between the actual location and the reference location. The 
remaining columns of A are the power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) 
corresponding to each of the flowgates (or possible congested transmission lines). The 
first element of the vector η is the spot price of electricity at the reference bus. The 
remaining elements are the shadow prices associated with congestion relative to the 
reference bus for the flowgates. 
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Rajaraman and Alvarado (1998) describe a risk management strategy where the 
market player takes a position f at time 0 in the futures markets (for delivery at time 
T), and a position s in the spot markets at time T to buy and sell obligations p at time 
T. The portfolio position p can be described as a combination of spot purchases s and 
futures purchases: 
 
1 1 11 1 1
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(2.29) 
 
where the matrix element ijx  in every column represents the numerical weight of the 
locational bus prices at a futures market and X is a market portfolio matrix.  
 
The cost (or profit) c to a market player of spot purchases and hedge purchases is 
given by: 
 
T T
fc = +s λ f p
                                                                                                       
(2.30) 
 
where λ  is the spot price at a bus and fp  is a vector of futures prices with dimension 
M. Since the futures prices are known at time 0 while the locational bus prices are 
uncertain this yields: 
 
( )T T T Tc A X A= − ⋅ + fp f η f p  
                                          
                                    (2.31) 
 
The costs are only subject to uncertainty in locactional prices, since the futures prices 
are given at time 0. The costs will be minimized when the difference between the two 
first terms is zero, as given by the condition:  
 
( ) 0T T TA X A− =p f
                                                                                               
(2.32) 
 
This can be performed by taking a position in the futures market f at time 0, and a 
position p-Xf  in the spot market at time T, such that the difference is zero. The costs 
of the hedge are T ff p . In complete markets,45 the difference is zero for an arbitrary 
choice of p. Equation (2.32) may be viewed as a linear equation in f.  By studying the 
dimension of the matrices we find that TX A  has dimensions M by L+1, and ATp  is a 
row vector of dimension L+1. If the number of electricity futures markets M is strictly 
less than one more than the number of flowgates, L+1, then there are too many 
equations in too few unknowns and the condition will usually46 not be satisfied. If M 
is strictly greater than L+1, then there are too few equations in too many unknowns 
and the condition will be satisfied for many different portfolios f. When M is exactly 
equal to L+1, there will usually be a unique solution f. Equation (2.32) will have a 
solution if T T TX=p f . For an arbitrary choice of p this condition will be satisfied if 
                                               
45
 The term “complete markets” means that the futures markets “span” the set of all possible 
transmission congestion events. 
46
 Synonymous with the phrase “chances are that” (Rajaraman and Alvarado, 1998). 
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X is invertible, i.e. M = N. These results show that perfect hedging is usually possible 
for any arbitrary obligation p  when the number of futures markets equals the number 
of buses or when the number of futures markets equals one more than the number of 
flowgates. While risk is perfectly hedged it will not necessarily leave the market 
player better off than if it had participated only in the spot market.  
2.4.4 Pricing of transmission congestion derivatives 
Siddiqui et al. (2003) study the prices of transmission congestion contracts in the 
New York market and find that the TCC prices do not reflect the congestion rents for 
large exposure hedges and over large distances. These TCC holders pay excessive risk 
premiums. They argue that this may be due to the way the TCCs are defined with 
fixed capacity over a fixed period and high transaction costs for disaggregating them 
in the secondary market. Market players therefore consistently predict transmission 
congestion incorrectly for all other hedges than the small and straightforward hedges. 
Also the large number of possible TCCs decreases price discovery. Pricing of TCCs 
are based on anticipated and feasible congestion patterns which may not be realized in 
the actual dispatch. This may make TCCs mispriced. However, the pricing of TCCs 
may be symptomatic of an immature market. Also arbitrage of electricity prices may 
be impossible because of illiquidity, risk aversion, and regulatory risks (Siddiqui et 
al., 2003) 
 
Kristiansen (2004) studied the prices of Contracts for Differences in the Nordic 
market and found that most of the contracts do not reflect the congestion rent. But 
there are also contracts that underestimate the congestion rent, resulting in a positive 
payoff to the holders. The Nordic CfDs are traded as forward contracts and do not 
have any connection to the congestion rent that the transmission system operator 
collects. The pricing of CfDs could be due to that the CfD market has only been in 
operation since November 2000 and therefore is immature. The majority of the results 
are in line with the pricing of futures at Nord Pool (Botterud et al., 2002).  
2.5 Transmission investments 
Transmission capacity is vital for the development of electricity markets. Shortages 
could prevent generators from selling electricity at high price locations and result in 
end users paying higher prices. The development of electricity transmission 
infrastructure requires adequate incentives to solve short-run congestion management, 
recuperate long-term fixed costs, and investment to expand the network (Rosellon, 
2003). The short-run congestion management is solved by calculating the cost of 
transmission usage as the difference in locational prices times the transferred quantity. 
However, there are conflicting objectives of congesting the network in the short-run 
and expanding it in the long-run. Woolf (2002) and Hunt (2003) present diverging 
international mechanisms or practices that have been used to solve these issues. The 
United Kingdom and Norway have applied basic regulation, while the northeastern 
US has applied a mixture of planning and auctioning of long-term transmission rights. 
The Australian market uses a combination of regulatory mechanisms and merchant 
incentives.  
 
Bushnell and Stoft (1997) explain that the external benefits of transmission 
investments are not appropriable and certain transmission investments might have 
negative externalities on the capacity of other transmission lines. One way to proceed 
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with this is to let the investor pay for the negative externalities generated by buying 
back transmission rights from the initial holders.  
 
We can now consider the basic economic theory for merchant transmission 
investments and then the approach of long-term FTRs for transmission expansion. 
This section also describes the market power problems associated with transmission 
expansion. 
2.5.1 Merchant transmission investment theory 
Network deepening investments are those that involve physical upgrades of the 
incumbent transmission owner’s facilities47 (Joskow and Tirole, 2003). These 
investments are physically intertwined with and inseparable from the incumbent 
transmission owner’s facilities and can be undertaken most efficiently by the 
incumbent network owner. Network maintenance decisions are similar to network 
deepening investments and also are most efficiently undertaken by the incumbent 
transmission owner.  
 
Independent network expansion investments are investments that involve the 
construction of separate new lines (including parallel lines) that are not physically 
intertwined with the incumbent network except at the point where they are 
interconnected (Joskow and Tirole, 2003). These investments can be made by 
incumbent transmission owners, by stakeholders or by third-party merchant investors. 
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Figure 2-6. Congestion rents and congestion costs. 
 
Figure 2-6 shows a simple radial line where loads at bus 2 buy their consumption 
at the cheap bus 1 and possibly at the more expensive generators at their local bus 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2003). The capacity from bus 1 to bus 2 is constrained to K. 
Based on the net demand/supply curves the system operator is forced to dispatch “out 
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 Examples are capacitor banks, phase shifters, upgrading transformers and substations, 
and reconductoring existing transmission lines. 
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of merit” to meet demand. The scarce transmission capacity is reflected in the 
locational prices p1 and p2 that clear the market at bus 1 and bus 2. The difference 
2 1p pη = −  is the scarcity price of transmission. The area 0Kη  is the congestion rent 
and the triangle ABC represents the congestion or redispatch cost. The congestion 
cost represents the cost of running more expensive generation at bus 2 that has to 
substitute cheap generation at bus 1 because of the transmission constraint. Next, 
consider a marginal unit increase in transmission capacity Kδ  that allows one more 
MW to flow from bus 1 to bus 2. It therefore replaces a marginal generator at bus 2 
with cost p2 by a cheaper generator at bus 1 with cost p1. The social value of this 
investment is given by the reduction in area ABC in Figure 2-6. 
 
Assume that the builder of this marginal capacity is rewarded with an FTR of value 
η . A non-incumbent investor will proceed with this investment as long as η  exceeds 
the investment costs. Conversely, an incumbent transmission owner that is 
compensated through the congestion rent may not want to proceed with this 
expansion. This will depend on the extra revenue η  net of investment costs with the 
reduction in the congestion rent on its inframarginal transmission units /Kd dKη− . It 
is only when the incumbent transmission owner’s transmission capacity has been 
rated at some level K* not too different from the actual capacity, and that the 
corresponding FTR with value *Kη , has been auctioned off, that the monopoly 
distortion disappears. The incremental capacity then yields ( *) dK K
dK
ηη + −  close to 
η . 
 
Hogan (1992) and Bushnell and Stoft (1996 and 1997) demonstrate that under 
certain conditions48 all efficient transmission investments will at least recover their 
costs from congestion rents. Likewise, inefficient investments will not be profitable. 
Joskow and Tirole (2003) argue that the optimality of this market-driven approach 
depends on several strong assumptions that are unlikely to be found in practice. 
 
At bus 2 which is import constrained the generator may exercise market power by 
withdrawing output and driving the price up. Then the price 2p  would exceed then 
marginal cost 2c  at that location. The measured congestion rent then overestimates the 
cost savings associated with the replacement of one unit of power generated at bus 2 
by one unit of power generated at bus 1. Therefore, it results in an over-incentive to 
expand the line assuming no impact of other potential market imperfections. 
Conversely, the increased transmission capacity does not replace generation at bus 2 
one-for-one so it leads to an increase in total electricity consumption at bus 2, 
resulting in an increase in social welfare equal to 2 2( )p c−  times the increase in 
consumption. Joskow and Tirole (2003) demonstrate that the first effect dominates 
and market power results in an over-incentive to invest in transmission. Similarly, 
entrants in generation expansion have an over-incentive to invest at bus 2. 
Summarizing, Joskow and Tirole (2003) find that market power in the importing 
region produces enhanced incentives for transmission investment.  
                                               
48
 No increasing returns to scale, simultaneous feasibility constraints bind when allocating 
FTRs, efficient locational prices clear all markets, no market power in the wholesale market, 
well defined property rights, a complete set of liquid futures markets. 
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Conversely, a generator with market power at bus 1 may be able to drive the price 
1p  up by withdrawing output (perhaps to the level of 2p  if it faces no competition at 
bus 1). Then the congestion rent underestimates the benefit from expanding the 
transmission capacity, resulting in an under-investment by merchant investors 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2003). Similarly, a price cap at bus 2 could reduce congestion 
rents during those hours that are important because they produce the majority of the 
rents to support the investment, resulting in under-investment in transmission. 
 
Network expansion projects are likely to be lumpy. This means that the average 
cost of a new line decreases as its capacity increases, other things being equal 
(Baldick and Kahn, 1992; Perez-Arriaga et al., 1995). Many network deepening 
investments may be less lumpy, but as discussed by Joskow and Tirole (2003) those 
are more likely to be undertaken by the incumbent network owner rather than a 
merchant investor. 
 
The impact of lumpiness is illustrated in Figure 2-7. The initial capacity is K0 and 
is expanded to K1. It is assumed that the locational prices are efficient (net 
demand/supply reflect true marginal costs/willingness to pay) and clear the market. 
The increase in social surplus S1 created by the expansion is illustrated by the shaded 
area in Figure 2-7. This is also equal to the reduced redispatch costs. The value of the 
FTR is 1 1 0( )K Kη − , equals the ex post congestion rent and is rewarded to the 
merchant investor. The area 1 1 0( )K Kη − is less than the increase in social surplus S1. 
Thus, lumpiness results in an under-incentive for the investor to proceed with the 
expansion. Likewise, an incumbent network owner that is rewarded by congestion 
rents has suboptimal incentives to remove these congestion rents. 
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Figure 2-7. Impact of lumpiness. 
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Lumpiness can also be found when there is scarcity of rights of way, for example a 
unique corridor between a cheap and an expensive area (Joskow and Tirole, 2003). 
Merchant investments are then likely to end up in a “pre-emption and monopoly” 
situation, where the investor builds a small new incremental capacity that is 
subsequently expanded in network deepening investments. In addition to under-
stimulating investments, lumpiness may also make investments occur too early when 
the objective of the investor is pre-emption of additional entry. 
2.5.2 Long-term financial transmission rights for transmission expansion 
There are three possible approaches for stimulating investments in transmission 
expansion: long-term FTRs, price caps, and market power analysis which all build on 
the equilibrium in the spot market (Rosellon, 2003). We focus on the long-term FTR 
approach where an ISO allocates through an auction long-term FTRs corresponding to 
the new economic capacity created. Typical existing FTRs have a duration from one 
month to five years. However, the life-time of a transmission investment is 
approximately 30 years. Therefore, the owner of such an investment may prefer to 
receive a long-term FTR.  
 
The long-term FTR approach is based on a short-run spot market for energy and 
ancillary services that is operated by the ISO. The spot prices are calculated in a 
security-constrained economic dispatch. Hogan (2002a) views the approach as a 
merchant transmission investment because incremental FTRs can provide market-
based transmission pricing that may create incentives for transmission investments. 
 
Bushnell and Stoft (1997) indicate that market failures in electricity transmission 
expansion are because of: 1) market power of a single regional transmission capacity 
owner, 2) external benefits of transmission investments that are not appropriable, and 
3) negative externalities on existing transmission capacity caused by an investment in 
the network. Specifically Bushnell and Stoft studied expansion in a two-node network 
where a new line was inserted. They demonstrated that this expansion might violate 
some of the existing FTRs, and proposed that the investor should pay back to the 
market players the amount that represents the externalities. 
 
Moreover, Bushnell and Stoft (1997) demonstrate that the value of incremental 
FTRs allocated under the feasibility rule will be less than or equal to the change in 
social welfare. If a transmission investment reduces social welfare, the investor has to 
take incremental FTRs with negative value. However, the investor may benefit from 
this investment because it has commercial interests of a value that offsets the costs of 
the negative valued FTRs. To prevent investments that decrease social welfare, 
market players must hold FTRs that match their net load perfectly and incremental 
FTRs must be allocated under a feasibility rule. 
 
Hogan (2002a) generalizes and extends Bushnell and Stoft’s analysis. He provides 
some preliminary axioms that could define long-term FTRs. The long-term FTR 
model assumes market players such as generators, loads, Gridco49 and marketers 
interested in transmission expansion. Under the assumption that not all FTRs are 
                                               
49
 An independent company that owns the grid but does not have responsibility for operating 
the system. It works in conjunction with a system operator and may be a for-profit or not-for-
profit entity. 
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allocated in the network prior to expansion, the allocation of incremental FTRs should 
satisfy some criteria. The first is that any incremental FTR should be simultaneously 
feasible with existing FTRs. The second is that such an incremental FTR should 
remain feasible given that certain currently allocated FTRs (proxy awards) are 
preserved. The third is that the investor maximized its objective function and the 
fourth is that allocation process should apply for decreases and increases in 
transmission capacity. 
 
As Hogan (2002a) points out, the difficulty is to define proxy awards. To extend 
the definition beyond radial lines, Hogan proposes defining a proxy award as the best 
use of the current network along the same direction as the incremental FTR was 
awarded (including negative and positive awards). There are two possibilities in 
defining the best use. The first is to maximize the preset proxy preferences in terms of 
proxy FTRs. The second is to maximize investor preferences and simultaneously 
minimize the amount of proxy FTRs.  
2.5.3 Discussion of the long-term financial transmission rights model 
Most electricity markets are by nature volatile and therefore no restructured 
electricity market in the world has adopted a pure merchant approach (Joskow and 
Tirole, 2002). The PJM and New York ISOs utilize long-term FTRs, and Australia 
uses a mixture of regulated and merchant transmission investments (Littlechild, 
2003). Argentina also uses the hybrid approach under a locational pricing scheme. 
 
Joskow and Tirole (2003) have the following criticisms regarding the long-term 
FTR model: 
• Lumpiness in transmission investments makes payments to investors less than the 
increase in social surplus. 
• Transmission investments are dynamic, and there is no perfect coordination of 
interdependent investments in generation and transmission. Supply and demand 
are stochastic and therefore locational prices are stochastic.  
• The assumption about equal access to investment opportunities is not good because 
upgrading of the incumbent’s network can only be efficiently put through by the 
incumbent.  
• Inserting a new transmission line might have a negative social welfare value as 
demonstrated by Bushnell and Stoft (1997). 
 
Some of the criticisms of the FTR model are responded to by Hogan (2002a and 
2003). The negative externalities can be taken care of by letting the investor pay for 
them as pointed out by Hogan (2002a). Moreover, Hogan agrees that the FTR market 
is only efficient when there is no market power, and when transmission investments 
are non-lumpy (or almost non-lumpy). He therefore indicates that merchant 
transmission investments should be for small-scale projects and that large and lumpy 
projects need regulation. Regulation is also necessary to prevent market power abuse. 
He argues that it is important to establish a boundary to differentiate between these 
investments. 
 
Hogan (2003) also assumes that agency problems and information asymmetries 
are part of an institutional structure of the electricity industry where the ISO is 
separated from transmission ownership and where market players are decentralized. 
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However, he claims that the main issue on transmission investment is the decision of 
the boundary between merchant and regulated transmission expansion projects. He 
argues that asymmetric information should not necessarily affect such a boundary.  
 
The main consensus in the FTR literature is the need for co-existence of central 
planning and merchant investment for the long-term FTR approach to work and create 
incentives for transmission expansion. Central planning is necessary because of 
economies of scale, free riding and incentives to congest the network. Joskow and 
Tirole (2002) argue that there must be a careful definition of the function of the ISO 
in planning, timing, and degree of participation in transmission expansion. 
 
It is not clear if a central planned system could be combined with unplanned 
investments given their impact on the existing and future transmission system. The 
probabilities of all states of the world over the investment horizon must be considered. 
However, these probabilities are not of common knowledge and the actual 
probabilities chosen by the ISO could be subjective. Moreover, contingency markets 
are hard to implement in practice because they assume that the owners of the existing 
network are not neutral with respect to new investments. Hogan (2003) points out that 
contingencies in the short-run are taken into account by running security-constrained 
economic dispatch.   
 
It is impossible to define the activity of the transmission system in terms of an 
output process, because it is impossible to physically trace electricity (Rosellon, 
2003). An analytical determination of the cost and production functions could reveal 
if transmission has large sunk costs and sub-additivity. Under such an assumption the 
long-term behaviour of the Gridco could be regulated through some type of incentive 
regulation (Rosellon, 2003). 
 
The main incentive for investing in transmission capacity is that the benefits from 
the transmission investment outweigh the benefits from congestion. A long-term FTR 
model would give efficient results under such a criterion. On the contrary, a 
transmission company that benefits more from congestion than expansion would have 
no incentives to expand the network. 
 
Barmack et al. (2003) claim that FTRs alone will not induce efficient operation and 
investment as a part of the United States’ standard market design. They argue that an 
optimal incentive mechanism should meet at least two criteria. First, it should 
encourage the transmission owner to equalize the marginal social benefit of reduced 
congestion costs and the marginal cost of reducing congestion (including the short and 
long-run). Second, it should not discriminate between capital and operational 
expenses as potential means of reducing congestion, but rather should encourage the 
transmission owner to pursue whichever approach is most cost-effective. They 
differentiate between congestion rents and congestion costs. Based on a comparison 
between congestion rent shortfalls (or surpluses) and redispatch costs they argue that 
the transmission owner is given incorrect incentives for efficient investment and 
operation. One of the criticisms is that investments eliminating congestion result in 
worthless FTRs. However, FTRs may be given to investors as a hedge against future 
price differences, not as a financing source. It is also difficult to make a correct 
allocation of FTRs. There is some amount of arbitrariness in the process of creating 
and allocating FTRs through the feasibility test. The model grid may be an inaccurate 
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representation, resulting in over- or under-funding of payments to FTR holders. In the 
case of under-funding the transmission owner must make up the deficit and it will 
therefore have a risk by providing FTRs. Likewise, given the problems with allocating 
FTRs accurately, it may result in inefficient investments because investors are not 
allocated FTRs corresponding to the new capacity created. Barmack et al. (2003) also 
claim that the allocation of FTRs to investors in small-scale projects such as 
capacitors, transformers, or breakers will be imprecise and may not correspond to the 
new capacity created.  
 
Barmack et al. argue that if the transmission owners should bear the risk of 
congestion rent shortfalls (from payments to FTR holders) they should be 
compensated by for example up-front payments to create funds that could be used to 
finance shortfalls. Alternatively, FTRs could be partially funded and pay only the 
congestion rents collected. Still another alternative is that independent transmission 
providers50 (that are incorporating the assets of many different transmission owners) 
could issue FTRs in sufficiently restricted volumes so that shortfalls would be 
unlikely. As an alternative to FTRs they propose to use performance-based 
regulation.51 
2.5.4 Pope and Harvey proposal for long-term financial transmission rights 
Pope and Harvey (2002) present a methodology for implementing long-term FTRs. 
The ISO allocates long-term FTRs to parties that invest in transmission as long as 
these FTRs are made possible by the expansion. The incremental FTRs are allocated 
based on investor preferences, but the ISO could also allocate the FTRs. 
 
In this process, the amount of existing and incremental FTRs must be taken into 
account such that all FTRs are simultaneously feasible and thus revenue adequacy is 
ensured. The auction including feasibility constraints checks that the investor’s 
nominations are feasible and prevents the allocation of FTRs that were made 
infeasible by the expansion.  
 
The bidding process is conducted over several steps. First, the investor can choose 
between short- and long-term FTRs52 for transmission expansion. Second, the 
allocation of incremental FTRs takes place in an auctioned or un-auctioned period. In 
the auctioned period the FTR auction model allocates summer and winter incremental 
FTRs53 based on investors’ preferences. In order to make possible some transmission 
expansions, mitigating FTRs (that corresponds to counterflow FTRs) might be issued. 
In the un-auctioned period, transmission capacity is reserved to be released for sales 
in later periods. Finally, short-term FTRs are allocated through an auction. 
 
                                               
50
 Independent transmission providers include regional transmission organizations and 
independent system operators. 
51
 The basic structure of their proposal is that the transmission owner is allowed to collect a 
transmission fee based on the expected levels of demand, the revenue requirement of the 
grid, and redispatch costs. 
52
 The long-term FTR typically is allocated at one-time with a life-time of 20 years, while the 
short-term FTR is allocated every 6 months with a life-time of 6 months. 
53
 The separation between winter and summer FTRs is non-trivial because FTRs that are 
feasible in one period might be infeasible in another period. 
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Harvey (2002) analyzes the allocation of incremental FTRs associated with 
controllable DC lines. These lines require special attention in the transmission pricing, 
the feasibility test and how to allocate incremental FTRs. The allocation methodology 
depends on whether the expansion is done by a market player or by the ISO. When a 
market player schedules the line, the transmission pricing might differ from locational 
pricing when an outage of a DC line is a binding constraint. Conversely, when the 
ISO schedules the line, locational pricing would be prevailing. 
2.5.5 Market power associated with transmission expansion  
Léautier (2001) analyzes transmission expansion in a three-node network in a two 
period setting. Transmission expansion occurs in the first period resulting in revenues 
to the transmission owner. In the second period, the system operator maximizes 
consumer benefits in a dispatch allowing for loop flows and according to a pay-as-bid 
rule. Léautier finds two major effects. The first is a substitution effect where 
transmission expansion allows for substitution of cheaper electricity for more 
expensive electricity. The second is a strategic effect where competition in generation 
increases. The substitution effect always increases welfare, but the welfare impact of 
the strategic effect depends on the weight of generators’ profits relative to consumers’ 
utility weight. The higher the generators’ weight, the lower the positive effect on 
welfare.  
 
Based on these results Léautier argues that incumbent generators may not be the 
best market players to carry out transmission investments. Expansions allow 
generators to increase revenues by improved access to new markets, collecting 
transmission charges and FTR payments, but the benefits might be outweighed by 
loss of local market power. Therefore, generators might prefer to congest the network. 
To create welfare improving transmission investments the regulator must vertically 
separate the electricity industry, in order to make any market player able to invest in 
transmission. 
 
Bushnell and Stoft (1997) show that in a three-node network, a generator might 
benefit from a social welfare reducing investment. 
 
Based on the research findings in the literature, generators’ behaviour in the FTR 
market should be regulated. Hogan (2002a) argues that transmission companies 
should be the principal buyers and sellers of long-term FTRs. Likewise, the Gridco 
could have the main responsibility of making a regulated investment under a market 
failure, but this would require strict imposition of open access to transmission 
networks. 
2.5.6 Alternative approaches towards transmission expansion 
Two other possible approaches towards transmission expansion besides the long-
term FTR approach can be briefly mentioned. For a thorough overview, see Rosellon 
(2003).  
 
The first of these defines the optimal expansion of the transmission network 
according to the strategic behaviour of generators, and considers conjectures made by 
each generator on other generators’ marginal costs due to the expansion. The 
approach utilizes a real option analysis to evaluate the net present value of both 
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transmission and generation investments and therefore their interdependences. The 
weakness is that it assumes a transportation model with no loop flows. 
 
The second possible approach is given by regulatory mechanisms for Transcos. 
The basic principle is that the Transco faces the social costs of transmission 
congestion. One possibility is to use a two-part tariff cap that solves the opposite 
incentives to congest the existing transmission network and to expand it in the long-
run. This approach utilizes the analysis of the cost and demand functions for 
transmission that still is in its infancy. For this approach to work there must be a 
monotonic increasing transmission cost function. Hogan (2002a) demonstrates that 
this assumption in general is not valid because an expansion of a certain link can lead 
to a decrease in total transmission capacity. 
 
In the literature there is a debate regarding the use of a regulated Transco approach 
for transmission expansion. On the one hand, Hunt (2002) and Joskow and Tirole 
(2002) claim that a Transco model avoids the moral-hazard-in-teams problem of an 
ISO model. Therefore, the regulated Transco offers an advantage over the merchant 
FTR approach because the Transco carries out all externality calculations. In this 
sense, it would properly respond to incentive regulation even under loop flows 
(Vogelsang, 2001). On the other hand, the Transco approach faces implementation 
hurdles. As argued by Hogan (1999a), a Transco needs an institutional framework 
with a single grid owner. As explained by Wolfram (1999), the Transco system like 
the one currently used in the United Kingdom, relies on discriminatory treatment of 
transmission uses. This is unacceptable in other countries such as the United States. 
Finally, an incentive type of regulation can hardly be implemented in meshed 
networks because of the impossibility of correctly defining the output of the 
transmission system. 
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3 Summary of research findings and directions for further research 
This thesis contains the eight research papers shown in Table 3-1. The main 
theme is transmission pricing and hedging of risks associated with transmission 
congestion. Both numerical tools and theoretical models have been utilized. 
 
Table 3-1. Research papers included in the thesis. 
 
Paper Analysis Model 
“Transmission congestion 
risks”54 
Theoretical analysis of 
different transmission risk 
management tools  
Cash flow analysis and 
optimal hedge ratios 
“Markets for financial 
transmission rights”55 
Descriptive and empirical 
analysis of financial 
transmission rights in 
markets around the world 
Market design and 
policy issues 
“Utilizing MATPOWER in 
optimal power flow”56 
Social welfare 
considerations 
Application of 
numerical software to 
calculate locational 
prices 
“Pricing of Contracts for 
Differences in the Nordic 
market”57 
Empirical analysis of 
Contracts for Differences 
prices in the Nordic market 
Spot-forward pricing 
and risk-premiums 
“A merchant mechanism 
for electricity transmission 
expansion”58 
Economic consequences of 
awarding long-term FTRs 
to investors in transmission 
expansion 
FTR auction model 
“Provision of financial 
transmission rights”59 
Theoretical and numerical 
analysis of the credit risk of 
the ISO in providing FTRs 
Maximum volume and 
value at risk calculations 
“Effects of losses on area 
prices in the Norwegian 
electricity market”60 
Impacts of losses and 
transmission congestion on 
locational prices after 
enforcing area pricing 
Numerical software 
(MATPOWER) 
“Financial risk 
management in the electric 
power industry”61 
Analysis and discussion of 
numerical results obtained 
from a real case study on 
Norway’s second largest 
hydropower generator 
Stochastic optimization 
model developed by 
SINTEF Energy 
Research 
 
                                               
54
 An early version of this paper was published in Kristiansen (2003a). 
55
 Working paper. 
56
 An early version of this paper was published in Modeling, Identification and Control 
(Kristiansen, 2003b). 
57
 An early version of this paper will be published in Energy Policy (Kristiansen, 2004). 
58
 An early version of this paper was published in Kristiansen and Rosellon (2003). 
59
 An early version of this paper was published in Kristiansen (2003c). 
60
 Submitted for publication (Kristiansen and Wangensteen, 2004). 
61
 An early version of this paper was published in Kristiansen (2002). 
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3.1 Joint work with co-authors 
The paper “A Merchant Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion” was 
partly co-authored with Professor Juan Rosellon. I contributed with the realization of 
Hogan’s proposal for merchant transmission investments in a modeling context, while 
Rosellon put the model in a regulatory economics context. We discussed the model 
solution and its impact on the electricity market in a way that was understandable by 
economists and policy makers. Later I included some more examples to the first 
version of our paper. I also co-authored the paper “Effect of Losses on Area Prices in 
the Norwegian Electricity Market” with my supervisor Professor Ivar Wangensteen. 
He had the hypothesis that losses would have an impact on the grouping of buses in 
an area price model. I implemented a model of a three-bus network in MATPOWER 
and modeled area prices and the impact of losses. We discussed the numerical results 
and policy implications together. The remaining papers are my own contributions. 
3.2 Scientific contributions 
This section summarizes the eight research papers and their findings. 
 
Paper 1: Transmission congestion risks 
The paper “Transmission congestion risks” analyzes contractual arrangements to 
manage spatial risk in electrical networks in the forward market, the bilateral market, 
and the Nordic market. The paper describes transmission risk management tools 
including time aspects. 
 
Paper 2: Markets for financial transmission rights 
The paper “Markets for financial transmission rights” presents a survey of markets 
for transmission rights around the world. It makes a comparison of the markets with 
regard to design and their associated advantages and disadvantages. It also describes 
efficiency in the FTRs markets and places FTRs in a policy context.  
 
Paper 3: Utilization of MATPOWER in optimal power flow  
The paper “Utilization of MATPOWER in optimal power flow” demonstrates how 
MATPOWER, a software simulation package, calculates the nodal prices as a result 
of an optimization of the minimum costs of active generation, taking into account the 
power system constraints. Strictly speaking, there are not any scientific contributions 
in this paper. However, the emphasis is on the utilization of MATPOWER as a tool 
for calculating locational prices and description of the software that is used in paper 7. 
 
Paper 4: Pricing of Contracts for Differences in the Nordic market 
The paper “Pricing of Contracts for Differences in the Nordic market” analyzes the 
CfD prices for the first eight trading periods. Based on a comparison between the 
trading prices of the contracts and the average of the seasonal area price minus the 
System Price during the settlement period, they appear to be over-priced on average 
ex post. The explanation may be the presence of a majority of risk-averse consumers 
who are willing to pay a risk premium for receiving the future price differential.  
 
The findings included the fact that contracts were under-priced ex post. The prices 
of the contracts depend on the inflow in the actual year which is an important factor in 
creating transmission congestion. Since every contract is referred to a season or a 
year, this makes the present amount of data limited. To my knowledge, this is the first 
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survey of how CfDs have been priced. 
 
Paper 5: A merchant mechanism for transmission expansion 
The paper “A merchant mechanism for transmission expansion” proposes a 
merchant mechanism to invest in electricity transmission. Proxy awards (or reserved 
FTRs) are a fundamental part of this mechanism. We defined them according to the 
best use of the current network along the same direction of the incremental expansion. 
The incremental FTR awards are allocated according to the investor preferences, and 
depend on the initial partial allocation of FTRs and network topology before and after 
expansion.  
 
Our examples showed that the internalization of possible negative externalities 
caused by potential expansion is possible according to the rule proposed by Hogan 
(2002a): allocation of FTRs before (proxy FTRs) and after (incremental FTRs) the 
expansion is in the same direction and according to the feasibility rule. Under these 
circumstances, the investor will have the proper incentives to invest in transmission 
expansion in its preference direction given by its bid parameters. Likewise, the larger 
the existing current capacity the greater the number of FTRs that must be reserved in 
order to deal with potential negative externalities depending on post network 
topology. 
 
Our mechanism of long-term FTRs is basically a way to hedge market players 
from long-run nodal price fluctuations by providing them with the necessary property 
transmission rights. Although our model is specifically designed to deal with loop 
flows, and the security-constrained version of our model can take care of contingency 
concerns, our proposed mechanism is to be applied to expansions where the locational 
price difference does not vanish totally. Long-term FTRs are efficient under no or 
small returns-to-scale marginal expansions of the transmission network, and lack of 
market power. Regulation has then an important complementary role in fostering 
large and lumpy projects where investment is large relative to market size, and in 
mitigating market power. Since revenues from nodal prices only recover a small part 
of total costs, long-term FTRs must be complemented with a regulated framework that 
allows the recovery of fixed costs. The challenge is to effectively combine merchant 
and regulated transmission investments or, as Hogan (2003) puts it, to establish a rule 
in practice for drawing a line between merchant and regulated investments. 
 
Paper 6: Provision of financial transmission rights 
The paper “Provision of financial transmission rights” demonstrates the key issues 
associated with the provision of FTR obligations and options. In particular, the 
independent system operator (ISO) must conduct an analysis of revenue adequacy, 
because the maximum volume of FTRs (both obligations and options) will vary with 
the transmission line capacities and contingencies. In a three-bus network, the 
maximum volume associated with an issue of a single FTR is determined by the shift 
factor matrix elements and transmission line capacities. The paper shows the 
alternative relationship for the maximum volume, congestion rent and locational 
prices. Due to counterflows a higher volume of FTRs might be issued between certain 
buses. Conversely, a lower volume of options than obligations must be issued because 
they do not create counterflows. Proceeds from the FTR auction were considered and 
demonstrated that a higher volume might be issued. Uncertainty associated with 
congestion gave the ISO an uncertain cash flow, composed of the congestion rent and 
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payments to the FTR holders. As a tool for risk management any provider could 
utilize the VaR approach. The VaR shows that the greatest potential loss occurs when 
FTRs with the highest expected payments are issued and the lowest when FTRs with 
the lowest expected payments are issued. Private parties would not have to fulfill the 
simultaneous feasibility test and might buy insurance in the market to hedge any risks 
associated with providing FTRs. 
 
Paper 7: Effect of losses on area prices in the Norwegian electricity market 
The paper “Effect of losses on area prices in the Norwegian electricity market” 
demonstrates that taking into account the joint interaction of losses and transmission 
congestion may have significant impacts on the individual bus prices. The numerical 
results illustrate that the bus prices differ due to both transmission congestion and 
losses when there is a transmission constraint binding in the full transmission 
network. Moreover, running a DC and an AC OPF may have different impacts on the 
bus prices. We also illustrate and describe the current practice for area pricing in 
Norway. Numerical results illustrate that area prices may change substantially after 
regrouping the buses in different price areas or when using a DC OPF rather than an 
AC OPF. 
 
Paper 8: Financial risk management in the electric power industry  
The paper “Financial risk management in the electric power industry” 
demonstrates that it is possible to apply an integrated risk management model to 
realistic cases. The case results show that hydropower generation and trading in the 
futures market change with the risk aversion. In general it was found that the expected 
income decreased with increasing penalty as expected. The minimum income 
scenarios in the closest income periods are reduced when risk aversion is introduced. 
When no hedging in the futures market is allowed, the water is moved between the 
different time periods (seasons) to meet the income targets. 
 
The model gives risk adjusted water values as output and these can be used as a 
condition for sale in the spot market. Likewise, marginal contract values, when 
properly adjusted, can be used as signals for buying or selling in the futures market. 
 
When dynamic hedging is introduced, the simulated income uncertainty is reduced 
and the model offers a more realistic forecast of the associated income for a portfolio 
of physical generation, futures contracts, and load factors contracts. An optimization 
of both physical generation and the contract portfolio is necessary because the 
information about reservoir levels and rest volumes gives signals for changes in future 
position and reduces inflow risks. 
 
3.3 Directions for further research 
The study of transmission congestion derivatives prices will be improved with 
more empirical data as time passes and therefore needs to be updated periodically. 
Likewise, the PJM market, the New England market, and other markets that have 
implemented FTRs could be analyzed. 
 
The main purpose of the four basic axioms that support the long-term financial 
transmission rights model (feasibility rule, proxy awards, maximum value and 
symmetry) were to define property rights for increased transmission investment 
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according to the preset proxy rule. However, the general implications on welfare and 
incentives for gaming are still an open research question. Another “axiom” might be 
needed to deal with these last issues. 
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4 Transmission congestion risks 
In this chapter we describe available instruments for hedging against transmission 
congestion risks. These include forward contracts and options. We illustrate risk 
management strategies for trades between two locations when transmission 
congestion is present. Risk management in three different markets is exemplified by 
the general forward market, the bilateral market, and the Nordic market. Cash flow 
analysis describes the conditions under which hedging is profitable and demonstrates 
that players can protect themselves against future price differences. Taking into 
account that a riskless hedge may be non-optimal if the objective is to minimize 
variance, the optimal hedge ratio for forward contracts is calculated. 
4.1 Introduction 
After deregulation of electricity markets, price volatility has increased. Therefore, 
hedging instruments play an important role in the most well-functioning markets (e.g. 
Nord Pool). Trading across different regions creates risks that can be managed by use 
of financial transmission rights (Hogan, 1992) and energy forward contracts 
(Rajaraman and Alvarado, 1998).  
 
When market players trade between different locations, they face the risk of paying 
a congestion fee for transferring electricity. The congestion fee from bus i to bus j is 
defined as: 
 
Congestion fee = Oij (Pj-Pi)                                          (4.1)               
 
        
 
where Oij is the amount of transferred electricity from bus i to bus j and P is the local 
bus62 price. The congestion fee arises from the scarcity of transmission.63 It is 
typically zero because there is adequate transmission capacity most of the time. When 
transmission capacity is scarce, however, prices can become high. To some extent 
these prices are predictable, but they contain a significant random component that can 
be problematic for traders. 
 
If a generator trades with load at the local bus, it is not charged for transmission, 
and can use a forward product to hedge the price uncertainty. If a generator trades 
with a distant load, and there is a chance of congestion, the trade is exposed to 
transmission price risk. This discourages trade because trading across a congested 
path in either direction will be risky (Stoft, 2002). This may enhance market power by 
decreasing the number of distant trades. To reduce such problems players can utilize 
financial instruments to hedge against transmission congestion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
62
 A bus refers to a node in the transmission network.  
63
 This ignores the charge for losses, which is almost never above 10% and is far more 
predictable. 
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4.2 Financial transmission rights  
The basic types of transmission rights are: 
• Financial transmission rights (FTRs64) obligation: right to collect payment from 
(or an obligation to pay) the price difference associated with transmission 
congestion between destination and origin for a specified contract quantity.65 
• Financial transmission rights (FTRs) option: right to collect payment from the 
price difference associated with transmission congestion between destination and 
origin for a specified contract quantity. If the price difference is negative the 
payoff is zero.  
• Flowgate rights (FGRs66): constraint-by-constraint hedge that gives the right to 
collect payments based on the shadow price associated with a particular 
transmission constraint. 
• Physical transmission rights (PTRs): right or priority to physical transmission for 
a specified amount between two defined locations.  
 
While forward contracts are used to hedge the temporal risk, transmission rights 
are used for hedging spatial risk.67 Transmission rights are used mainly to facilitate 
trade in advance of the physical scheduling (usually done by a system operator a day 
in advance). Physical and financial transmission rights have different impacts on 
market power and on the electricity transmission system. Every transmission line at 
any time has a net directed power flow, which may consist of flows in both directions 
(both are fictitious). For FTRs only the net power flow matters, while for physical 
rights the directed power flow determines their feasibility.  
 
Financial rights are only instruments for hedging against financial risk. Often they 
are provided by the ISO and are restricted in number by the network capacity 
calculations of the ISO that ensures that the independent system operator (ISO) has 
sufficient revenues to cover the payments to FTR holders (Hogan, 1992). Provision of 
options is more restrictive because they do not create counterflows. The feasibility test 
can be complex and may require a central coordinator to produce a feasible set of 
FTRs. 
 
 Physical rights give the right to inject a certain amount of electricity at point i and 
withdraw it at point j. The holders are guaranteed scheduling for their rights. These 
rights can make withholding of transmission capacity possible and necessitate 
capacity release rules (use-it-or-lose-it principle), and are more restrictive than FTRs. 
Another type of physical right confers only a scheduling priority and is a less 
centralized and more flexible approach.68  
 
                                               
64
 FTRs are also often called transmission congestion contracts (TCCs). For more 
background on FTRs see Hogan (2003) and Stoft (2002). 
65
 The set of point-to-point obligations can be decomposed into a set of balanced and 
unbalanced (injection or withdrawal of energy) obligations. The unbalanced FTRs can be 
used to hedge against losses (Hogan, 2002b). 
66
 In the earliest proposals, these rights were categorized as physical rights, but in the recent 
proposals the value of the FGRs are decided in the ISO settlements, and they do not require 
the parties to obtain all the FGRs needed prior to settlement. 
67
 FTRs are usually also forward contracts, since they are hedges against future transmission 
prices. 
68
 An example is firm transmission rights in California. 
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An FTR obligation will entitle its owner to be paid the price difference between 
two buses times the contract quantity over a specified time period. This payment will 
net out any price risk associated with using that path (i.e. paying congestion fees) if 
the hedge is perfect. Such payments will be made regardless of the owner’s actual 
usage of the transmission system. The payments under this right are therefore 
independent of the owner’s physical use of the grid. Even if the congestion risk is 
hedged, traders will still be exposed to locational price signals and should still make 
efficient choices for generation and load. The mathematical formulation for the payoff 
is: 
 
FTR = Qij(Pj -Pi)                                                (4.1)         (4.2)          
 
where Pj is the bus price at location j, Pi is the bus price at location i and Qij is the 
directed quantity specified for the path from i to j. An FTR obligation may be viewed 
as an injection Qij of electricity at bus i and a withdrawal of Qij at bus j. A perfect 
hedge is created by purchasing a contract quantity, Q, that equals the amount of 
electricity that is transferred between the two locations, O. An FTR may be acquired 
by either purchasing it in auctions or in the secondary markets, or by investing in 
transmission lines. Ideally, the auction price of an FTR obligation should equal the 
expected future congestion price. 
 
Locational prices are needed before an FTR can be defined. These should depend 
on transmission congestion and perhaps losses. Typically, FTR obligations are 
forward contracts that are settled in the day-ahead market. Their payoff (assuming a 
fixed contract quantity) is only dependent on the bus prices, not on the actual power 
flow, and it may be positive, zero or negative as illustrated in Figure 4-1 for a 1 MW 
FTR obligation. Prices will change during the specified contract period, so the value 
of the total payment to the FTR holder is calculated by averaging a series of 
fluctuating locational prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Payoff from a 1 MW FTR obligation. 
 
An FTR obligation will have a negative value if the contract covers a path for 
which the price at bus i (injection) is higher than the price at bus j (withdrawal), 
Pi>Pj.  This can happen because the acquired FTR is defined opposite to the 
prevailing direction, or because electricity on this path is flowing from a high to a low 
( )j iP P−
Payoff 
( )j iP P−
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price bus. The first is highly desirable in a transmission system because it relieves 
congestion, while the second can exist in a meshed network. In either case, if the FTR 
of the trader more than covers its transmission needs during slack periods, the trader 
may suffer an unpredictable financial penalty for owning the unused part of its right 
(Bushnell and Stoft, 1996).  
 
A point-to-point transaction can also be hedged by purchasing a mix of other 
FTRs. However, locational prices, congestion fees, and the values of FTRs are 
undefined until the dispatch occurs. Thus, the trader cannot be certain whether any 
mix of FTRs other than the point-to-point FTR provides a perfect hedge. FTRs may 
be more flexible if they are defined to and from central hubs because the buyer and 
seller then have one FTR for the same hub. When the buyer and seller enter into a 
contract they use two FTRs to hedge the congestion fee. The holders can then freely 
trade their contracts and make the secondary market more liquid. In general FTRs are 
more difficult to trade because of the large number of possible buses they can be 
defined between. In an N-node network the possible number of FTRs is 1/2·N(N+1) 
for N>2. An FTR obligation is decomposable and has the following properties: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )j j hub i j hubP P P P P P− = − + −                                         (4.3)      
( ) ( )j i i jP P P P− = − −  
 
FTRs can also be purchased as one-way options. In this case the holder is not 
responsible for negative payments that occur when the locational price difference is 
negative. The mathematical formulation for the payoff is: 
 
FTR_option = max (Qij (Pj -Pi), 0)                                        (4.4)           
    
Payments from an option are non-negative, and the option will have a clearing price 
greater than or equal to the price of an FTR obligation. The clearing price of an option 
is a function of the shadow price of each binding transmission constraint and it will 
never be less than zero for a buy bid. The payoff from a 1 MW FTR option is 
illustrated in Figure 4-2. A physical transmission right has a similar payoff.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2. The payoff from a 1 MW FTR option. 
max{0, }j iP P−
  Payoff 
( )j iP P−
 Transmission congestion risks                                                                                   65 
_____________________________________________________________________
  
 
If the objective is to fully and efficiently utilize the network, schedules that create 
counterflows are necessary, because they relieve congestion. Obligations also provide 
parties with transaction hedges against price uncertainty at generation and load buses. 
They work in favor of obligations. In the presence of counterflows, options issued by 
the ISO will not allow full hedging. The parties can then try to work out hedging 
arrangements in the private market. The FTR option does not have the same 
decomposition properties as the FTR obligation as demonstrated by: 
 
max(0, ) max(0, ) max(0, )j i hub i j hubP P P P P P− ≠ − + −                                               (4.5)          
max(0, ) max(0, )j i i jP P P P− ≠ − −  
 
Still another alternative is to use flowgate rights (Chao and Peck, 1996 and 1997). 
The idea is that since electricity flows along many parallel paths, it may be natural to 
associate the payments with the actual electricity flows. Key assumptions include a 
power system with few flowgates or constraints, known capacity limits at the 
flowgates and known power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) that decompose a 
transaction into the flows over the flowgates. In practice, however, this may not be the 
case. The physical rights approach has been abandoned and a financial approach has 
been proposed in the literature (Hogan, 2002b). The payoff from the FGRs is 
determined by taking the associated flowgate shadow price times the flowgate amount 
and totaling them for all lines k that are affected by the transaction between buses m 
and n (Equation (2.25)).  
 
( )
( )
* *
* * * *
FGR
shadow price
( , ) the flowgate amount
( , )  the PTDF at the optimal operating point ( , )
for a transaction between buses  and  over line  
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∇ =
∑
                    (4.6)                    
 
The flowgate amount can take negative, zero or positive values. 
 
To illustrate how FGRs can be used for hedging an example is provided in Figure 
4-3  (Singh, 2003). Here a 100 MW transaction from A to E would pay: 
 
BE CD60 20 $1000η η⋅ + ⋅ =  
 
Thus the transaction can be hedged by buying 60 MWs FGRs on BE and 20 MW 
FGRs on CD. However, important issues are what happen if for example line AB 
becomes congested or if the PTDFs change. A perfect hedge for the same transaction 
could be accomplished by purchasing a 100 MW FTR between A and E that would 
pay exactly the same and would remain perfect if other lines became congested or the 
PTDFs changed. 
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Shadow Price of FGRBE = ηBE= $ 15.00
Shadow Price of FGRCD = ηCD= $ 5.00
LMPA = $20/MW
LMPE = $30/MW
E
D
C
A
B
FGRCD
FGRBE
LMPC = $21.50/MW
PTDFs
Transactions FGRBE FGRCD
A to E 0.6 0.2
 
 
Figure 4-3. Flowgate right example (Singh, 2003). 
 
In general, parties that want to be fully hedged should purchase a mix of FGRs that 
matches the distribution of flows from its transaction.69 In a transmission network, the 
flows will be determined by the line impedances, and more than one flowgate 
(transmission constraint) may be affected. Flowgate proponents assert that trading is 
easy if there are few commercially significant flowgates, resulting in a limited set of 
FGRs and if the PTDFs change infrequently (Chao et al. 2000). This seems difficult to 
ensure in a dynamic power system where unanticipated transmission constraints may 
become binding (Hogan, 2000).  
 
Although some ISOs sell transmission rights in their day-ahead markets, these 
markets are only approximations of the real-time congestion prices. A continuous 
market with a slowly changing price that traders can observe before trading may be 
needed. Afterwards, they can purchase transmission rights at a price close to the 
observed transmission price. As yet, there are no such markets. 
4.3 Contracts for Differences 
The Nordic market (i.e. Nord Pool) has introduced Contracts for Differences 
(CfDs).70 These financial instruments make it possible for the market players to hedge 
against the difference between the area (zonal) price and the System Price (the 
unconstrained price) in a future time period (Nord Pool, 2002c). The area prices that 
are traded are: Oslo (NO1), Stockholm (SE), Helsinki (FI), Århus (DK1), and 
Copenhagen (DK2). 
 
 
                                               
69
 This assumes that all constraints that could have been binding in the dispatch have been 
designated as flowgates, and that the ISO has made FGRs available for all flowgates. If some 
constraints have not been designated, but become binding, then there is no mechanism by 
which parties can purchase a perfect hedge. Some proposals for FGRs take this into account 
by not charging holders for the non-predicted constraints and instead socialize the costs. 
70
 Here, the term Contract for Differences is different from the corresponding term used in the 
British market. In the Nordic region, CfDs are used to hedge against the difference between 
the two uncertain prices (area price and System Price), not as in the British market, where 
they hedge the difference between the spot price and a pre-defined reference price or price 
profile. The Nordic CfD is a locational swap, while the British CfD is settled based on the 
difference between the spot price and the reference price. When referring to CfD in the Nordic 
market, the term Nordic CfD is used. 
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The forward and futures contracts traded at Nord Pool are with reference to the 
System Price. Producers are paid the area price for generation in their area. 
Consumers purchase electricity at their respective area price. Often, producers and 
consumers in different areas encounter situations of transmission congestion when the 
area prices differ from the System Price. They may also be exposed to significant 
financial risks associated with congestion fees for bilateral transactions in the Nordic 
countries that are calculated based on the difference between the area prices times the 
transferred quantity. Usually producers pay the fee, but parties can also make other 
arrangements. 
 
The payment from the Nordic CfD is:  
 
CfD = Qi (APi –SP)                                                                                      (4.7)    
       
where APi refers to the area price in area i, SP is the System Price, and Qi is the 
contracted volume. Payments are calculated as the average of the difference between 
the daily area price and the System Price during the delivery period (a season or a 
year) times the contracted volume. From Equation (4.7) we see that each time the area 
price is higher than the System Price the holder receives a payment equal to the price 
differential times the contracted volume. Otherwise the holder must pay the 
difference.  
 
The market price of a Nordic CfD can be positive, negative or zero (Kristiansen, 
2004). CfDs trade at positive prices if the market expects that the area price will be 
higher than the System Price (a net import situation). CfDs trade at negative prices if 
the market expects an area price below the System Price (a net export situation). 
 
A perfect hedge using forward or futures contracts is possible only when the area 
price and the System Price are equal. If forward or futures contracts are used for 
hedging, this implies a basis risk equal to the area price minus the System Price. To 
create a perfect hedge against the price differential: 
 
4. Hedge the specified volume by using forward contracts. 
5. Hedge against the price differential – for the same period and volume – by using 
CfDs. 
6. Accomplish physical procurement by trading in the Elspot area of the holder of 
the contract. 
 
Norway has adopted an area (zonal) price model to manage congestion in the day-
ahead market. A charge equal to the difference between the System Price and low area 
price times the transferred quantity (capacity charge) is imposed in the low price area, 
and a charge equal to the difference between the high area price and the System Price 
times the transferred quantity is imposed in the high price area.  Thus, withdrawals are 
charged in the high price area and compensated in the low price area. The opposite is 
the case for injections. However, it is impossible to hedge against price differences 
within Norway, because there is only one contract with reference to the area Norway 
1 (Oslo). Shorter-term products and products for hedging directly against area price 
differentials are unavailable at the exchange. Nord Pool is considering listing CfDs 
with reference to Norway 2 (Trondheim) and CfDs with shorter delivery periods such 
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as weeks or months (Nord Pool, 2003). Nord Pool is also considering the listing of 
CfDs with reference to the German EEX price. 
4.4 Transmission risk management contractual arrangements 
We analyze three different markets: a forward market (including a day-ahead 
market), a bilateral market, and the Nordic market. There are no deviations in the real-
time market from the contracted volume. Hence, the market player does not 
participate in the real-time market and is paid the day-ahead price. 
4.4.1 Forward market 
Assume that the generator sells electricity to a load at bus 2. The generator is paid 
the price at bus 2 and pays a congestion fee to the system operator so that the price it 
is effectively paid equals the price at bus 1. The load pays the price at bus 2. Other 
arrangements are also possible depending on the contract type. Assume that bus 1 is a 
surplus area and bus 2 is a deficit area. The price at bus 1 is therefore expected to be 
lower than at bus 2.  
 
Table 4-1. Consequences for the generator facing a congestion fee in the day-ahead 
market without an FTR. 
 
 Day-ahead 
market 
Congestion fee Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12P2 –Q12(P2  – P1) Q12P1 
Load pays: Q12P2  Q12P2 
 
The cash flow analysis shows the generator is indifferent between selling 
electricity at its local bus and at bus 2 (Table 4-1). To hedge the congestion fee, the 
generator buys an FTR obligation for the contracted volume. Its cash flow is shown in 
Table 4-2, where pFTR  is the contract price of the FTR. 
 
Table 4-2. Consequences for the generator facing a congestion fee in the day-ahead 
market with an FTR. 
 
 Day-ahead 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
FTR Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12P2 –Q12(P2  – P1) Q12(P2  – P1) 
–Q12pFTR 
Q12P2  – Q12pFTR 
Load pays: Q12P2   Q12P2 
 
The revenue of the generator will be dependent on the price at bus 2 and the price 
of the FTR. It avoids paying a congestion fee and is paid the price at bus 2 by 
purchasing an FTR. This arrangement is profitable if the contract price is less than the 
differences in the local day-ahead prices, 2 1- .FTRp P P<  
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Table 4-3. Consequences for the generator arranging a sale in the low price area (bus 
2) in the day-ahead market without an FTR. 
 
 Day-ahead 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
Total cash flow 
Generator is paid: Q12P2  Q12(P1 – P2) Q12P1  
Load pays: Q12P2  Q12P2 
   
If the price at bus 1 is higher than at bus 2 and the generator has arranged a sale at 
bus 2, the generator receives compensation for relieving congestion equal to the 
congestion fee as shown in Table 4-3. Therefore it is indifferent to selling electricity 
at the local (high price) bus and the distant (low price) bus.  
 
Table 4-4 illustrates the situation in which the generator receives compensation, 
but the FTR is an obligation so the generator must pay the same amount to the seller 
of the right. Buying an FTR is profitable if the contract price is less than the 
difference in prices between locations 2 and 1.  
 
Table 4-4. Consequences for the generator arranging a sale in the low price area in the 
day-ahead market with an FTR. 
 
 Day-ahead 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
FTR Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12P2   Q12(P1 – P2) –Q12(P1  –  P2) 
–Q12pFTR 
Q12P2  –  Q12pFTR 
Load pays: Q12P2   Q12P2 
 
Next, assume that a trader arranges to buy Q12 at a price P1 from the generator at 
bus 1 (low price) and sell it to the load at bus 2 for the price P2 (high price). It also 
pays the congestion fee as shown in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5. Consequences for the trader in the day-ahead market without an FTR. 
 
 Day-ahead 
market 
Congestion fee Total cash 
flow 
Generator is paid: Q12P1    Q12P1 
Load pays: Q12P2    Q12P2 
Profit of the trader: Q12(P2  – P1) –Q12(P2  – P1)      0 
 
The trader does not profit when the line is congested. To hedge the congestion fee, 
it buys an FTR and receives a profit (or an expense) equal to that of the congestion fee 
minus the contract cost. If the price of the FTR is lower than the price differential 
between buses 2 and 1, this is a profitable trade as shown in Table 4-6.  
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Table 4-6. Consequences for the trader in the day-ahead market with an FTR. 
 
 Day-ahead 
market 
Congestion fee FTR Total cash flow 
Generator 
is paid: 
Q12P1   Q12P1 
Load pays: Q12P2   Q12P2 
Profit of 
the trader: 
Q12(P2  – P 1)    –Q12(P2 – P1) Q12(P2  – P1) 
  –Q12pFTR 
Q12(P2  – P1) 
–Q12pFTR 
 
4.4.2 Hedging by taking opposite positions in the forward markets 
This hedging strategy requires that there are two energy forward markets with 
prices p1 and p2 in the two regions in which the trade 12Q  is accomplished. The hedge 
gives the same payoff as the congestion fee, Q12(P2 – P1). Assume that the contracted 
volume is Q12. The generator in region 1 can then enter into a contract agreement 
where it is long (buying) in the region of the load and short (selling) in its own region. 
The congestion fee is paid by the generator. This gives a combined cost equal to: 
 
12 2 1 12 2 1 12 2 1 12 2 1( - ) ( - ) - ( - ) ( - )Q p p Q P P Q P P Q p p+ =                                                  (4.8)                                            
 
where p1 and p2 are the forward prices in the two regions. Parties have also agreed that 
the generator sells electricity to the load at price pC. The consequences are illustrated 
in Table 4-7. 
 
Table 4-7. The cash flows of a generator from a bilateral trade while hedging against 
the congestion fee. 
 
 Forward 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
Day-ahead 
market 
Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12p1 – Q12p2 
+Q12 pC 
–Q12(P2 – P1) Q12(P2 – P1) Q12p1  – Q12p2 
+Q12 pC 
 
    This contractual arrangement gives the generator a cash flow that is perfectly 
hedged. When there is congestion (P2 > P1) the generator in region 1 will receive a net 
profit which may be higher than in its local forward market,71 since it can sell 
electricity in region 2 at the fixed price pC  at a cost of  Q12(p2 - p1). 
4.4.3 Hedging with options 
The advantage of an option is that it does not give a negative payoff. However, the 
price will be higher, since the market prices this into a premium. The payoff from the 
option is: 
 
                                               
71
 This depends on the level of the forward prices in region 2 compared to the fixed contract 
price pC. If the contract price is higher than the forward price in region 2, the net profit will be 
higher. Conversely, when the contract price is lower than the forward price in region 2, the net 
profit will be lower. 
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12 2 1
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max(0, - )
0
Q P P P PQ P P
P P
>
= 
>
                                       (4.9)                                                                     
 
When the price at bus 2 is higher than at bus 1, the generator is assumed to pay the 
congestion fee.   
 
Table 4-8. Consequences for the generator facing a congestion fee in the day-ahead 
market when buying an option. 
 
 Day-
ahead 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
Option Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12P2 – Q12(P2- P1) Q12(P2  – P1) 
–Q12poption 
Q12P2  – Q12poption 
Load pays: Q12P2   Q12P2 
 
The generator has hedged the congestion fee as shown in Table 4-8. Its expected 
profit will be lower than by purchasing FTRs because the price of the option will be 
correspondingly higher. Consider the case where the price at bus 1 is higher than at 
bus 2 and the sale is conducted at bus 2 (Table 4-9). The generator receives its price at 
bus 1 because it receives a rebate equal to the congestion fee for relieving congestion, 
but at the same time it has paid for an option with zero payoff (P1  > P2).  
 
Table 4-9. Consequences for the generator facing a congestion fee in the day-ahead 
market when buying an option and the price at bus 1 is higher than at bus 2. 
 
 Day-
ahead 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
Option Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12P2 –Q12(P2  – P1) – Q12poption Q12P1 – Q12poption 
4.4.4 The bilateral market 
Traders must find each other and negotiate contracts. Consider two types of 
contracts: a standard bilateral contract and a British contract for differences (CfD). 
The British CfD makes it possible to hedge against the difference between the spot72 
price and a pre-defined reference price or price profile and can be written in several 
ways.  
 
Assume that the generator and load have signed a bilateral contract of volume Q12 
without the benefit of a middleman. The price of the contract is PC. The generator 
pays the congestion fee and is paid the contract price. P1 is the day-ahead price at the 
bus of the generator. P2 is the day-ahead price at the bus of the load. First consider the 
case with the bilateral contract and no insurance as shown in Table 4-10. 
 
 
                                               
72
 The spot price is assumed to be equal to the day-ahead price, since there are no deviations 
in contracted and delivered volumes. Originally the CfD was with reference to the spot price. 
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Table 4-10. Consequences for the generator paying a congestion fee in the bilateral 
market without an FTR. 
 
 Bilateral market Congestion 
fee 
Total cash flow 
Generator 
is paid: 
Q12PC –Q12(P2  – P1) Q12PC – Q12(P2  – P1) 
Load pays: Q12PC  Q12PC 
 
By buying an FTR the generator will be compensated for the congestion fee as 
shown in Table 4-11. The FTR makes it possible to fix the price of transmission. The 
arrangement will be profitable if 2 1 -FTRp P P<
 
which is the same condition as in the 
preceding cases. 
 
Table 4-11. Consequences for the generator with an FTR. 
 
 Bilateral 
market 
Congestion 
fee 
FTR Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12PC –Q12(P2 – P1) Q12(P2  – P1) 
–Q12pFTR 
Q12PC  – Q12pFTR 
Load pays: Q12PC   Q12PC 
 
The second example considers a CfD where the generator pays for transmission. 
The situation is illustrated in Table 4-12. 
 
Table 4-12. Generator pays for transmission CfD. 
 
Effect of CfD Payment from load to 
generator 
Generator pays for 
transmission: 
Q12(PC  –  P2) 
 
The generator is not hedged against locational price differences as illustrated in Table 
4-13. The effect of using the CfD is that the load pays a fixed price for the electricity, 
while the generator receives a fixed price for electricity and pays the congestion fee. 
To hedge the congestion fee, the generator can buy an FTR as shown in Table 4-14. 
 
Table 4-13. Cash flows to the parties resulting from using a CfD when the generator 
pays for transmission. 
 
 CfD     Spot   
    market 
Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12(PC – P2) Q12P1 Q12PC – Q12(P2 – P1) 
Load pays: Q12(PC – P2) Q12P2 Q12PC 
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Table 4-14. Cash flows to the parties resulting from using a CfD when the generator 
pays for transmission and has purchased an FTR. 
 
 CfD Spot 
market 
     FTR Total cash flow 
Generator 
is paid: 
Q12(PC – P2) Q12P1 Q12(P2 – P1) 
–Q12pFTR 
Q12PC  – Q12pFTR 
Load pays: Q12(PC – P2) Q12P2  Q12PC 
 
In the next example, the trader pays the congestion fee, because it has agreed to 
buy 12Q at bus 1 at a price f1 and sell the power at bus 2 at a price f2. However, since 
both the generator and load participate in the spot market, the trader must specify that 
the generator will pay it 12 1Q P
 
(the amount the generator is paid in the local spot 
market). The trader pays load 12 2Q P (the amount the load pays in the local spot 
market). This trade constitutes two CfDs: trader pays generator 12 1 1( - )Q f P  and load 
pays the trader 12 2 2( - )Q f P . This arrangement is favorable when the generator and 
load want price certainty, and the trader wants to exploit profits from electricity 
trading. The trade is illustrated in Table 4-15.  
 
Table 4-15. Cash flows to a trader providing two CfDs and at the same time paying 
the congestion fee. 
 
 CfD Spot 
market 
Congestion 
fee/FTR 
Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Q12(f1 – P1)  Q12P1  Q12f1 
Load pays: Q12(f2 – P2) Q12P2  Q12f2 
The profit of 
the trader: 
Q12(f2 – f1)  –Q12(P2 – P1) Q12(f2 –  f1) 
–Q12(P2 – P1) 
The profit of 
the trader with 
an FTR: 
Q12(f2 – f1)  –Q12(P2 – P1) 
+Q12(P2 – P1) 
 –Q12pFTR 
      Q12(f2 – f1) 
      
 
–Q12pFTR 
 
As shown the trader is perfectly hedged against locational price differences by 
purchasing an FTR. This is profitable for the trader as long as the contract price is less 
than the difference in bus prices between the two locations. 
4.4.5 The Nordic market 
Assume that there is a System Price (i.e. unconstrained price), and area (zonal) 
prices. Most financial contracts are referred to the System Price, while the generators 
are paid the local price for their production and the consumers pay their local area 
price. This means that the parties are left with a risk that the System Price and the 
local area price differ due to transmission congestion. According to the area price 
model, withdrawals are charged in the high price area and compensated in the low 
price area. Injections are compensated in the high price area (B) and charged in the 
low price area (A). Congestion fees for bilateral transactions in the Nordic countries 
are calculated based on the difference between the area prices times the transferred 
quantity. 
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 Assume a load has purchased a forward contract of volume Qs from the exchange 
at the price pf and a CfD of the same volume at the price pCfD. In addition, it also 
accomplishes physical procurement by trading the same volume in its local spot area. 
The cash flow during the delivery period is shown in Table 4-16. 
 
Table 4-16. The cash flows of a load in the delivery period resulting from the 
purchase of a forward and a Nordic CfD. 
 
 Forward 
market 
CfD Day-ahead 
market 
Total cash flow 
Load pays: Qs pf  Qs pCfD Qs APB – Qs SP 
–Qs(APB  – SP) 
Qs(pf + pCfD) 
 
The load fixes the costs of purchasing electricity to the prices of the forward 
contracts and is therefore perfectly hedged against any uncertainties in spot prices. 
 
Similarly, assume that a generator has sold a standard forward contract and a 
Nordic CfD, both with volume Qs. Its cash flows are shown in Table 4-17. In this case 
the generator fixes its revenue to the prices of forward contracts. 
 
Table 4-17. The cash flows of a generator in the delivery period resulting from the 
sale of a forward and a Nordic CfD. 
 
 Forward 
market 
CfD Day-ahead market Total cash flow 
Generator is 
paid: 
Qs pf  Qs pCfD Qs APA – Qs SP 
–Qs(APA – SP) 
Qs(pf + pCfD)  
 
Another contractual arrangement is when a generator in area A enters into a 
contract to sell electricity to a consumer in another area B at the price PC as shown in 
Table 4-18. The congestion fee is paid by the generator. In this market there are no 
FTRs available so the generator must use Nordic CfDs. A synthetic FTR is replicated 
by buying one CfD for the delivery area (B) and selling one CfD for the generation 
area (A). The payoff for 1 MW is:  
 
( - ) - ( - ) -B A B AFTR AP SP AP SP AP AP= =                                         (4.10)             
 
As a result, the generator is able to hedge perfectly against the area price differential 
at a fixed cost of Qs(pCfDB - pCfDA).         
 
Table 4-18. The cash flows of a generator from a bilateral trade while hedging against 
the congestion fee.               
 
 CfDs Bilateral 
contract 
Day-ahead 
market 
Total cash flow 
Generator 
is paid: 
–Qs pCfDB 
+ Qs pCfDA 
   Qs PC Qs(APA – APB) 
+Qs(APB – APA) 
Qs PC – Qs pCfDB 
+Qs pCfDA 
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4.5 Optimal hedging 
Traditionally, hedging can be done by entering an identical, but opposite position 
to offset all risk. One replicates the risky asset by taking a short position in a forward 
instrument if the relationship between the prices of the two assets is linear. It can be 
shown (Hull, 2003) that the optimal hedge ratio for a player that wants to hedge its 
spot (or day-ahead) position (S) is to purchase the amount h* of forward (F) contracts: 
 
* S
SF
F
h σρ
σ
=
                                                                                       (4.11)            
 
 
where σ is the volatility of the assets and ρ is the correlation between the assets. The 
returns of both the spot and the forward can be estimated from historical data. 
 
 The variance will then be a natural risk measure and variance minimization while 
holding the mean return constant is appropriate. The optimal hedge can be illustrated 
when the underlying asset is a price differential PD AP SPP P P= − between the area and 
System Price following the methodology utilized by Tanlapco et al. (2002). The 
purpose of this hedging is to insulate from price variations. Assume that the hedge is 
for one MWh and that the market player wants to trade at different locations. The 
value of the hedge (H) is: 
 
, 1 ,[ ]AP SP CfD t CfD tH P P h F F−= − + −
                                                           
(4.12)
                
 
where h represents the number of MWhs of CfDs that are used for hedging (i.e. the 
hedge ratio) while FCfD,t  and FCfD,t-1 are the prices of CfDs at time t and t-1 
respectively. If h is negative, then the player buys forward contracts at time t. 
Conversely if h is positive it sells forward contracts at time t. A value h equal to 1 
means that the company is fully hedged (i.e. riskless hedge). Hedging is performed in 
a two-period setting and the player plans to sell h of the closest (t-1) forward contract. 
At time t when the anticipated spot market transaction occurs, the player closes out its 
forward position by purchasing the same forward contract at time t. This avoids 
physical delivery of the forward contract. The derivation of the optimal hedge is done 
in a minimum risk framework of a risk-averse company.73 The mean and the variance 
of the hedge are shown as: 
 
, , 1
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
, , , ,
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] 2
2 2
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SP AP CfD t SP CfD t SP CfD t
AP CfD t AP CfD t SP AP SP AP
E H E P E P hE F hF
Var H h h
h
σ σ σ ρ σ σ
ρ σ σ ρ σ σ
−
= − − +
= + + +
− −
                                    (4.13)             
 
Since the price of the CfD is known at t-1. σ is the standard deviation of the price. The 
variance is minimized with respect to the hedge ratio74 when: 
                                               
73
 One reason why a risk-minimization framework is acceptable is that for a highly risk-averse 
agent, the problem of maximizing a mean-variance utility function collapses into a variance-
minimization problem. 
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where APSPσ  is the standard deviation of the difference between the area and System 
Prices, and 
, ,APSP CfD tρ  is the correlation between the area/ System Price differential and 
the CfD price. The greater the covariance between the spot and Nordic CfD prices, the 
higher the forward market position for every MWh to be sold in the spot market, all 
else being equal. Conversely, if the variance of the CfD prices is high, this tends to 
lower the CfD position. The hedge is riskless (h=1) when 
, , ,CfD t APSP CfD t APSPσ ρ σ= . In 
practice, performing the optimal hedging strategy would require a liquid market 
where trades could be conducted whenever there was a need. 
 
We can derive the corresponding hedge for two forward contracts for two different 
regions: 
 
1 , 1 , 2 , 1 ,[ ] [ ]B A B t B t A t A tH P P h F F h F F− −= − + − − −
                                        
(4.15)
             
 
 
If h1 is negative the trader buys forward contracts at time t and if h1 is positive it sells 
contracts at time t. The opposite is the case for h2. Similarly the mean and the variance 
of the hedge are:75 
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where FA and FB are referred to time t.  
 
The first-order conditions for optimality are: 
 
1
2
1 , , 2 ,[ ] 2 2 2 2 0FA B FB B FB A FB A FB FA FB FA FBhMin Var H h hσ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ= + + − =                     (4.17)              
2
2
2 , , 1 ,[ ] 2 2 2 2 0FB B FA B FA A FA A FA FA FB FA FBhMin Var H h hσ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ σ σ= + − − =               
            
 
The second derivatives with respect to h1 and h2 are positive, so a minimum is found. 
Solving for h1 and h2 gives: 
 
}
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The optimal hedge ratios for forward contracts are more complex than for CfDs. 
There are more uncertainties to monitor and hedge against.  
4.6 Forecasting transmission congestion 
As a starting point for analysis, current congestion pricing allows market 
participants to make an educated guess about the financial consequences of future 
congestion. However, it should be emphasized that current congestion may wrongly 
estimate future congestion. For example, in the US the national load growth is 
projected to be around 1.8% per year, but at the moment there are no incentives for 
investments in the national grid. If this continues to be the case, it will increase the 
frequency of transmission congestion and the magnitude of price differentials.  
 
While it is impossible to predict future transmission congestion, it is possible to 
predict reasonable ranges. One starting point is to use the market price of an FTR. 
Another is the utilization of a rigorous generation and transmission model for 
forecasting locational prices. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has described different instruments for hedging against transmission 
congestion, and illustrated the use of financial transmission rights in the forward and 
bilateral markets. The Nordic market has been used to demonstrate the application of 
Contracts for Differences to hedge against transmission congestion. The cost of 
transmitting electricity (i.e. the congestion fee) between two locations is offset 
precisely by a higher price at one location. Similarly, selling to a low price location is 
offset by compensation. All trades between different regions then, are as profitable on 
average as local trades. To hedge against the congestion fee traders may purchase 
financial transmission rights or energy forward contracts if there are forward markets 
at both locations. If the contract price is less than the price difference between the 
high and low price location, the trade may be profitable. 
 
If the objective is to minimize variance, a perfect hedge may be non-optimal. 
Expressions are derived for optimal hedges for Nordic CfDs and energy forward 
contracts with respect to different regions.  
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5 Markets for financial transmission rights76 
This chapter surveys the markets for financial transmission rights (FTRs) around 
the world. FTRs are used to hedge the costs associated with transmission congestion. 
Currently these rights are in use in PJM, New York and New England. A variant of 
financial transmission rights, which has both a physical and a financial aspect, was 
introduced in California in 2000. FTRs are also planned for introduction in New 
Zealand. The chapter describes the features of the FTRs and the design of the different 
FTR markets. The focus is placed on how FTRs can be acquired, their advantages and 
disadvantages, and their market performance. 
5.1 Introduction 
According to Hogan (2003) transmission policy stands at the center of electricity 
market design. The basic principles are open access and non-discrimination. Financial 
transmission rights (FTRs) facilitate competitive open transmission access. The 
proposed standard market design in the US will reduce seams between regions and 
markets. Certain critical market activities require standardization in order to support 
efficient operation with open access and non-discrimination. The design includes an 
independent transmission provider, which administers a single tariff and operates the 
transmission system to support essential services.  There should be a coordinated spot 
market for energy and ancillary services, which employs bid-based security 
constrained economic dispatch with locational marginal cost pricing. The design 
includes bilateral contracts with a transmission usage charge for each transaction 
based on the difference in the locational prices at the points of injection and 
withdrawal.    
 
In these electricity markets, generators receive the locational price at the point 
where they inject power into the market and loads pay the locational price at the point 
where they have withdrawn power from the market. When the locational price differs 
between the generator and the load, the load or generator may be subject to congestion 
costs (i.e. congestion fees). FTRs as described by Hogan (1992) entitle the holders of 
FTRs to receive the value of congestion as established by the locational price 
difference. Thus, a holder of an FTR between a generator located at point A serving 
load at point B would be indifferent to any difference in the locational prices between 
the generator and load locations. The FTR would effectively reimburse the holder the 
same amount it pays in congestion costs. In the case of an FTR option, the payoff 
would be non-negative. FTRs are assumed to redistribute congestion costs which can 
considerable in the US power markets as illustrated in Figure 5-1. In PJM, FTRs are 
called fixed transmission rights, in New York transmission congestion contracts 
(TCCs), in California firm transmission rights, and in New Zealand and New England 
financial transmission rights. 
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Figure 5-1. Congestion costs in US power markets (Singh, 2003). 
 
FTRs have been used in the PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland) 
Interconnection since April 1, 1998, in New York since September 1, 1999, in 
California since February 1, 2000, and in New England since March 1, 2003.  
 
PJM has introduced FTR obligations and options, while New York and New 
England have introduced FTR obligations, and are now evaluating FTR options.  
 
Various jurisdictions have chosen different FTR designs. PJM, New York, and 
New England have chosen purely financial contracts and Transpower New Zealand 
plan to do the same. California has introduced contracts that have both a physical and 
a financial element and that have similarities to flowgate rights (FGRs) and is 
currently evaluating congestion revenue rights, which are similar to firm transmission 
rights.  
5.2 Market performance criteria 
This chapter looks at the performance of the PJM and New York markets. Siddiqui 
et al. (2003) identify two issues that are important in evaluating financial hedging 
instruments. The first issue is how good the hedge is. The second issue is how 
efficient the market is. Important data in this regard are FTR prices and volumes 
(liquidity). An FTR is also a forward contract since it hedges against future uncertain 
locational prices. The market price of the forward contract should reflect the value of 
the underlying risky cash flow with a proper risk premium. According to Energy 
Security Analysis (2001) the price level of a forward contract is driven by the 
volatility of prices, the number of competitors in the market and the credit standing of 
the counterparties. Illiquid markets will result in higher premiums compared to liquid 
markets.  
 
A proper relationship between the forward price and the underlying asset is 
achieved through arbitrage. This may be more difficult when dealing with FTRs. The 
large number of possible FTRs gives relatively low liquidity. There are few secondary 
markets that enable reconfiguration and reselling. The issuer of FTRs is usually an 
independent system operator (ISO). The FTRs are supposed to redistribute the 
congestion charges collected by the ISO during constrained conditions. In issuing 
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FTRs, an ISO would use a simultaneous feasibility test, which ensures that the total 
amount of FTR issued can be provided under expected network conditions. If the 
issued FTRs meet this test under the same network capacity, then the ISO will collect 
sufficient revenues to cover all FTR payments. The linkage between the simultaneous 
feasibility test and FTR revenue sufficiency is an important factor in preserving the 
quality, value, and amount of the FTR hedges. If the test is not met, revenues may be 
insufficient to cover payments to FTR holders. In the case of obligations, the test is 
easy to perform, but for options the computational demands are more substantial.  
 
To evaluate whether the FTRs offer simultaneous feasibility, the ISO utilizes a 
model grid to ensure that offered rights are met by the capacity of the dispatch grid 
under expected normal conditions. Accordingly, pricing and trading of FTRs is done 
through a central periodic auction. The interaction among the different FTRs through 
the simultaneous feasibility test makes the prices and the congestion rents highly 
interrelated. An efficient FTR market must anticipate not only the uncertainty in 
transmission prices, but also the shift in the operating point within the feasible region 
determined by the economic dispatch (Siddiqui et al., 2003). 
 
The model grid that represents expected conditions may be an inaccurate 
description of the grid offered for dispatch, resulting in discrepancies between the 
congestion charges and the payoff to the holders of FTRs. Currently, the ISO 
redistributes excess congestion charges to the FTR holders in deficit payment periods 
and transmission service customers. Conversely, when there are deficit congestion 
charges, the ISO may reduce payments proportionally to FTR holders or require 
transmission owners to make up the deficit.  
 
We compare FTR prices with the underlying asset by studying several examples of 
FTRs over time and locations. 
5.3 The PJM market  
The PJM market uses hubs for commercial trading. The hubs are a cross-section of 
representative buses and their prices are less volatile than a single point because they 
are weighted averages of locational marginal prices (LMPs). The three main hubs are: 
• Western hub (111 buses) 
• Eastern hub (237 buses) 
• Interface hub (3 buses) 
The Western hub is the most actively traded location. The day-ahead market in PJM 
(predominately Western hub) is considered to be the most liquid market in the USA. 
5.3.1 History 
PJM introduced locational pricing on April 1, 1998, and at the same time offered 
some players fixed transmission rights to hedge against price variations. An auction-
based market for FTR obligations was introduced May 1, 1999 and options were 
introduced in June 2003. From 1999-2002 there has been an annual increase in 
congestion charges in the PJM system. The overall increase can be attributed to 
different patterns of generation, imports and load and in particular the increased 
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frequency of congestion at PJM’s Western interface which affects a majority of PJM 
load.77 
Congestion in PJM was 58 percent higher in 2002 than 2001. This increase in 
measured congestion was partly due to the result of adding PJM-West facilities to the 
market, thus permitting the more efficient redispatch of local generation and making 
explicit the price differentials that resulted.  
 
The significant increases in congestion suggest the importance of implementing the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) order to begin to identify areas 
where investments in transmission expansion could relieve congestion that may 
enhance generator market power and support competition. 
5.3.2  Fixed transmission rights 
As initially defined by PJM, this is a purely financial contract that entitles the 
holder the right to receive compensation (even with no intent to deliver energy) for 
any transmission congestion charges present in the day-ahead market. A fixed 
transmission right (FTR) can protect the physical players that have costs correlated 
with the congestion charges and hedge the basis risk. It is not possible for the players 
to hedge against price differences due to losses with the present FTRs. FTRs are also 
issued together with firm transmission service.  
 
FTRs are available for any location for which PJM posts an LMP (bus, aggregate, 
hub, or zone). They may be designated from injection buses outside of PJM and 
withdrawal locations inside PJM, injection buses inside PJM and withdrawal locations 
outside PJM, or buses with injections and withdrawals within PJM. For each hour 
with constraints on the transmission lines, the holder receives a portion of the 
congestion charges that are charged by the PJM ISO. The amount received is equal to 
the difference between the sink (point of withdrawal) and source (point of injection) 
LMPs multiplied by the actual amount of power specified in the contract as shown in 
Equation (5.1).  
 
Congestion charge
MWh (day-ahead sink LMP -day-ahead source LMP)
Point-to-point FTR credit
MW (day-ahead sink LMP -day-ahead source LMP)
=
=
                 
 
                                     
(5.1)    
 
An FTR obligation may give the holder revenues or expenses depending on the 
specified direction of the contract. It gives revenues when the direction is the same as 
the congestion (the price at the injection bus is lower than at the withdrawal bus) and 
expenses if it is in the opposite direction. In the case of an FTR option the payoff is 
positive if the direction is the same as the congestion and zero otherwise. If FTRs 
were a perfect hedge, FTR holders would receive a credit equal to the FTR capacity 
reservation multiplied by the LMP difference between the point of delivery and the 
point of receipt of the FTR, when constraints exist. This is termed the transmission 
credit target allocation (Equation (5.1)). FTRs are not necessarily a perfect hedge and 
in fact, FTRs have hedged the percentages shown in Figure 5-2 in 2001 and 2002. 
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Figure 5-2. Average FTR payout for 2001 and 2002 (Singh, 2003). 
 
The congestion calculations steps are: 
• Calculate congestion charges in the day-ahead and balancing market. 
• Determine FTR target allocation based on day-ahead LMPs. 
• Allocate congestion charges based on target allocations. 
• Distribute excess revenues. 
 
If the target allocation is not satisfied, the credits from the FTRs are reduced 
proportionally. Excess congestion charges are distributed by covering hourly FTR 
deficiencies within a month and from the previous month within a calendar year. The 
remaining excess revenues are distributed pro rata to network and firm transmission 
customers at the end of the year based on demand charge ratio shares.   
 
The FTRs have to meet the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) that was created to 
ensure that the transmission system supports the outstanding amount of FTRs, given a 
normal operation situation. If the FTRs can support a normal operation condition and 
congestion is present, the congestion revenues will be sufficient for the ISO to cover 
the payments to the holder of FTRs.  
 
The FTRs can be allocated in periodic yearly, monthly, weekly or daily auctions or 
in the secondary markets. The FTR secondary market is one in which holders and 
other entities that have acquired them sell FTRs on a bilateral basis. The contracts 
give coverage of congestion insurance for a month or longer. The buyers pay a 
premium for each right depending on the forecasted locational price differences. PJM 
evaluates proposals for new FTRs continuously. FTRs are also awarded to those who 
invest in transmission expansion, to the extent that the expansion allows additional 
FTRs that are simultaneously feasible with existing FTRs. 
5.3.3 Acquisition and trading of fixed transmission rights 
There are four ways to purchase FTRs: 
• Network integration service (physical players). 
• Firm point-to-point transmission service (physical players). 
• Monthly FTR auctions (on- and off-peak). 
• Secondary FTR market. 
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The time frame for the acquisition and settlement of FTRs in the PJM market is 
shown in Figure 5-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Time frame for the FTRs in PJM. 
 
Transmission service customers who acquire network or firm point-to-point 
transmission service pay the embedded costs of the PJM transmission system. In 
return for paying these, the firm transmission service owners have the option to 
nominate for network resources78 that they own or control to the zone(s) where their 
load was located in a quantity up to their coincident peak load within their zone. 
 
Residual capacity is supplied in the market in two separate auctions: on-peak hours 
ending 0800 to 2300 and off-peak hours ending 2400 to 0700, including weekends 
and holidays. The supply of FTRs consists of the new issues plus any offers to sell by 
current FTR holders. Interested buyers may submit bids to buy FTRs. The secondary 
market and the auctions make it possible to trade existing FTRs independent of the 
initial allocation.  
 
Annual FTR allocation processes provide FTRs only to network and firm point-to-
point transmission customers. Initially PJM’s secondary market allowed only the 
exchange of those specific FTRs. The initial process also provided that existing FTRs 
for network and firm point-to-point service had priority in subsequent annual FTR 
allocations and that the FTRs were continued. The network FTRs were held by the 
providers (utilities) of retail service to network customers. A load serving entity (LSE) 
that wished to serve customers in a congested area had difficulty competing with an 
incumbent utility holding FTRs. The new entrant faced the risk of congestion while 
the incumbent did not (PJM Interconnection, 2004). 
 
To address this issue, effective as of June 1, 2001, PJM treated all requests for 
FTRs identically. The revised process allocated FTRs to network service customers 
based on annual peak load share rather than on historic priority. This resulted in 
opening access to FTRs to new LSEs that lacked historic FTRs. 
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 Network resources are defined as generators that meet the PJM deliverability requirement, 
and may be nominated to be a capacity resource service. Capacity resource is net owned 
capacity from owned (or contracted) generating resources that are designated and committed 
by a load serving entity to serve its obligation under the reliability assurance agreement. 
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However, the link between generation resources and ability to nominate FTRs 
remained. For example, two identical retail customers received different financial 
payments based on the generation resources owned by the LSEs that served them, as 
well as in the sequence in which those LSEs obtained the rights to claim such 
generation as capacity resource. The potential lack of any payments to those LSEs 
that acquired new load with an annual cycle remained as well. 
 
Therefore, in 2002 PJM approved a significant change to the method of allocating 
FTRs (PJM Interconnection, 2004). The method was implemented for the planning 
year commencing June 1, 2003. The network FTR allocation process is discontinued 
and replaced with an annual FTR auction. This change provides a market evaluation 
of FTR value and permits all participants who value FTRs to bid a corresponding 
price to purchase them. Network customers is allocated FTR auction revenue rights 
(ARRs), which are the rights to collect the revenues from the FTR auction, based on 
the fact that network customers pay for the transmission system.  
5.3.4 Network integration service fixed transmission rights 
In PJM, all LSEs must buy network integration service for all their loads. This 
method forces customers to pay the entrance fee to the grid. In exchange for paying 
these fees, the LSEs receive some rights and obligations. They have an obligation to 
identify the production capacity that will deliver peak-load plus 20 percent. LSEs can 
choose to receive FTRs from the injection point (the generators), or the 
interconnection point with an external control area, to the withdrawal point for the 
aggregate load. FTRs are designated from unit-specific capacity resources, and cannot 
exceed the capacity contracted by the participant. The generators associated with the 
FTRs are referred to as designated network resources. The payoff from a network 
integration service FTR is:  
 
Network service FTR credit
MW (Day-ahead aggregate load LMP -Day-ahead generation bus LMP)
=
                  
 (5.2) 
 
The request process is annual, and the duration of the FTRs is from June 1 to May 
31 of the following year. Modifications are allowed at any time. Network customers 
can choose combinations up to an amount equal to their peak load and can freely add 
or subtract FTRs as long as the amount of the outstanding FTR is feasible. Customers 
specify priority (between 1 and 4; 1 is highest) on their FTR requests. The maximum 
amount of FTRs for each priority is limited to a participant’s 25 percent share of zonal 
peak load. If all FTR requests are not simultaneously feasible, the FTRs are then 
analyzed by priority level. Proration is required if all FTR requests within the same 
priority level are not simultaneously feasible. PJM can freely approve or not approve 
the proposed changes based on the SFT.  
5.3.5  Firm point-to-point transmission service fixed transmission rights 
Firm point-to-point transmission service means that the customer identifies two 
points and pays a fixed fee/tariff that basically equals the entrance fee for the network 
service. In exchange, the customer may receive an FTR between the two points and 
request a volume up to the transmission service capacity level. Firm customers may 
receive FTRs for their transmission reservations and their bilateral contracts. The 
FTRs are for the same duration as associated firm point-to-point transmission service 
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and can be requested annually, monthly, weekly or daily. The source may be a 
producer in PJM or an interconnection point with an external control area where 
power is injected. The load point may be one of the aggregated PJM buses or the point 
of interconnection with the external control area of the receiver.  
 
The same approval process applies that is used in the network integration service. 
PJM approves all, some or none of the proposed FTRs based on SFT.  
5.3.6 Auction revenue rights 
ARRs are long-term rights and are allocated to firm transmission service consisting 
of network integration service and firm point-to-point transmission service. ARRs are 
acquired for one year and are allocated for the entire capability of the transmission 
system. ARR holders are entitled to the price difference between the sink and source 
LMPs established in the FTR auction times the numbers of ARRs they hold. 
 
The maximum amount of ARRs is limited to the peak load responsibility of a 
participant within a zone. ARRs must be designated from unit-specific capacity 
resources to aggregate loads. The ARRs requested from capacity resource cannot 
exceed the capacity value contracted by the participant. Network customers specify 
priority (between 1-4) on their request (each priority level is limited to 25 percent of 
network service load share). 
 
All ARR requests are tested for feasibility. If all FTR requests are not 
simultaneously feasible, the FTRs are then analyzed by priority level. All ARR 
requests within the same priority that are not simultaneous feasible are prorated. 
ARRs are allocated proportionally to the MW requested and inversely to their effect 
on constraint.79 
 
The holder can convert the ARR into an FTR by “self-scheduling” the FTR into the 
annual auction on the exact same path as the ARR. It may reconfigure ARRs by 
bidding into the annual auction to acquire FTRs on an alternative path or for an 
alternative product. It may also retain allocated ARRs and receive associated 
allocation of revenues from the annual auction.    
 
Moreover, from March 2004 ARRs are allocated to firm transmission service 
customers annually in a two-stage allocation process. ARR requests are no longer 
required to have a unit-specific capacity resource as a source. Likewise, the annual 
FTR auction is a multi-round auction. Stage 1 assigns candidate ARR sources for each 
zone from resources historically designated to serve load in the zone. Stage 2 is a 4 
round iterative approach which allows LSEs to request additional ARRs from a 
variety of potential ARR source points. ARRs allocated for the planning period is 
reassigned daily on a proportional basis within a zone as load switches between LSEs 
within the planning period (PJM Interconnection, 2004). Some benefits of the revised 
annual FTR allocation are: 
• Protects native load utilization of the transmission system. 
• Provides flexibility to adjust hedging paths annually. 
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of the annual auction. Network service peak load associated with the initial allocation of ARRs 
will also be transferred to the new holder for the purpose of reassignment. 
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• Continues to allocate property rights to firm transmission customers through  
ARRs. 
• Supports retail programs by reassigning ARRs/FTRs as load switches between 
LSEs within the planning period. 
5.3.7 Monthly auctions 
After the initial allocation of the network- and point-to-point transmission service 
FTRs, an auction is held where any existing FTR or residual capacity can be traded to 
create new FTRs. PJM members and transmission service customers can submit bids 
to purchase residual FTRs and submit offers to sell existing contracts. The PJM ISO 
determines the winning offers and bids by maximizing the total surplus without 
violating SFT. Participants submit bids for capacity of service for a specified 
injection/withdrawal bus pair, aggregates, hub or zone internal or external to PJM. 
PJM arranges monthly auctions (FTRs have one-month duration), which allow a 
reconfiguration of the total amount of rights. 
 
The auction period opens 15 days before the FTRs are active. PJM calculates and 
informs about non-simultaneous possible FTRs for the PJM grid and the external 
connection points. The bids are checked and rejected bids are sent back to the holders 
for correction and new bidding. The bidding closes 10 days before the FTRs are 
active. Then the bids are evaluated according to SFT. The SFT decides a new number 
of “possible” FTRs by calculating a market price for each bus, selecting the highest 
bid-based value combination of feasible FTR paths. The price of an FTR path is the 
difference between the injection and withdrawal point market clearing prices.  
5.3.8 Market performance  
A major limitation to trading of FTRs is the lack of multiple requesters with the 
same injection and withdrawal buses. The monthly auction market was introduced to 
increase the liquidity of FTRs. An increase in liquidity should occur when offering a 
mechanism for auctioning the residual FTR transmission capacity and increasing the 
supply of FTRs. 
 
Buying bids, volume and revenue have increased, reflecting the willingness of 
buyers to pay higher prices for residual system capacity because of increased 
congestion. In the period May 1999-December 2002, 87 percent of the FTRs issued 
by the PJM ISO were of the network type and 1 percent were of the point-to-point 
type.  
 
PJM’s 2002 annual market report (PJM Interconnection, 2003) indicated that the 
FTR market was competitive in 2002 and succeeded in its purpose of increasing FTR 
access. There was a steady increase in the capacity of cleared FTRs and cleared FTR 
auction prices. 
 
Over the life of the FTR auction, the bid volume has exceeded the offer volume by 
nearly a 10:1 ratio, 45000 versus 5500 MW per month on average (PJM 
Interconnection, 2003). The average bid and offer volumes were 52000 and 7000 MW 
per month in 2002. Cleared bid volume ranged between 3900 and 6400 MW per 
month during the 2000 to 2002 period, while the cleared offer volume ranged between 
2200 and 5200 MW per month during the same period. Approximately two-thirds of 
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the cleared bids were supplied from the cleared offers while one third drew on 
residual system capacity.  
 
Prices in the FTR auction rose from $356 to $369 MW per month. Auction FTRs 
increased from an average of 3 percent of all FTRs in 1999 to 11 percent on average 
in 2000 and 2001, to 20 percent in 2002. Auction FTRs peaked in November 2002 
when 11263 MW of on-peak FTRs cleared, representing 29 percent of all FTRs for 
the month. The auction revenue has doubled in each of the subsequent years since 
2000, increasing to $1.2 million per month in 2002. 
 
An evaluation by the PJM Interconnections Market Monitoring Unit (MMU) to 
FERC (PJM Interconnection, 2000) after the first year concluded: 
• FTR auctions succeeded in increasing the supply of FTRs. 
• The main mechanism in the auction functioned well and trading increased. 
• FTR auctions can affect the timing of the grid revisions.  
 
The timing of the grid revisions is important because any player knowing in 
advance about planned revisions of the grid can use the information to take positions 
in the auction market. Grid companies will also have knowledge of revisions before it 
is public information. It is questionable if the grid companies take positions in the 
FTR market based on such non-public information. If the planned revisions increase 
congestion, the grid companies gain extra revenue from the contracts purchased 
before the revisions. One complaint was brought before the MMU, but no proof was 
found.  
 
MMU proposed to PJM that all the grid owners must inform the market about the 
revisions at least two days prior to the auction closure. MMU also proposed a penalty 
for providing insufficient information about revisions. Grid owners must pay back any 
revenue from their revisions and they must give an updated plan of revisions one year 
ahead. 
5.3.9 Payoffs and prices 
The payoff from purchasing on-peak FTRs was calculated between 6 pairs of 
locations over the year 2002 in Figure 5-10 and Table 5-5 in the appendix. The payoff 
is defined as the difference between the average monthly point-to-point FTR credit 
target allocation and the monthly FTR clearing price (in $/MWh). For these 6 FTRs, 
the payoff is positive for all except for one FTR. The standard deviation of the FTRs 
is higher than the average, implying highly uncertain market expectations about 
transmission congestion. During the year there are both negative and positive monthly 
payoffs. If the congestion charge target allocation exceeds the FTR credit target 
allocation parts of the FTR credit are reduced proportionally so both targets are met.  
5.4 The New York market 
New York introduced transmission congestion contracts (TCCs) September 1, 
1999. The annual percentages of congestion hours for 2000 and 2001 are shown in 
Figure 5-4. 
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Figure 5-4. Congestion in the New York zones (Oren, 2003). 
5.4.1 Transmission congestion contracts 
Transmission congestion contracts (TCCs) are financial instruments for hedging 
against transmission congestion fees (New York ISO, 2003). The holder of the 
contract collects the congestion rent associated with transferring power from the 
source to the sink. The contracts are settled in the day-ahead market. In New York the 
locational prices are calculated based on an AC network (PJM uses a DC load flow 
model) with marginal losses. However, TCCs are only a hedge against congestion. 
The contracts are unidirectional and they become an obligation with reverse 
congestion.  
 
The congestion charges apply uniformly whether the customers undertake a 
bilateral transaction or buy energy from the location-based marginal price (LBMP80) 
market. The congestion charges paid by the customers are collected in a TCC fund 
used to pay the primary holders of the TCCs and congestion paid to generators 
through LBMP. Over-collection of funds is allocated to the transmission owners to 
offset transmission system costs (TSC). Conversely, the transmission owners fund 
under-collection, and there is a true-up at the end of month. 
 
Transmission owners are contractually bound to honor existing transmission 
facility and wheeling agreements. Parties to existing agreements are said to hold 
grandfathered rights. They must continue to pay transmission rates under existing 
contracts and they do not pay congestion costs, but may be subject to curtailments. 
Grandfathered transmission rights have until the implementation of the End State 
Auction (expected 2004) to convert the rights into TCCs. The total transmission 
capacity is divided among grandfathered transmission rights, grandfathered TCCs, 
existing transmission capacity for native load (ETCNL), and residual transmission 
capacity (RTC). A portion of RTC was allocated to transmission owners as residual 
TCCs prior to the formation of the New York ISO (NYISO). 
 
                                               
80An LBMP is the same as a locational price or an LMP. 
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5.4.2 Acquisition and trading 
TCCs can be purchased in MWs, and have durations of 6 months or 1 year. TCCs 
can be sold by direct sales, through a centralized TCC auction or via the secondary 
market. In the future FTRs will also be awarded to those who invest in transmission 
expansion. Direct sales are allowed by FERC but not exercised by the transmission 
owners.  
 
Available TCC transmission capacity is offered to qualified market players through 
an auction process managed by the NYISO. The auction provides a means for market 
players, through their bidding preferences, to determine which set of TCCs will be 
awarded. It also allows primary holders to release the system transfer capability 
associated with their TCCs into the auction process. Upon completion of an auction, 
the ISO collects payment for all TCCs awarded for each round and the residual 
revenue is allocated to the transmission owners. 
5.4.3 Auctions 
The auctions have different stages: 
• Phase 1: Two stages, multi-round auctions where stage 1 is a multi-round 
historical auction, and stage 2 is a single-round auction. It offers TCCs for 
specified durations in sub-auctions (historically) with 2 classes for each auction. 
The auction is conducted prior to each capability period (i.e. the minimum 
duration of the TCC). 
• Phase 2: End State Auction for long-term TCCs. The annual auction will be 
implemented in 2004, and is a single-stage multi-round auction. Bids submitted by 
players determine the durations of TCCs purchased. The ISO then determines the 
minimum and maximum durations for TCCs sold and the period (on peak, off-
peak). Later, an auction may be conducted semi-annually to sell 6-month TCCs. 
The End State Auction will replace the Phase 1 auction. 
 
TCCs purchased in stage 1 can be turned around and released at the discretion of 
the seller in given stage 2 rounds. The players can also bid on system transfer 
capability released in stage 2. The process starts 45 days before the auction period (i.e. 
the settlement period). The auction is conducted over 30 days consisting of two 
stages. Stage 1 usually has 4 rounds, and stage 2 has 1 round. This process enhances 
price discovery and avoids fire sales. Two weeks in advance the ISO posts the number 
of rounds to be conducted in each stage; the system transfer capability; power flow 
model; non-simultaneous closed interface limits; the accumulated LBMP congestion 
component per MW; and any special rules or conditions. One week in advance TCC 
holders and the NYISO enter their submissions. Six days in advance data are posted 
and then the auctioneer is ready to receive bids. The total system transfer capability is 
divided in equal portions among each round, for a total of 4 rounds.  
 
Reconfiguration auctions are also held monthly in a single round. The duration of 
the TCCs sold is one month. The TCCs offered by primary holders capture short-term 
changes in transmission capacity. Primary holders may re-sell their TCCs in the 
secondary market. In 2002 there were spring, summer, autumn and winter (parts of 
2003) auctions. The spring and autumn auctions consisted of 6-month TCCs that were 
auctioned in 4 rounds plus one reconfiguration round (i.e. stage 2), and annual TCCs 
that were auctioned in 2 rounds plus one reconfiguration round. The summer and 
winter auctions are monthly reconfiguration auctions. 
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Each TCC has a specific source and sink. The source and sink may be a generator 
bus, a New York control area zone, the NYISO reference bus, or an external proxy 
bus. This creates great diversity in the TCCs that can be formulated, and because of 
that, makes trading TCCs somewhat limited. With such diversity in TCCs there is less 
chance that one party (seller) will have the exact TCCs that another party (buyer) 
desires. The concept of “unbundling” addresses the diversity issue by unbundling a 
TCC into standard components, each of which is a TCC. Because there is less 
diversity in the standard components, many believe that standard component, or 
unbundled, TCCs will be easier to trade, thus increasing the liquidity of the TCC 
market. The standard components of a TCC are: 
• TCC from source to the zone containing the source 
• TCC from source zone to sink zone 
• TCC from source zone to source 
 
When a TCC is unbundled into standard components, the original TCC is replaced 
by up to three TCCs as illustrated in Figure 5-5. The new TCCs retain the same 
capacity as the original. All TCCs sold in the spring 2000 initial TCC auction have 
been unbundled into their basic components effective as of September 1, 2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Unbundling of TCCs. 
5.4.4 Market performance 
In Figure 5-6 we show the auctioned volumes of TCCs. The auctioned volume 
increased almost 120 percent in 2000, around 50 percent from 2000 to 2001, and 
almost 9 percent from 2001 to 2002, reaching 140000 MW. The distribution of the 
TCC prices during 2002 is shown in Figure 5-7.  
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Figure 5-6. Annual volume in MWs of auctioned TCCs in New York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-7. Price distribution of TCCs during 2002. 
 
In Table 5-6 in the appendix we calculated the average auction prices and the 
average of the locational prices during the settlement period for some selected TCCs. 
There are discrepancies between the TCC price and the underlying locational prices, 
resulting in over- or under-collection of funds. When there is under-collection holders 
are honored the residual payment. 
 
Siddiqui et al. (2003) analyze the TCC prices from the four initial auctions in 2000 
and 2001. They find that the market performs relatively well. For example, buyers of 
TCCs predict congestion correctly most of the time. However, the TCC market does 
not appear efficient at hedging complex transactions involving larger exposures 
(greater than $1/MWh) or across multiple congestion interfaces. In this case TCC 
buyers pay prices including an excessive risk premium which is far from being 
reasonable. Siddiqui et al. also find no evidence through cumulative analysis that the 
market players learn how to use the TCC more efficiently over time. These results 
might be symptomatic of a new market with rules unfamiliar to most market players. 
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Likewise, arbitrage of price differences might not be possible because of illiquidity, 
risk aversion, and fear of regulatory intervention (Siddiqui et al., 2003). 
5.5 The California market 
California introduced firm transmission rights81 on February 1, 2000. California 
chose a model in which the California ISO (CAISO, 2003) auctions the contracts.  
5.5.1 Firm transmission rights 
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Figure 5-8. The California control area (Singh, 2003). 
 
California uses zonal pricing, meaning that buses within an area with no or little 
congestion are grouped into zones as shown in Figure 5-8. In the near future they will 
introduce locational marginal pricing and congestion revenue rights as a part of the 
market reform MD02 (CAISO, 2003). The FTR in California has one financial and 
one physical aspect. The contract gives the holder the right to transfer power and at 
the same time receive the potential share in the distribution of usage charge revenues 
collected by the ISO due to congestion between two predefined areas.  Together these 
aspects amount to a lease.  
 
The holder of the contract receives the contract quantity times the shadow price on 
available transmission capacity (ATC) on a specific flowgate associated with a 
transaction (in the day-ahead market) when the congestion is in same direction as 
specified in the contract. The FTRs give the users of the ISO-controlled grid a hedge 
(that might be perfect) against hourly variations in the costs due to transmission 
                                               
81
 The financial part of firm transmission rights is similar to a flowgate right. 
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congestion. FTRs do not entitle holders to usage charges generated by counter-
scheduling. 
 
FTR holders have priority in the scheduling of energy across interfaces in the day-
ahead market. Holders of FTRs who do not use the contract, lose the scheduling 
priority but keep the associated congestion payment.  
 
The amount of FTRs auctioned is equal to the ATC at the 99.5 percent level. This 
implies that the amount of FTRs outstanding approximately equals the actual 
generation and allows the ISO to allocate the outstanding capacity in the real-time 
power markets both hourly and daily.  
 
If the transmission capacity on a line is reduced, the outstanding amount will not 
match the actual transmission capacity. All generation without FTRs will then be 
denied transmission. After that, the generation with FTRs will be constrained 
proportionally with regard to priority (if all the FTRs have the same priority). 
5.5.2 Acquisitions and trading 
The FTRs are provided in an annual auction and have a duration of one year. The 
auction is conducted in mid-January and FTRs are settled from April to March of the 
following year. The holders of the FTRs can sell the contracts in the secondary and in 
the hour-ahead markets for a specified price by using adjustment bids. This gives 
players without FTRs the opportunity to buy transmission in the hour-ahead market 
from the holders or the ISO.  
 
The surplus from the auction goes to the owners of the transmission lines (the 
transmission operators) to cover a part of the fixed cost of the underlying grid. The 
higher the surplus, the lower the connection fee for consumers. 
5.5.3 Auctions 
The initial period for the primary auction is one year. Within that limit the ISO 
offers the option to create or eliminate new zones. FTRs with a duration of less than 
one year were too complex for the ISO to administer and reduced the incentives for 
creating liquid markets. 
 
The amount of issued FTRs is calculated by determining the ATC for a branch 
group,82 in a specific direction for each hour over the past year. The hours are ranked 
from the highest to the lowest value, and the ATC is chosen at the 99.5 percent 
availability level. The value at 99.5 percent is the number of FTRs for sale. 
5.5.4 Market performance 
Table 5-1 shows the annual volume of auctioned firm transmission rights. The 
volume ranges from 9553-10475 MW and is relatively stable over time. Prices ranged 
from 165 $/MW to 17610 $/MW in 2002. 
 
 
                                               
82A group of transmission branches that is treated as a single entity for purposes of running a 
congestion management market. 
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Table 5-1. Volume of auctioned firm transmission rights in the California market 
(there was no auction in 2000). 
 
Year Volume (MW) 
1999 9553 
2001 10475 
2002 10419 
2003 9559 
5.5.5 Congestion revenue rights 
The California ISO is currently evaluating congestion revenue rights (CRRs), 
which are similar to what FERC proposed in its standard market design (FERC, 
2003). Transmission capacity will be awarded, allocated, and auctioned as CRRs in 
the following priority sequence: non-converted existing transmission contracts 
(ECTs), converted ECTs, ECTs under conversion, LSE nominations and CRR bids. 
Point-to-point CRRs are physical (scheduling rights) and financial rights in the day-
ahead market. CRRs are defined between buses or hubs and are forward contracts in 
which the holder is obligated to receive (or pay) the difference in LMP between the 
sink and source times the contractual volume. CRRs can also be offered as obligations 
or options to converted ECTs. Network service rights (NSRs) are forward contracts 
for fixed power transfers from multiple sources to multiple sinks. The sum of power 
injections at sources equals the sum of power withdrawal sinks. The sources and sinks 
can be network buses or hubs. NSRs are financial obligations and solely financial (at 
this time). They will be allocated to LSEs as obligations and can be acquired through 
CRR auction and via the secondary market. CRRs can be unbundled as point-to-point 
CRRs for trading purposes. 
5.6  The New England market 
New England introduced financial transmission rights (FTRs) in March 2003.  
5.6.1 Financial transmission rights 
The FTR is a financial instrument that entitles the holder to receive compensation 
for congestion costs that arise when the transmission grid is congested in the day-
ahead market, and differences in day-ahead LMPs result from the dispatch of 
generators to relieve congestion (New England ISO, 2002). If a constraint exists in the 
network, the holders receive a credit target allocation based on the FTR MW quantity 
and the difference between the congestion components of the day-ahead sink and 
source LMPs. The holder receives credit regardless of who delivered the energy or the 
amount delivered across the path designated in the FTR. Similarly, an FTR is a 
financial obligation if the congestion flows in the opposite direction of the FTR.  
 
If the monthly total of the positive FTR target allocations is less than the 
transmission congestion revenue, holders receive a congestion credit equal to their 
total positive FTR target allocations. If the monthly total of the positive FTR target 
allocations is more than the transmission congestion revenue, FTR holders receive 
shares of the monthly congestion revenues proportional to their total positive target 
allocations. 
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5.6.2 Acquisitions and trading 
FTRs can be acquired or sold in auctions or in the secondary markets. Bilateral 
trading may be done independently or through ISO-administered bilateral trading.  
Reallocation also occurs in the auctions and secondary markets. The purchaser of an 
FTR in a bilateral transaction outside these markets receives only a contractual right 
against the seller of the FTR and has no rights or obligations in ISO settlement or in 
the energy market.  
5.6.3 Auctions 
The auctions are characterized by start and end dates, and are on- (ending hours 
0800 to 2300 on weekdays) and off-peak (ending hours 2400 to 0700 on weekdays, 
weekends and holidays). The ISO conducts periodic auctions to allow eligible bidders 
to acquire FTRs. The SFT performed in the auction process ensures that there is 
sufficient system capability to support the FTRs sold and that congestion revenue is 
adequate to compensate the holders. 
 
FTR auctions are introduced on a monthly basis, after which the ISO will conduct 
both longer-term and monthly auctions. The locations in the contracts are defined by 
LMPs at the source and sink and the contracts are awarded in tenths of a MW. The 
auction volume and revenue for the first three months are shown Figure 5-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-9. Auction volume and revenue for monthly FTR auction in New England 
(Singh, 2003). 
 
Auction revenues are distributed to the FTR sellers and the ARR recipients. ARRs 
are awarded to entities (ARR recipients) paying for transmission upgrades which 
make it possible to award additional FTRs and allocate them to the entities 
responsible for paying congestion charges. A four-stage process determines the ARR 
of each entity based on its load share of all generation and its tie sources within the 
capability of the transmission system. Special recognition is given to certain 
contractual arrangements and the parties to those agreements.  
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5.7 The New Zealand market 
A system with nodal pricing and a wholesale market was introduced in New 
Zealand in 1996. At the same time, players were offered a price differential hedging 
product as a hedge against the increased risk. Transpower New Zealand (the system 
operator) agreed to provide this product for a limited period. The product gave 
restricted insurance against nodal price differences and had minimum and maximum 
prices to reduce the counterparty risk for Transpower. The product was withdrawn in 
1998, because there was little interest among the players. It was more natural to let 
other players provide the product. 
 
In New Zealand, the congestion revenue is defined as the surplus from losses and 
congestion and is allocated among the users of the grid. In the present power system 
the system operator receives the congestion revenue. The system operator allocates 
the congestion revenue to the owners of the grid companies that are paying the sunk 
costs for transmission investments.  
 
There is a debate in New Zealand about the introduction of financial transmission 
rights (FTRs). The industry says that Transpower has focused too narrowly on 
refining the concept, while ignoring broader issues and options. They also believe that 
there has been pressure to find a quick solution, rather than the appropriate solution. 
Opinions vary about who is entitled to the settlement surplus and has the right to 
develop an FTR and/or allocation regime. 
5.7.1 Financial transmission rights 
The proposed FTR will give the right to receive or the obligation to pay the 
difference in prices at the buses (or hubs) for which the hedge is written for a defined 
amount of MWs and a defined period (Transpower, 2001 and 2003). An FTR will be 
an obligation and will have payoff: 
 
Payoff MW (Day-ahead sink nodal price
-Day-ahead source nodal  price)
=
                  
(5.3)                                
 
The nodal price contains both a congestion and loss component. Directional FTRs will 
consist of balanced FTRs (congestion) and spot FTRs (losses). Spot FTRs will 
represent injection at a bus (or hub) to make up any shortfall in forecasted losses. 
Both spot and directional FTRs will be auctioned.  
 
FTRs will be funded through transmission losses and transmission congestion 
rents. Transpower will offer the FTRs at a no profit/loss basis so all income from FTR 
auctions and residual rents will be returned via lower charges to the parties that pay 
the sunk costs of the grid. FTR payments are reduced proportionally when there are 
deficit congestion rents. 
5.7.2 Acquisition and trading 
Today there are bilateral financial instruments to hedge against differences in nodal 
prices. Private players provide these products that have no effect on the physical 
market. 
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FTRs of 1-month duration will be auctioned monthly to all parties and can be 
traded freely in the secondary market. Later they may be offered for future months 
and longer durations. Together with the initial auction this will ensure that the FTRs 
are allocated to the players who value them most. 
 
FTRs will be allocated for all new investments in the grid and will have duration 
equal to the lifetime of the investment. New investment FTRs may be offered into 
auction by the holder. 
5.7.3 Auctions 
After an introductory phase the FTR market will change to a 12-month forward 
market. FTRs could be sold for any volume (MW) and between every pair of buses or 
hubs, given that the SFT is met. For future periods, reconfiguration auctions will be 
held monthly. Existing FTRs could be offered back into these auctions and additional 
FTRs purchased. It is expected that the LSEs, consumers, and producers will value 
FTRs higher than the other players, since their revenues are correlated with the price 
differentials. The auctions will be designed to ensure that the congestion rent and the 
FTR payments will balance. However, to the extent that the grid offered for dispatch 
will be different from the auction grid, there will be a risk that the congestion rents for 
that dispatch period will not cover FTR obligations. In such an event the FTR 
payments will be scaled down pro rata. Careful grid design will minimize the risks. 
The FTR auction income will be allocated to those who pay the sunk costs of the grid 
and the income is expected to be less variable than the congestion rents.  
5.8 Financial transmission right properties 
Financial transmission rights define property rights and are a mechanism to hedge 
transmission price risk. Property rights provide market players with the financial 
benefits associated with transmission capacity and facilitate efficient use of scarce 
resources. Property rights are also a mechanism to reward transmission investments. 
The rights will give investors a tradable contract in return. The ability to hedge 
transmission price is an important feature in facilitating an efficient electricity market. 
Efficient pricing of FTRs through liquid trading provides economic signals for 
location of generation, load and transmission investments. 
 
FTRs can be allocated in different ways (Lyons et al., 2002). First, they can be 
given to those who invest in transmission lines. For other market players there needs 
to be eligibility requirements for FTR ownership in the existing transmission system 
and in the secondary markets. The implemented solution depends on the market 
design and the decisions made in that market. FTRs for existing transmission capacity 
can be allocated in a number of different ways such as based on existing transmission 
rights or agreements, auctioned off, or so that their benefits offset the redistribution of 
economic rents arising from tariff reforms. An auction allocates the FTRs to those 
market players who value them highest. The revenues from an auction can be 
allocated to the transmission owners. In California transmission owners use them to 
pay off their transmission investments, and in New York they are used to reduce the 
transmission service charge.  Reallocation can happen in the secondary markets. FTRs 
can also be allocated based on historical use and entitlements. 
 
FTRs offer instruments for converting historical entitlements to firm transmission 
capacity into tradable contracts that keep the owners just as well-off as economically 
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while enabling them to cash out when others can make more efficient use of the 
transmission capacity covered by these contracts. An attractive policy issue is that the 
FTRs offer a convenient path to competitive open transmission access. This is critical 
in establishing a competitive electricity market. 
 
An important issue is the efficiency of the FTR market as pointed out by Siddiqui et 
al. (2003), where they compare the FTR auction prices to the prices they are settled 
against. Inefficient pricing of FTRs distorts long-term transmission price signals and 
will result in inefficient dispatch, inefficient location of generation and load, and 
inefficient transmission investments. Oren and Deng (2003) test if price discovery and 
learning lead to convergence of FTR auction prices to the value of the underlying 
asset. They simulate n-1 contingencies and load uncertainty in a test network to 
calculate the expected FTR value. They find that the FTR auction prices will depend 
on bid quantities or distribution of initially allocated FTRs. To achieve efficient 
pricing some hedgers holding FTRs covering their energy transactions must yield 
these instruments to speculators that will bid up the most profitable FTRs. Therefore, 
an allocation will preserve FTRs better than an initial auction. They also claim that 
imposing simultaneous feasibility on FTRs is too stringent.  
 
Among researchers, there is consensus about the need to mitigate market power for 
any FTR auction to be efficient. The conclusion in the FTR literature is that 
generators can more easily exert local market power when transmission congestion is 
present.  
5.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented an overview of markets for transmission rights around 
the world (Table 5-2, Table 5-3 and Table 5-4). The design and the rules of these 
markets are changing continuously. The information is complex and therefore this 
overview presents the author’s understanding of the markets at the current time.  
 
Table 5-2.  Advantages and disadvantages of FTR markets. 
 
Market Advantages Disadvantages 
PJM Western hub liquid 
New York Several rounds of auctions 
enhance price discovery and 
avoids fire sales, unbundling 
California Both physical and financial 
New England  
New Zealand Hedge against losses 
No short-term hedges, 
lack of multiple requesters 
with the same injection and 
withdrawal buses decreases 
liquidity, potential exercise of 
market power 
 
 
Table 5-2 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the FTR markets. One major 
disadvantage is that all FTRs are short-term hedges.  
 
The numbers for trading volume indicate increased liquidity in the PJM and New 
York markets. However, the limited liquidity of FTRs in some regions inhibits trade. 
Efforts to increase liquidity should be made through trading hubs such as the PJM 
Western hub. Unbundling may also contribute to increased liquidity. The system in 
PJM has limited liquidity and transparency for annual FTRs. Auction revenue rights 
will allow for better liquidity because they are not tied to the holding of network load 
or resources. New York conducts auctions with up to 4 rounds for the same FTR. 
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There are also monthly reconfiguration auctions. This enhances price discovery and 
avoids fire sales.  
 
Experience from the PJM market indicates that the process of allocating FTRs to 
utilities of retail service based on historic priority, inhibited competition because an 
entrant LSE had difficulties in acquiring FTRs. This problem was addressed by 
allocating FTRs to network customers based on annual peak load share rather than on 
historic priority. However, the link between generation resources and ability to 
nominate FTRs remained. From June 2003, the allocation of annual FTRs is 
according to a market valuation where players bid for FTRs (i.e. ARRs).  
 
In New York grandfathered (historic) transmission rights are present. These are 
converted to TCCs in the End State Auction in year 2004. In this way TCCs offer 
mechanisms for converting historical entitlements to firm transmission capacity into 
tradable contracts. 
 
Table 5-3. Comparison of FTR markets. 
 
Market PJM New York 
Contract Fixed transmission rights, financial, no 
hedge against losses, both obligations and 
options, auction revenue rights to 
transmission network customers 
 
Transmission congestion contracts,  obligations, 
no hedge against losses 
Contract 
duration 
1 month auction FTRs, 
annual network integration service FTRs, 
firm point-to-point transmission service 
FTRs have duration equal to the associated 
firm point-to-point service 
6 months and 1, 2 and 5 year auction FTRs, 
monthly reconfiguration FTRs 
Acquisition and 
trading 
Network  integration and firm point-to-
point transmission service, auctions and 
secondary  market 
Auctions, secondary  market 
Initial allocation Initially allocated to network integration 
service customers  
Prior to the formation of the NYISO, there was 
an allocation of TCCs. In the first stage of this 
allocation, customers receiving service under 
existing transmission agreements were given 
the choice of converting their existing rights 
into either grandfathered rights or 
grandfathered TCCs. After these rights had 
been allocated and accounted for, existing 
transmission capacity for native load was 
allocated to some transmission owners. 
Once all of these had been accounted for, 
residual TCCs were allocated to the 
transmission owners.  
Auction design Monthly (on- and off-peak) Seasonal (with several rounds),  
monthly reconfiguration auctions 
Liquidity, 
(volume traded 
2002) 
Bid: 624 GW 
Offer: 84 GW 
Total: 140 GW 
Congestion 
rents 
Excess rents distributed to deficiencies in 
other periods, deficit rents reduce payments 
proportionally 
Excess rents offset transmission system cost, 
deficit rents covered by the transmission 
owners 
Distribution of 
auction 
revenues 
FTR auction revenues are allocated among 
the regional transmission owners in 
proportion to their respective transmission 
revenue requirements 
All revenues received by transmission owners 
from the sale of grandfathered TCCs and 
residual TCCs, as well as excess auction 
revenues, are credited against the transmission 
owner’s cost of service to reduce the 
transmission service charge 
 
The work has also studied the FTR prices for some selected pairs of locations. 
Limited studies indicate that there are discrepancies between the FTR price and the 
value of the underlying asset. The reason is that the model grid used in the auctioning 
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of FTRs is an inaccurate representation of the dispatch grid. This is not surprising, 
because unforeseen shocks during settlement periods are bound to occur. Siddiqui et 
al. (2003) analyze the TCC prices from the four initial auctions in 2000 and 2001. 
They find that the market performs relatively well. However, the TCC market does 
not appear efficient at hedging complex transactions involving larger exposures 
(greater than $1/MWh) or across multiple congestion interfaces. In this case TCC 
buyers pay prices including an excessive risk premium which is far from being 
reasonable.  
 
The information technology of today makes it relatively easy to collect and work 
through large amounts of data. It also makes it easier to design transmission rights and 
define the volumes. PJM designed a simultaneous feasibility test that ensures that 
FTRs are consistent with the possible schedules and the physical conditions in the 
grid. 
 
Table 5-4. Comparison of FTR markets. 
 
Market California New England New Zealand 
Contract Firm transmission rights, 
financial with scheduling 
priority, option-like, no hedge 
against losses, 
congestion revenue right 
obligations and options will be 
implemented in the future  
Financial transmission right 
obligations, no hedge against 
losses 
Financial transmission right 
obligations,  hedge against 
losses 
Contract 
duration 
1 year auction FTRs Monthly auction FTRs Monthly auction FTRs, 
investment FTRs have duration 
equal to the lifetime of the 
investment 
Acquisition 
and trading 
Auctions,  secondary  market, 
hour-ahead market 
Auctions, secondary  market, 
transmission upgrades 
Auctions, secondary  market, 
transmission expansion, 
entities paying congestion 
charges 
Initial 
allocation 
The initial allocation was 
through a primary auction of 
November 1999, in which 
FTRs equal to 100 percent of 
the operating limit at 99.5 
percent availability were 
auctioned off. These FTRs 
were valid for a period of 14 
months, from February 1, 
2000 until March 31,  2001.  
Monthly FTR auctions, 
longer-term auctions later 
To be decided 
Auction design Annual Monthly Monthly, FTR for investments 
in the grid,  
Liquidity, 
(volume 
traded 2002) 
Total: 10.4 GW Introduced March 2003, 
limited data available 
To be implemented 
Congestion 
rents 
Excess rents partly cover the 
fixed costs of the grid, deficit 
rents reduce payments 
proportionally 
Excess rents redistributed to 
FTR holders, deficit rents 
reduce payments 
proportionally 
Excess rents redistributed to 
those who pay the sunk costs of 
the grid, deficit rents reduces 
payments proportionally 
Distribution of 
auction 
revenues 
The primary auction proceeds 
went to the participating 
transmission owners. Each 
participating transmission 
owner credited its FTR 
auction proceeds against its 
access charge 
FTR auction revenues are 
distributed to sellers of FTRs 
and auction revenue rights 
recipients 
 
 
PJM differs from other markets because its ISO assigns parts of the financial rights 
directly to the transmission service customers who pay the embedded cost of the 
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transmission grid. The allocation is more restrictive because customers only can 
request FTRs up to their transmission service level. 
 
The contracts proposed for introduction in New Zealand include payments for 
losses. This means that an FTR gives the holder the right to the entire price difference 
between two buses, both the one due to losses and the one due to congestion. In New 
York an AC network is used, which takes losses into account, but the FTR does not 
hedge against losses. In most of the literature the transmission rights only give the 
right to differences in price due to congestion. Harvey and Hogan (2002) give an 
overview about how to design FTRs for hedging against losses. 
 
The introduction of FTRs/TCCs in the different systems in the USA must be 
viewed in relationship to the organization of the market. Often private players own the 
central grid, but a system operator operates it. The FTR is a means to reduce the 
possibilities for the grid owners or system operators to exercise market power. 
 
In all markets the FTRs are supposed to redistribute the congestion charges to the 
users of the transmission services. This creates incentives for transmission providers 
to maintain and expand the transmission grid, thus reducing congestion. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
PJM FTR prices 
 
Table 5-5. Average payoff and standard deviation from selected FTRs in the PJM 
market in $/MWh during the year 2002. 
 
FTR Average payoff Standard deviation 
 
BAYONNE 138 KV COGEN1 PVSC 138 KV T-1 -0.06 0.12 
BRUNNERI 230 KV DIES WHEMPFIE 138 KV PRIN_1 0.21 0.71 
COLLINS 115 KV LD1 NEWBERRY 115 KV 1 BANK 1.13 4.15 
WHITPAIN WHITEMAR 230 KV DBU6 0.75 1.40 
HOMERCIT 20 KV UNIT 2 HOMERCIT 23 KV DUM2 0.07 0.55 
DEANS PSEG 0.14 0.52 
 
The payoff is defined as the difference between the average monthly point-to-point 
FTR credit and the monthly FTR clearing price (in $/MWh) and is illustrated in Table 
5-5 and Figure 5-10. The prices are shown in Figure 5-11 and Figure 5-12. Table 5-5 
shows that the average payoff during a year is positive for all FTRs except 
BAYONNE 138 KV COGEN1 PVSC 138 KV T-1. The standard deviation is higher 
than the average, implying highly uncertain market expectations about transmission 
congestion. During the year there are both negative and positive payoffs. The FTR 
COLLINS 115 KV LD1 NEWBERRY 115 KV 1 BANK has the highest payoff 
(13.91 $/MWh) in July 2002. Conversely the lowest payoff (-2.80 $/MWh in 
September) is for the same FTR. This FTR has the highest standard deviation of all 
contracts. 
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Figure 5-10. Payoff from selected FTRs in the PJM market in $/MWh during the year  
2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-11. Selected monthly FTR prices during 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12. Selected monthly FTR prices during 2002. 
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New York TCC prices 
 
Table 5-6 shows the auction prices of selected TCCs and their associated spot 
prices in $/MWh in the New York market. 
 
Table 5-6. Auction prices of selected TCCs and their associated spot prices in $/MWh 
in the New York market. 
 
 Average 
traded price  
Average of 
locational 
prices  
Payoff  
Spring 2002 auctions round 4 MHK VL – CENTRL  -0.01 -1.53 -1.52 
HUD VL – N.Y.C  4.84 -8.38 -13.22 
HQ-NYISO_LMBP_REF -0.48  -0.24 -0.71 
HUD VL – N.Y.C Jan. reconfig. 2.12 -0.65 -2.77 
Feb. reconfig. 1.75 -0.13 -1.88 
Mar. reconfig. 1.08 -0.92 -2.00 
Jun. reconfig. 6.00  -9.12 -15.12 
DUNKIRK_3 NEG WEST_LANCAS,  Jan.  reconfig. -0.12 0.34  0.46  
Feb. reconfig. -0.09 0.29  0.38  
Mar. reconfig. -0.06 0.41  0.47  
RAVENSWOOD_G-HUDSON  Jan. reconfig. -0.08 0.28 0.36 
Feb. reconfig. -0.05 0.09 0.14 
Mar. reconfig. -0.04 0.01 0.05 
PJM-HQ_GEN_CHAT_DC Jan. reconfig. 0.68 1.55 0.87 
Feb. reconfig. 0.37 1.02 0.65 
Jun. reconfig. -0.50) 0.35 0.85 
Oct. reconfig. -0.44 0.69 0.25 
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6 Utilizing MATPOWER in optimal power flow 
This chapter demonstrates how MATPOWER, a MATLAB package (Zimmerman 
and Gan, 1997) can be used for optimal power flow (OPF) simulations. An OPF 
simulation calculates the active/reactive power generated and purchased at each bus 
and the nodal prices. The nodal prices are of special interest because they reflect the 
marginal value of generation and load at each bus (node). These prices are also called 
locational prices and are found to be the optimal prices, maximizing social welfare 
and taking transmission constraints and losses into account. They can provide the 
right incentives to market players and maximize social welfare. When transmission 
congestion is present, this creates market inefficiency, since cheap distant generation 
may be replaced by more expensive generation. There is particular interest in OPF as 
utilized by a centralized dispatcher, and the features relevant for the Norwegian and 
Nordic markets. Three cases are optimized and the chapter analyzes the economic 
consequences of different network topologies and transmission congestion.  
6.1 Introduction 
Deregulation has required a stronger focus on the financial aspects of the Nordic 
power market and a need for economic analysis of power transmission services.  
 
The optimal prices in a transmission network are the nodal prices (Schweppe et al., 
1988 and Hogan, 1992) resulting from an optimal power flow (OPF) performed by a 
centralized dispatcher (e.g. an independent system operator - ISO). The OPF model is 
implemented in parts of the United States (e.g. PJM), and in Australia and New 
Zealand. In the Nordic region area (zonal) pricing is used.  This is a simplification and 
aggregation of nodal pricing. The Nordic power system does not include a central 
scheduling/dispatching entity, only a central power exchange (Nord Pool). Generators 
and loads schedule by self-dispatch. There is one power exchange and 5 transmission 
system operators (TSOs) in the Nordic region. 
 
When congestion is predicted in Norway, two or more spot areas are defined. This 
procedure is called market splitting. In these cases, the players must specify their bids 
in the different spot price areas. Clearing at Nord Pool determines that the prices in 
the different areas are such that the power flows do not exceed the specified 
constraints. A surplus area will then receive a lower price than a deficit area. The 
difference between the respective area prices and the System Price is called the 
Congestion Fee.83 Statnett (the Norwegian system operator) defines the fixed price84 
areas in Norway according to its information on the likely pattern of flows on the 
system for a certain period of time. Congestion inside the price areas is managed by 
use of counter trade.85  
 
OPF in the context of nodal pricing is considered as well as how it can be used for 
area pricing. This chapter shows that even a simple system can give interesting 
results, when an economic analysis is conducted to the system. 
                                               
83
 Statnett uses the term “Capacity Fee” (Norwegian: kapasitetsavgift). 
84
 The number of price areas in Norway may be more than two. 
85
 Counter trade is real-time congestion management by increased production (upward 
regulation) within the constrained area and decreased production (downward regulation) in 
the surplus area.   
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6.2 Optimal power flow and nodal prices 
OPF is a technique that has been used in the electricity industry for several 
decades. The objective in OPF is to minimize generator operating costs. 
6.2.1 Formulation of optimal power flow 
The objective function is the total cost of real and/or active generation. The costs 
may be defined as polynomials or as piecewise-linear functions of generator output. 
The problem can be formulated schematically as: 
 
Min (costs of active and reactive generation)  
subject to 
active power balance equations 
reactive power balance equations 
apparent power flow limit of line, from and to side 
bus voltage limits 
active and reactive power generation limits 
 
To guarantee that the OPF can be solved, one of the zones (nodes) is assigned a 
zero phase angle by setting its phase angle upper and lower limits to zero (the swing 
bus). The post-contingency interface flow limits are included in the OPF. If all n-1 
contingencies were considered, there would be a constraint for each line contingency 
for each interface.86 This would make the problem size too large for efficient 
computation. To limit the number of constraints, the OPF is solved without 
contingency constraints, a contingency analysis is performed, and then the OPF is 
resolved with new constraints added only for those contingency outages that result in 
overloads, and only for the interfaces that are overloaded. 
 
Generator cost functions are represented as quadratic functions: 
 ( ) 2
iii GiGiiGi PcPbaPC ⋅+⋅+=                                                                                   (6.1) 
 
where GP  is the produced power and a, b and c are constants. The quadratic cost 
functions make this OPF formulation a problem that can be solved with a quadratic 
programming (QP) algorithm. The QP algorithm used can accept upper and lower 
bound limits on each variable.  
 
   The DC OPF power flow model assumes that only the angles of the complex bus 
voltages vary, and that the variation is small. Voltage magnitudes are assumed to be 
constant. Transmission lines are assumed to have no resistance, and therefore no 
losses (Christie et al., 2000). This is a reasonable first approximation for the real 
power system, which can be considered only slightly nonlinear in normal steady state 
operation. In MATPOWER, a DC power flow is modeled by setting the resistance to 
zero for the transmission lines. An alternating current (AC) power flow is modeled by 
using values for both resistance and reactance. 
                                               
86
 In practice the n-1 criterion is implemented in the OPF. Here a simplification is made. 
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In electricity markets the loads are usually relatively inelastic, meaning that they 
do not change as much as the price changes. When this is the case, the OPF objective 
is to minimize total generation cost subject to all relevant constraints. In 
MATPOWER it is possible to specify the inelastic power demand at a bus. The 
current version of MATPOWER cannot take elastic demand into account, but in 
principle this should be possible to do in the future. To model this, the coefficients in 
the cost function should be negative, because the load pays for the energy. A typical 
elastic demand function is decreasing with increasing price (e.g. GPbap ⋅−=  is a 
typical demand function, p is price). There should also be an additional constraint 
keeping the power factor87 constant.  
 
A full AC OPF is used in this chapter. For a detailed mathematical formulation of 
the OPF the reader is referred to Zimmerman and Gan (1997) and Christie et al. 
(2000). 
6.2.2 The Lagrange multipliers and transmission congestion 
Any optimization problem will have a Lagrange multiplier λ associated with each 
constraint in the problem. In our case, the Lagrange multiplier is the marginal value of 
the power balance constraint; the instantaneous price of the next small increment of 
load. If no interfaces are congested, then the zone price for all zones will be equal in 
the DC case (no losses) and almost equal in the AC case. The small difference is due 
to the effects of transmission losses.  
 
In the uncongested case, an increase in a zone load may be met by an increase in 
output by a generator in that zone or by an increase in generation in another zone or 
zones. The generators with the lowest costs and which are not at their maximum 
output are dispatched first. 
 
When congestion occurs, zone prices across the system are different. Then the 
higher cost generators within the same zone have to run, because a contingency or 
transmission line makes the lowest cost generators in others zones unable to supply 
load. 
6.2.3  Optimal power flow used in a deregulated power system 
Generators send a cost function and loads send a bid function to the ISO. The ISO 
has a complete transmission system model and can then do an OPF calculation. The 
zone prices determined by the OPF are used in the following way: 
 
• Generators are paid the zone price for energy 
• Loads must pay the zone price for energy 
 
If there is no congestion and the ISO has run a DC OPF, there is one zone price 
throughout the whole system. Both generators and loads pay the same price for their 
energy. When there is congestion, zone prices differ, and each generator is paid its 
price in the zone and each load pays its price in the zone for energy.  
 
                                               
87
 The cosine of the phase angle between the voltage and current. 
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If there are no losses in the transmission system then some interesting relations can 
be shown to be true: 
 
∑∑ ⋅=⋅
i
Gi
i
Li ii
PP
 zones all zones all
λλ                                                                                                            (6.2) 
 
where iλ  is the price in zone i. This implies that the ISO has to pay all the money it 
collects from the loads to the generators. However, when there is congestion there will 
always be a surplus. The money paid by the loads is greater than the money paid to 
the generators: 
 
 ∑∑ ⋅>⋅
i
Gi
i
Li ii
PP
 zones all zones all
λλ                                                                                                        (6.3) 
 
The OPF performs the function of controlling the transmission flows and thereby 
system security. Congestion will give rise to different zone (nodal) prices and the ISO 
collects a surplus. In the AC OPF there will be a surplus to the ISO in the case with no 
congestion (e.g. the left-hand term is greater than the right-hand term in Equation 
(6.2)).  
6.3 The three test cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We use an eleven-zone power system from Christie et al. (2000) to illustrate the 
aspects of nodal pricing and congestion, shown in Figure 6-1. Each zone consists of a 
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Figure 3.1  Eleven zone model
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Figure 6-1. An eleven-zone model (Christie et al., 2000) 
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single bus. The zones are connected by interfaces. Each interface consists of multiple 
identical transmission lines.  
 
Individual lines can be out of service, one at a time, and this event is called a 
contingency. When a contingency occurs, the power flow increases in the remaining 
lines in the interface and on lines in other interfaces. Flow limits immediately after a 
contingency are usually higher than in normal operation. Operators are expected to be 
able to reduce flows to normal limits before line damages occur. To reflect this 
common practice, post-contingency interface limits are 10% higher than normal 
interface flow limits. 
 
Table 6-1. Generation and load cost data. 
Bid 
Number 
 
Zone 
b 
Constant 
c 
Constant 
Max 
MW 
1 1 10.00 0.0040 1000.0 
2 2 15.00 0.0060 800.0 
3 3 50.00 0.0080 1500.0 
4 4 12.00 0.0050 2500.0 
5 5 15.50 0.0060 1500.0 
6 6 15.50 0.0070 1500.0 
7 7 21.50 0.0080 1500.0 
8 8 16.00 0.0060 1500.0 
9 9 14.00 0.0050 1500.0 
10 10 13.00 0.0040 1500.0 
11 11 16.00 0.0060 700.0 
12 11 31.00 0.0090 2000.0 
13 1 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
14 2 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
15 3 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
16 4 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
17 5 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
18 6 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
19 7 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
20 8 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
21 9 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
22 10 -200.00 0.0000 1000.0 
23 11 -200.00 0.0000 1500.0 
 
6.3.1 Base case 
Table 6-1 shows the generation and load cost data (i.e. the b and c constants). Note 
that the value of the a constant does not affect the optimal solution which is well-
known from optimization theory. It is set to zero in the calculations used in this 
Chapter. The loads are 1000 MW for all zones except zone 11 which has a load of 
1500 MW. The willingness-to-pay (the negative b constant) is 200 EUR/MWh for all 
zones. 
 
The data for transmission lines can be found in Table 6-2. In the base case, the 
transmission system is as shown in Figure 6-1. Contingencies are checked but no 
contingencies are binding at the optimal solution reached by the OPF. Table 6-3 and 
Table 6-4 show the base case OPF generation and load results, the zone lambdas and 
total export or import (positive values indicate export and negative values import).  
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Bus 11 has two generators, and in MATPOWER this is modeled by an introduction 
of a dummy bus for the most expensive generator. The transmission line connecting it 
to bus 11 has almost zero impedance and large transmission capacity. 
  
All load is being supplied and all the generators are supplying some power with the 
exception of the generator in zone 3 and the second generator in zone 11 which are so 
expensive that they are not used. Note that any generator not at its minimum or 
maximum will have the same incremental cost in a DC OPF (almost the same 
incremental cost in the AC OPF). 
 
Table 6-2. Example transmission system data. 
From 
Zone 
To 
Zone 
No. of 
Circuits 
Total 
Circuit 
Reactance 
R, per unit 
Total 
Circuit 
Reactance 
X, per unit 
Capacity 
in MW 
1 2 4 0005 0.008 2000.0 
1 3 4 0.010 0.012 1600.0 
2 3 2 0.020 0.032 250.0 
2 4 3 0.003 0.004 3000.0 
2 5 2 0.005 0.008 1000.0 
3 8 4 0.010 0.016 1000.0 
3 9 2 0.015 0.020 400.0 
4 5 2 0.003 0.004 2000.0 
4 6 4 0.010 0.008 2000.0 
4 7 3 0.003 0.004 3000.0 
5 7 3 0.005 0.008 2000.0 
6 7 2 0.0075 0.008 2000.0 
8 10 4 0.010 0.012 1600.0 
8 9 3 0.010 0.012 1000.0 
9 10 2 0.010 0.016 500.0 
6 11 3 0.0075 0.008 1500.0 
7 11 3 0.010 0.012 1200.0 
10 11 2 0.010 0.016 500.0 
 
In the base case all zones have almost the same zone price (λ). Note that zone 11 is 
importing 800 MW of power, its first generator is at its maximum output of 700 MW 
and its second generator is not producing.  
 
Table 6-3. Base case generation OPF results. 
Bid 
Number 
Bid 
Zone 
Max 
MW 
MW 
Sold  
Generator 
Incremental 
Cost 
1 1 1000.0 1000 18.00 
2 2 800.0 800 24.60 
3 3 0 0 50.00 
4 4 2500.0 1865.2 30.65 
5 5 1500.0 1263.8 30.67 
6 6 1500.0 1085.4 30.70 
7 7 1500.0 576.6 30.73 
8 8 1500.0 1217.3 30.61 
9 9 1500.0 1500 29.00 
10 10 1500.0 1500 25.00 
11 11 700.0 700 24.40 
12 11 2000.0 0.0 31.00 
 
In the uncongested case, the transmission system can withstand any first 
contingency outage of a single line in any interface and still not be overloaded. Total 
generation is slightly higher than total consumption, due to grid losses. The difference 
between total generation and load equals total grid losses. 
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Table 6-4. Base case load, zone lambdas and export/import. 
 
Zone 
Number 
Variable 
Generation 
Variable 
Load 
Zone 
Lambda 
Total 
Export or 
Import 
1 1000 1000 30.76 0 
2 800 1000 30.71 -200 
3 0 1000 30.85 -1000 
4 1865.2 1000 30.65 865.2 
5 1263.8 1000 30.67 263.8 
6 1085.4 1000 30.70 85.4 
7 576.6 1000 30.72 -423.4 
8 1217.3 1000 30.61 217.3 
9 1500 1000 30.54 500 
10 1500 1000 30.57 500 
11 700 1500 30.87 -800 
Total 11508.3    11500   
6.3.2 Congested case 
In this case congestion is created by changing the transmission system topology. 
All lines in the interfaces between zones 6 and 11 and zones 7 and 11 have been 
completely outaged. Table 6-5 shows the resulting congested system export/import 
data.  
 
The active or binding constraint is a contingency of one line in the zone 10 to zone 
11 interface which brings the remaining line in that interface to its post-contingency 
flow limit. This transmission limit is found by the calculation, 500 MW – 250 MW + 
250 MW · 10% = 275 MW (data for the line from 10 to 11 are found in Table 6-2). 
 
Table 6-5. Congested case export/import. 
Zone 
Number 
Variable 
Generation 
Variable 
Load 
Zone 
Lambda 
Total 
Export or 
Import 
1 1000.0 1000 29.47 0.0 
2 800.0 1000 29.44 -200.0 
3 0.0 1000 29.53 -1000.0 
4 1738.6 1000 29.39 738.6 
5 1158.5 1000 29.40 158.5 
6 994.4 1000 29.42 -5.6 
7 496.5 1000 29.44 -503.5 
8 1095.0 1000 29.14 95.0 
9 1497.8 1000 28.98 497.8 
10 1500.0 1000 29.00 500.0 
11 1225.8 1500 40.47 -274.2 
Totals 11506.6    11500.0     
 
The congestion results in an import reduction into zone 11 from 800 MW in the 
base case to 274.2 MW. Therefore, generation in zone 11 must increase from 700 
MW to 1225.8 MW to supply zone 11 load, and this must all come from the very high 
priced second generator in zone 11. The reduction of 525.8 MW in generation 
exported from the remaining zones results in their zone lambdas dropping slightly to 
around 29 EUR/MWh while zone 11 experiences an increase to 40.47 EUR/MWh due 
to the expensive second generator. 
 112                                                       Utilizing MATPOWER in optimal power flow 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6.3.3 Congestion in a networked system 
When congestion occurs on the radial interface in the previous case, there are two 
different zone prices at each side of the interface. Congestion in an interface that is 
part of a networked (meshed or looped) system will give unique zone prices at every 
bus. Congestion on any interface in a networked system affects zone prices in the 
entire networked system. This effect is illustrated by restoring the interface from zone 
7 to zone 11 to service. Only the interface from zone 6 to zone 11 is out of service. 
Table 6-6 shows the AC OPF results. 
 
Because of the increased interface capacity to zone 11, more power is imported and 
the more expensive generator in zone 11 now operates at 872.0 MW. This is a 
reduction of 353.8 MW from the previous case and lowers the zone 11 price.  
 
The interface from zone 10 to zone 11 is still the binding constraint, but this 
interface is now part of a networked system with unique zone prices. Every time the 
load or generation changes in a zone it affects the flow on the congested interface, 
even when the changed load or generation is in a zone far from that interface. Higher 
zone prices appear where decreases in generation or increases in load increase the 
flow on the congested interface. Lower zone prices appear where increases in load or 
decreases in generation decrease the flow on the congested interface. 
 
Table 6-6. Congestion in a networked system. 
Zone 
Number 
Variable 
Generation 
Variable 
Load 
Zone 
Lambda 
Total 
Export or 
Import 
1 1000.0 1000 30.3 0.0 
2 800.0 1000 30.9 -200.0 
3 0.0 1000 29.2 -1000.0 
4 1929.4 1000 31.3 929.4 
5 1316.2 1000 31.3 316.2 
6 1143.2 1000 31.5 143.2 
7 640.8 1000 31.8 -359.2 
8 962.4 1000 27.5 -37.6 
9 1345.2 1000 27.5 345.2 
10 1500.0 1000 26.3 500.0 
11 872.0 1500 34.1 -628.0 
Totals 11509.2    11500.0     
 
6.4 Economics and transmission congestion 
In economics, the ideal is a perfectly competitive environment, where goods 
wanted by consumers are produced at the least possible cost. In electricity markets, 
this would imply that consumers could buy power at the same price without respect to 
location. 
 
However, a congested transmission system prohibits customers from buying power 
from lower cost generators. This implies that transmission congestion introduces 
inefficiency in electricity markets. 
 
The degree of efficiency is measured by the social welfare, which should be 
maximized. The social welfare is the sum of the producer and consumer surplus, or 
alternatively the sum of the generator costs and the consumer benefits. The 
competitive benchmark is marginal cost pricing, resulting in maximum social welfare. 
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In a competitive market, more goods are produced at a lower price than in any other 
form of market.  
 
To study what the topology of a congested network involves, the three test cases 
were analyzed with respect to the social welfare and the income (or congestion rent) 
to the ISO. The results are shown in Table 6-7. 
 
Table 6-7. Economic analysis of the networks (CC = congested case and CNS 
congestion in a network system). 
 
 Network Import/ 
Export (MW) 
Income  to 
the ISO 
(EUR) 
Base case -2423.4/2431.7 257 
CC -1983.3/1989.9 3441 
CNS -2224.8/2234.0 3110 
 
Network Generator 
Surplus 
(EUR) 
Consumer  
Surplus 
 (EUR) 
Social 
Welfare 
(EUR) 
Base 
case 
110654 1946515 2057569 
CC 105338 1946085 2051423 
CNS 102234 1951250 2053484 
 
The base case gives the highest social welfare, followed by the CNS case. As 
expected social welfare decreases as the number of line outages increases. When lines 
6-7 and 7-11 are out of service (case CC) there is less export/import, and some of the 
high cost generators have to be scheduled, which increases the cost.  
 
The income to the ISO is highest for the CC case and is lowest in the base case. 
The income to the generators (producer surplus) is highest in the base case, followed 
by the CC case. The consumer surplus is highest in the CNS case, followed by the 
base case. We also see that there is 8.3 MW net generation (export less import) in the 
base case, due to grid losses. 
 
Another interesting aspect is how large the capacity of the congested interface 
should be before the price would be equal at both sides (i.e. to uncongest the 
interface). For the congested case, we found that the interface between 10 and 11 had 
to be 786 MW for the prices to be equal. This is an increase of 511 MW in capacity or 
186 per cent. For the meshed network, the interface had to be 489 MW, which is an 
increase of 214 MW or 78 per cent. In the congested case, the price differential is 
11.47 EUR/MWh between buses 10 and 11. To make investments in transmission 
lines profitable for producers at bus 10 their benefits from the line must outweigh 
investment costs.  
 
The greatest price difference over an interface appeared between buses 10 and 11, 
with bus 11 as the higher price bus. The producer and consumer surplus is calculated 
in Table 6-8. The producers at bus 11 experienced higher profits and consumers 
received lower surplus during congestion. The potential for creation of transmission 
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congestion and thereby exploitation of market power is therefore considerable at bus 
11. 
Table 6-8. Economic consequences for the players in the market at bus 11 for the 
three cases. 
Network Producer Surplus 
(EUR) 
Consumer Surplus 
 (EUR) 
Base case 7469 253695 
CC 16680 239295 
CNS 9997 248850 
 
To model market splitting88 it is possible to compare the power flows from the 
unconstrained solution (i.e. the base case) with the interface limits defining the price 
areas, taking into account contingencies and security limits. When the unconstrained 
transfer exceeds the transmission limits, each price area becomes a separate market 
with the constraint that the power flow from one area to another does not violate the 
interface limit. In the case of two areas the power balance constraint for area A (the 
surplus area) states that the generation in area A is equal to load in area A plus 
maximum transfer from area A to area B (the constrained area). Similarly, the area B 
constraint states that generation in area B is equal to load in area B minus the 
maximum transfer from area A to area B. New transmission capacity constraints 
expressing the maximum transfers are then replacing the unconstrained transmission 
limits. In practice price areas are defined pragmatically, based on operational and 
engineering experience. Analytical determination of price area divisions in a meshed 
network is still an unresolved issue (Bjørndal and Jørnsten, 2001). 
 
The Norwegian transmission provider (i.e. Statnett) can also use the OPF to 
analyze the impacts from new transmission lines or outages. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrated how MATPOWER calculates the nodal prices as a 
result of an optimization of the minimum costs of active generation, taking into 
account the relevant constraints. Three cases were considered: a base case, a 
congested case and a congested case in a meshed network. We found that when we 
had a congested case with two interfaces out of service it gave rise to a significantly 
higher price in one of the nodes. When one interface was out of service and the 
network was meshed it gave rise to different nodal prices at every node. Some of the 
prices were higher or some were lower than in the uncongested case. The social 
welfare, producer and consumer surplus, and income to the ISO were calculated for 
the different networks. Congestion in a network decreased social welfare and created 
inefficiency.  
 
We also found how much we had to increase the capacity in the lines to uncongest 
an interface. Bus 11 was found to be a market where market power potentially could 
be exploited because the generators received higher profits under congestion.  
 
                                               
88
 Strictly speaking, the relationship between the nodal prices and area prices in Norway is; 
nodal price = Area price • factor, where the factor is the adjustment for marginal losses in the 
grid. 
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Finally, it was shown how Nord Pool and Statnett could use OPF to analyze price 
areas and transmission congestion, including aspects of security and reliability. 
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7 Pricing of Contracts for Differences in the Nordic market 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an introduction to, and a pricing analysis of 
Contracts for Differences (CfD), introduced on November 17, 2000 at Nord Pool. The 
CfD is a forward market product with reference to the difference between the future 
seasonal area price and System Price. By using available historical trading prices and 
spot prices for seven seasonal contracts and one yearly contract, it is possible to 
analyze the relationships between the contract prices and the value of the underlying 
asset. For the first seven seasonal contracts it appears that the CfDs traded at Nord 
Pool are mostly over-priced relative to the underlying asset. Pricing theory for 
forward contracts explains this by the presence of a majority of risk-averse consumers 
who are willing to pay a risk premium for receiving the future price differential. We 
utilize statistical analysis with regard to the contract prices and the underlying asset, 
and find some interesting relationships. The analysis is preliminary because the CfD 
market is relatively new. 
 
7.1  Introduction 
In many electricity markets there is now a demand for new risk management tools. 
The Nordic market has shown a growing concern for transmission congestion and the 
associated risks of Area/System Price differentials. As a result, Contracts for 
Differences (CfDs) were introduced at Nord Pool November 17, 2000. These financial 
instruments make it possible for the players in the market to hedge against the 
difference between the area price and the System Price in a future time period. The 
forward and future contracts traded at Nord Pool are referred to the System Price, 
while the generators are being paid the area price in their area for their production, 
and the consumers purchase electricity at the area price referring to their area. Often 
the generators and consumers are located in different areas, facing periods with 
transmission congestion and area prices that differ from the System Price. They may 
therefore be exposed to significant financial risks. 
 
One extension of CfDs is financial transmission rights (FTRs) (Hogan, 1992). The 
FTR concept has been developed by Professor William W. Hogan at Harvard 
University (Hogan, 2004). FTRs can be used to hedge directly against a locational 
price difference, and they have been used in the PJM Interconnection (Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey and Maryland) since April 1998, and in New York since 1999. A study of 
how well the markets for hedging transmission congestion function is important 
because it will have implications for implementation in other regions.  
 
This chapter describes the Nordic electricity market, Nordic transmission pricing, 
and congestion management procedures. We study CfDs in an advanced electricity 
market. We discuss general theory for pricing of forward contracts, and the principles 
of CfDs. Utilizing data from November 17, 2000 to April 30, 2003, the CfD prices are 
analyzed with regard to the value of the underlying asset and volatility. Since the 
market for CfDs is relatively new, the limited data available might be insufficient to 
draw fully conclusive results. 
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7.2  The Nordic power market 
Since January 1996, Norway and Sweden have had a common electricity market, 
with Finland joining in September 1998, followed by western Denmark in January 
1999 and eastern Denmark in October 2000. These areas now constitute a common 
Nordic market. 
 
In the Nordic region Nord Pool organizes two different markets for electricity, 
Elspot and Eltermin. In the Elspot market, buyers and sellers trade in a daily spot 
market concluded at the day-ahead stage. Traders can submit offers to sell or bids to 
buy the physical electricity they expect to produce or consume for every hour of the 
next day. The System Price (spot price) is determined by the intersection point of the 
aggregated purchase (demand) and sale (supply) curves. The System Price is the price 
independent of any transmission constraints (i.e. the unconstrained price), and is the 
spot price for the common Nordic89 market.  
 
The Eltermin market is purely financial and is divided into the futures and forwards 
markets. These are markets for cash settlement of a specified volume of power at an 
agreed upon price, date and period. The market participants may trade for delivery up 
to four years in advance. Futures and forward contracts are used for trading and risk 
management. The main difference between the futures and forward contracts is the 
daily marking to market and settlement of futures contracts. Forward contracts are 
settled when the contracts reach their due dates. Forward contracts, which are the 
relevant contracts in this case, have 3 seasonal delivery periods: Winter 1 (weeks 1-
16), Summer (weeks 17-40), and Winter 2 (weeks 41-52/53). The forward contracts 
can also be purchased as yearly contracts. The System Price is used as a reference 
price for the forward and futures contracts. It is also used as the reference price for the 
Nordic over-the-counter (OTC) market, which is a bilateral wholesale market. Due to 
possible differences between the System Price and the actual area price of the sales or 
purchases, this hedging mechanism is imperfect. To overcome this price differential 
risk, CfDs were introduced.  
 
The futures contracts can be purchased as day, week or block contracts. The 
spectrum of contracts is updated dynamically every day. The week contracts are split 
into day contracts seven days before the delivery period starts, while the block 
contracts are split into week contracts four weeks before the delivery period starts. 
The new block contracts are issued one year before delivery. The time horizon for 
futures contracts is 8-12 months.90 
 
Besides the Nord Pool markets there is a bilateral market for OTC contracts. In this 
market the most common contract types are forward contracts with different (fixed) 
                                               
89
 Currently the System Price is the price cross between total bids and offers in Norway, 
Sweden and Finland. Bids/offers in the Danish areas are also included in the calculation up to 
the capacity limits to or from these areas. Beginning January 2006 the System Price will 
include Denmark West and Denmark East.  
90
 From the fall of 2003 several changes in Nord Pool’s financial market product structure will 
take place. The block contracts will be replaced with month contracts. The block and week 
contracts will be listed as 6 and 8 consecutive contracts in a continuously rolling cycle 
respectively. The year contract 2006 will be cascaded into quarters. 
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load profiles, options and forward contracts with flexibility in the load profile (load 
factor contracts). 
 
The balancing market at Nord Pool is called Elbas. In this market the players can 
trade one-hour contracts until one hour before real time. It is currently only available 
in Sweden and Finland. Deviations from generation and supply in the spot and the 
Elbas markets are managed by trading in the real-time market operated by the 
transmission system operators (TSOs). The TSOs in the Nordic countries apply 
different rules for the calculation of the real-time prices and the clearing of the 
market.  
 
The electricity is generated from different energy sources in the Nordic countries. 
Norway uses 99% hydropower, while Sweden has a mix of hydropower (mainly 
located in the north), nuclear power and conventional thermal power (located in the 
south). Denmark has mainly thermal power generation (89%), with an increasing 
share of wind power (11%). Finland has the same mix of generation as Sweden, but 
with a higher share of thermal and nuclear power than hydropower. Due to the high 
share of hydropower in the Nordic system, production can vary from a dry to a wet 
year with an order of magnitude of 40 TWh. The hydropower production is easily 
regulated, and can show substantial differences during the day. For this reason the 
transmission requirements can vary greatly. There is also a considerable load growth 
in the Nordic area (1.55% pa. during the 1990s). On cold winter days with high peak-
load, the system can be capacity constrained, resulting in hours with high prices (up to 
1500 NOK/MWh). For more information on the Nordic power market, see Nord Pool 
(2002a, 2002b and 2002c). 
7.3 Transmission pricing and congestion management 
The ideal tariff for trading arrangements in deregulated markets should have the 
following properties: 
• Market players should know their locational transmission cost. 
• The transmission costs should be independent of the location of the trading 
counterpart. 
Below we describe the main features of Nordic transmission pricing. 
7.3.1  Nordic transmission pricing 
The point-of-connection tariff is used in transmission pricing in the Nordic region. 
The Nordic tariffs give full access to the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and Finnish 
markets. The tariffs have substantial differences, but it is possible to accomplish 
market transactions across national borders of connection, because of the properties of 
the point tariff.  An essential property of this tariff is that it should not be an obstacle 
to free trade or restrict a player’s ability to choose counterparties (third party access - 
TPA). During the transition period, prior to a common Nordic market, border tariffs 
have been charged. The tariffs have been volume-dependent and have been based 
mainly on reciprocity, to make the competition fair on both sides of a border. 
 
The rates for injections into and withdrawals from the grid are different. The 
geographic location within the transmission grid also affects the rates. Cumulative 
tariffs require that the players pay the sum of the tariffs levied, including the high-
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voltage national network, down to lower-voltage local distribution grids. The main 
principles of the cumulative tariff rates are: 
• Main-grid tariffs must fairly reflect the main grid’s total costs. 
• Regional-grid tariffs must fairly reflect total regional-grid costs, plus utilization of 
the main grid. 
• Local-grid tariffs must fairly reflect local-grid costs, plus utilization of the 
regional grid. 
Main-grid tariffs are complex since they include several cost components. Local-
grid tariffs can be simple, including only an annual connection fee and a volume-
dependent fee.  
 
Losses in the Nordic grid are treated as TSO consumption. The TSOs have to 
purchase grid losses in the spot market or from the bilateral contract market. The 
associated costs are recovered through the transmission tariff.  
7.3.2  Market splitting, counter trade and constrained export/import  
When congestion is predicted, two or more spot areas are defined. This procedure is 
called market splitting. It is used within Norway and at the border interconnections 
among the Nordic countries. In these cases the players must specify their bids in the 
different spot price areas. By the clearing at Nord Pool the prices in the different areas 
are decided such that the power flow does not exceed the specified constraints. A 
surplus area will then receive a lower price than a deficit area. The difference between 
the respective area prices and the System Price is called the Congestion Fee.91 Market 
splitting gives price signals to the market players when there is scarcity of 
transmission capacity. The TSO receives an income from the market splitting, and 
therefore may have no incentives for expanding the grid.92  
 
Statnett (the Norwegian system operator) defines the fixed price areas in Norway 
according to its information on the likely pattern of flows on the system for a certain 
period of time. The price areas are named as NO1 and NO2. When necessary, 
additional price areas may be utilized. Sweden (SE) and Finland (FI) constitute one 
price area each, Denmark two (west DK1 and east DK2), and Norway constitutes two 
or three areas. In total there are six to eight (depending on the number of areas in 
Norway) price areas in the Nordic region. Congestion inside the price areas is 
managed by counter trade. Congestion between the countries can also be handled by 
constrained import/export. The bottleneck west of Oslo is managed by restriction of 
export to Sweden. In Sweden, Jutland, Funen, and Zealand there is counter trade after 
a restriction of import/export is conducted. In Finland there is only counter trade with 
an exception for unexpected events. Among all countries counter trade occurs when 
the real time physical flow is approaching the maximum transmission limit.  
 
The bids in the balancing market are first meant to balance the power system 
                                               
91
 Statnett (the Norwegian system operator) uses the term “Capacity Fee” (Norwegian: 
kapasitetsavgift). 
92
 To what extent the system operator keeps the congestion rent depends on the economic 
regulation of the grid company. With the current regulation in Norway (revenue cap 
regulation) the congestion rent adds nothing to the net revenue of the system operator. 
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(frequency control), but because they contain geographical information they can be 
used to manage congestion. If the power flow through a bottleneck exceeds the 
allowed limit, the TSO orders increased production (upward regulation) within the 
constrained area and decreased production (downward regulation) in the surplus area. 
This is counter trade, and it involves an expense for the TSO. The price paid for 
increased production is always higher than or equal to the System Price, while the 
price for decreased production is lower or equal. Downward and upward regulation is 
rewarded with the difference between the System Price and the price in the real-time 
market. The increased production (or decreased consumption) must occur in the area 
with the more expensive production, and the decreased production (or increased 
consumption) must occur in the area with cheaper production. The costs associated 
with counter trade over time can give the TSO incentives to expand the grid, and 
thereby reduce the costs. The counter trade gives one market with a uniform price, 
which promotes electricity trade. If the price differences are not allowed to last for 
some time, an extended utilization of counter trade can interfere with the price signals 
from scarcity of transmission capacity. 
 
It is important to distinguish between a thermal generator and a hydropower 
generator with regulation ability when transmission congestion is analyzed. Water can 
be stored and used later for production. When a bottleneck is predicted and has a 
certain period of duration, the congestion management methods have different 
impacts on the use of water. Spillage involves lost energy production and local low 
prices, if market splitting is used. The generators will earn more money by producing 
more before the bottleneck settles. With counter trade the generators can adjust as 
though there is no congestion. In a situation where the export capacity from an area is 
constrained, the generators are paid the System Price for their production. In addition 
they can participate in the counter trade arrangement. They avoid low area prices at 
the same time they are being paid for the water not produced because of transmission 
constraints. This weakens the incentives for avoiding spillage. 
7.3.3 Historical area price differences 
The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), which is the grid 
company regulator in Norway, believes that market splitting is the most efficient 
method to handle planned and persistent bottlenecks due to the grid’s structure and the 
varying reservoir levels (Norwegian Competition Authority, 2000). Small temporary 
bottlenecks due to failures, outages, and maintenance of the network are better 
handled by a counter trade arrangement.  
 
Since January 2000, NVE has introduced a test scheme with fixed price areas. The 
division of the areas will be reassessed before each season and will be fixed thereafter. 
Within the areas, congestion will be managed by a counter trade arrangement unless 
the costs associated with one bottleneck are higher than a specified cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 122                                       Pricing of Contracts for Differences in the Nordic market 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 7-1.Average yearly area prices (NOK/MWh) for 1996-2002. 
    
Year System 
Price 
Oslo (NO1) Tromsø 
(NO2) 
Stockholm 
(SE) 
1996 253.74 256.79 251.40 250.80 
1997 135.28 137.77 133.24 133.23 
1998 116.92 116.48 116.75 114.75 
1999 111.97 109.00 119.43 113.06 
2000 103.21 97.55 100.56 115.38 
2001 186.49 185.95 188.55 184.16 
2002 200.98 198.45 200.12 206.27 
 
Year Helsinki 
(FI) 
Copenhagen  
(DK2) 
Århus 
(DK1) 
1998 116.76   
1999 113.64  122.44 
2000 120.61 138.03 133.20 
2001 183.98 189.72 191.21 
2002 203.82 213.68 190.74 
 
Table 7-1 shows the yearly average prices for 1996-2002. As can be seen, the 
Stockholm, Helsinki and Copenhagen prices for 2001 were below the System Price. 
The Oslo price has on average been below the System Price since 1998. Conversely, 
the Århus (except 2002) and Copenhagen prices have been above the System Price 
since 1999 and 2000 respectively. This has implications for the electricity trading 
among the Nordic countries. For example, a trade of 100 GWh between two locations 
with a price differential of 5.26 NOK/MWh implies a Congestion Fee of NOK 
526100.   
 
Table 7-2 shows the percentage of the years in which the area price differed from 
the other area prices. Historically there has been a substantial percentage of the year 
with price differences, especially for the NO1, NO2 and DK1 areas. 
 
Table 7-2. Percentage of the years in which the area price differed from all other area 
prices. 
 
Year Oslo (NO1) Tromsø 
(NO2) 
Stockholm 
(SE) 
Helsinki (FI) 
1998 22.9% 23.1% 3.2%  
1999 33.2% 36.6% 0.6% 4.0% 
2000 55.0% 41.7% 5.5% 15.8% 
2001 8.9% 23.8% 0% 0.9% 
Year Copenhagen 
(DK2) 
Århus 
(DK1) 
1999  33.8% 
2000 7.2% 44.8% 
2001 5.4% 19.1% 
 
7.4 Forward pricing theory 
It is possible to use two different theories for pricing of forward and futures 
contracts (Fama and French, 1987). The first theory describes the current forward 
price as the expected spot price, plus a cost of storage and minus a convenience yield. 
The second theory states that the forward price is equal to the expected future spot 
price discounted at the risk premium for the holding period. Both of these theories are 
discussed as well as how they can be used for pricing of electricity forward and 
futures contracts. Our discussion is based on the references Botterud et al. (2002), 
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Clewlow and Strickland (2000), Leong (1997), Pindyck (2001) and Schwartz (1997). 
Let us briefly discuss risk premiums in pricing of commodities after presenting both 
theories. 
 
The traditional financial markets use the no arbitrage models for the valuation of 
the forward prices. The models show a relationship between the spot and forward 
prices by the possibility of arbitrage between the prices. Since it is easy to buy and 
sell the underlying asset, the argument of no arbitrage can be used.  
 
 However, in electricity markets, the no arbitrage models are not useful because 
they depend on whether a commodity can be stored. This is the opposite of storable 
commodities, where inventories play an important role in the price formation 
(Pindyck, 2001).   
 
The cost of carry relationship states that the payoff to a forward sale of an asset can 
be replicated by borrowing money for the purchase in the cash market, holding the 
asset until maturity, and then delivering the asset into the long position, using the 
funds received to pay off the loan. This relationship holds in markets where 
arbitrageurs are able to purchase and short sell assets easily.  
For some participants, holding the underlying asset has value relative to having the 
forward contract. The value has been termed the convenience yield. It can be 
represented in terms of an effective continuous dividend stream δ which the holder of 
the spot asset receives. The convenience yield also reflects the market’s expectation 
about the future availability of a contract. 
 
Let F(t,s) be the price of a forward contract at time t and with maturity time s (i.e. 
the life of the forward position is s-t) on a spot asset that is currently trading at the 
price S(t). Taking into account the cost of carry relationship and the convenience 
yield, the pricing formula for a forward is: 
 
( )( )( , ) ( ) r w s tF t s S t e δ+ − −= ⋅                           (7.1)
    
where r is the financing cost assuming continuous  compounding over the life of the 
forward position, s-t,  and w represents the cost of storage over the holding period.  
 
This formula can determine some interesting relationships between the spot and the 
forward prices. Depending on the relative magnitude of the interest rate (positive), the 
cost of the storage (positive) and convenience yield (negative) the forward price will 
be less, equal to, or greater than the expected future spot price. The forward curve is 
said to be in contango when the forward price is greater than the expected future spot 
price implying an upward sloping (normal contango) forward curve as illustrated in 
Figure 7-1. When the forward curve is downward sloping (normal backwardation) the 
forward price is less than the expected future spot price.  
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Figure 7-1. Illustration of normal contango and backwardation in the forward market. 
 
Often it is impossible to sell the underlying asset short and thereby execute 
arbitrage. In the presence of backwardation the market players should buy the forward 
contract at a discount to the spot price. 
 
The electricity storage problem implies non-uniqueness of forward prices, which 
means that the market is incomplete. The characteristics of incomplete markets are 
heavy tails, autocorrelation, skewness and illiquidity. 
 
The second theory for pricing of forward contracts takes into account an investor’s 
risk preference. The price of a forward contract is equal to the expected (E) future 
spot price and discounted at the risk premium at the time s. The commodity risk 
premium, v = - (r
 
–f), is equal to the difference between the investor’s discount rate f 
and the risk-free interest rate r. The risk premium must be interpreted in the light of 
the risk preference and the market share of the supply and demand side.  The theory 
states that a risk-averse investor would require a positive risk premium for a future 
investment, while the opposite holds true for a risk-seeking investor. The forward 
price can now be expressed as:  
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The forward-spot price relationship can be analyzed depending on the sign of v. A 
positive risk premium for a generator implies that the forward prices are lower than 
the expected future spot price. Conversely a negative risk premium for the consumer 
implies that the forward prices are greater than the expected future spot price. Several 
implications can be drawn, depending on the roles of the players (i.e. generators or 
consumers) and the dominance in the market. If the market player is a risk-averse 
generator it may want to hedge its production in the forward market. A market with 
dominant risk-averse generators will involve a forward market in backwardation. On 
the other hand, if the risk-averse consumers are the dominant players, this would 
imply a market in contango. 
 
The risk premium can also be explained by considering the correlation between the 
forward price and the spot price. If the two prices are positively correlated this 
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involves a positive systematic risk. Thus an investor would require an expected return 
above the risk-free interest rate.  
 
A risk premium could arise if either the number of participants on the supply side 
differs substantially from the number on the demand side, or if the degree of risk 
averseness varies considerably between the two sides.  
 
The share of generators and consumers in the forward market can be assumed to be 
relatively equal, since many companies have both generation and load. Concerning 
the capability of adjusting the quantity of supply and demand there are differences. 
The demand of electricity is relatively inelastic, while the generators have much more 
flexibility in regulating the produced quantity, especially the hydropower generators 
that can regulate their production in a short period of time. For these reasons the 
generators may not want to hedge their production in the forward market. The 
generators can use the available information to optimize their production in 
accordance with the hours with the highest prices in the day-ahead spot market and in 
the real-time market. On the other hand, if the consumers are risk-averse they may 
want to hedge their future consumption in the forward market by being willing to pay 
a risk premium for the future asset. 
 
The sign of the risk premium can also be dependent on the supply and demand of 
forward contracts. If there is an excess supply of contracts this would imply a positive 
risk premium, while an excess demand would imply a negative risk premium. 
 
In the context of a forward contract on the difference between the area price and the 
System Price, the risk premium theory will have the following interpretations. If the 
price differential in a given area is positive, the consumers are penalized if they have 
purchased a forward contract related to the System Price. They are risk-averse if they 
pay for the contract at a price greater than the expected price differential. If the price 
differential is negative, generators are penalized, and they are risk-averse if they pay 
for a contract that is more expensive than the expected price differential (in absolute 
value).  
 
The CfD is settled against the difference between the area price and the System 
Price, while the forward contract itself is priced based on the market’s expectations 
about the future spot prices. The risk premium model can then be formulated as: 
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where AP(s) and SP(s) are the future Area and the System Prices. The difference is 
that the expected spot price now is a difference which is typically more volatile than a 
single spot price. In general there will be different risk premiums for different areas. 
A hydropower area like Norway (in a normal or wet year) will have an area price 
which is lower than the System Price, implying a negative CfD price. Typically if the 
generators have sold most of their production as forward contracts referred to the 
System Price, they would be willing to pay a risk premium to hedge against the price 
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differential. Conversely, in a thermal area the area price would be greater than the 
System Price (with a corresponding positive CfD price), and consumers would be 
willing to pay a risk premium since it has to purchase power at the local price.  
 
If forward contracts referring to area prices in the Nordic market existed we would 
have the following relationship: 
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where FAP(t,s) and FSP(t,s) are the Area and the System Price forward contracts at 
time t and maturity s, and v1 and v2 are the risk premiums of the respective prices. 
The above equality would be true due to a no-arbitrage argument. 
 
All other things being equal, the longer the duration of a forward/futures contract or 
the more forward it can be purchased, the greater the hedging benefits it contains. 
Conversely, a very short-term contract has limited value, since its returns will closely 
approximate those of the underlying asset. The cost of this contract should be 
correspondingly small. 
 
Electricity markets generally exhibit complicated seasonal patterns. A peak is 
observed in winter due to the demand for heating. The spot price will also depend on 
the inflow to the reservoirs. There can be daily and hourly patterns, with less price 
variations in hydropower-dominant areas due to the high degree of controlling ability. 
The more complicated patterns are due to the non-storability of electricity. Another 
factor is that the electricity market is still a regional market. Differences among 
regions arise due to the fuels used to produce electricity, weather patterns, 
demographics, local supply and demand conditions, etc. Transmission lines between 
different regions help to reduce such problems but constraints on the lines mean that 
the problems do not completely disappear.  
 
The markets for oil, gas and coal will be related to the electricity markets since 
these are used as fuel in thermal power plants. Empirical research by Pindyck (2001), 
Fama and French (1987), Bodie and Rosansky (1980) and Chang (1985) on 
commodities futures prices finds evidence to support normal backwardation for 
petroleum and agricultural products and portfolios of commodities. The risk premium 
may vary in time, but is not related to the general level of the stock market.  
7.5 Major issues in trading forward and futures contracts 
Forward and futures contracts are a means of transferring risk to those who are able 
and willing to bear it and allow investors to transfer risk to others who might profit. 
The party transferring risk achieves price certainty but loses the opportunity to make 
additional profits. The party taking on the risk loses if the counterparty’s downside is 
realized. Except for transactions costs, the winner’s gains are equal to the loser’s 
losses.  
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According to Khoury (1984) a hedger is primarily motivated by the security and not 
the profit derived from the futures transaction. A speculator on the other hand, is 
motivated by the profits that are achieved through the successful prediction of price 
movements in a futures transaction. An arbitrageur capitalizes on unjustifiable price 
differences (e.g. between two different markets) over space or over time (e.g. between 
one maturity month and another). Pure arbitrage involves zero risk and no 
commitment of capital. The activities of the agents will determine the futures prices. 
 
The basis is the differential at a point in time between the futures price of a 
commodity and the spot price of the same commodity. Futures prices often exceed 
spot prices, but not always. The closer the spot price is to the higher futures price, the 
stronger the basis. A strong basis reflects excess demand for the commodity. In this 
case, the spot market is indicating its willingness to pay for earlier spot delivery. A 
weak basis indicates that the market is unwilling to make early “storage” payments. 
 
Under uncertain conditions, speculators would buy or sell futures contracts, 
depending on whether their expectations about future prices coincide with the 
maturity of the contracts. If their expected price is greater than the futures price they 
would be long on the futures contract. Conversely a short position would be 
established if the expected price is less than the futures price. The hedgers would enter 
futures contracts to offset their current or expected cash position, independent of what 
the expected price is going to be. Hedgers are only interested in shifting the risk that 
results from price fluctuations onto the speculators. Those who make sure that the 
relationship between the futures price and spot price is in equilibrium are the 
arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs tend to bet on more certain outcomes than on a forecast vs. 
a forward price. However, it would be easier to sell month m if it looks overvalued 
relative to m-1, because the bet can be hedged by buying m-1, and two prices one 
month apart can be expected to move together. It would be more difficult for a 
prudent trader to sell month m based on a forecast of spot prices in month m showing 
it is overvalued. If the traders own the option to build a power plant, that option is also 
a hedge that allows one to sell forward. Given the methods of traders and arbitrageurs, 
can we expect a consistent bias in the forward market?93 This issue is worth 
examining. 
7.6 Forward locational price differential products 
The CfD is a forward market product with reference to the difference between the 
area price and System Price during the delivery (settlement) period.  
 
CfD = average during the delivery period of  
(daily area price – daily System Price)                                             (7.5) 
 
From this formula we see that every time the area price is higher than the System 
Price the holder receives a rebate equal to the price differential. Otherwise the holder 
must pay the difference in prices. The payoff from a CfD is determined by calculating 
Equation (7.5) during the settlement period and multiplying the price differential by 
the contracted volume. The price of these contracts is settled by the supply/demand 
                                               
93
 Personal communication with power trader at Morgan Stanley, New York. 
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drives. 
 
New forward area price contracts could also be introduced, but they would split the 
total liquidity among several products, and are therefore rejected. 
 
The market price of a CfD during the trading period reflects the market’s prediction 
of a price differential during the delivery period. The market price of a CfD may be 
positive, negative or zero. CfDs are traded at positive prices when the market expects 
the area price to be higher than the System Price (a net import situation). CfDs will 
trade at negative prices if the market expects an area price below the System Price (a 
net export situation). 
 
A perfect hedge using forward or futures contracts is possible only when the area 
price and the System Price are equal. If forward or futures contracts are used for 
hedging there is a basis risk equal to the difference between the area price and the 
System Price. To create a perfect hedge against the price differential, a three-step 
process using CfDs must be used: 
1. Hedge the specified volume by using forward contracts. 
2. Hedge against the price differential – for the same period and volume – by using 
CfDs. 
3. Accomplish physical procurement by trading in the Elspot area of the holder of 
the contract. 
 
In the Nordic market the term Contract for Differences differs from the 
corresponding term used in the British market. In the Nordic region CfDs are used to 
hedge against the difference between the two uncertain prices (area price and System 
Price), not as in the British market, against the difference between the spot price and a 
pre-defined reference price or price profile. The Nordic CfD is a locational swap, 
while the British CfD is settled based on the difference between the spot price and the 
reference price. 
 
CfDs are also cleared at Nord Pool through Nord Pool Clearing, and it is assumed 
that the OTC volume is higher than the volume provided by Nord Pool’s financial 
market. The clearing service provided by Nord Pool reduces the counterparty and 
payment risk associated with the contracts. The fact that Nord Pool is providing the 
clearing service may therefore increase the liquidity of the contracts. 
 
Table 7-3. Traded volumes of CfDs. 
 
OTC volume (GWh) 
Reference area Winter 1 
2001 
Summer 
2001 
Winter 2 
2001 
Århus (DK1)   161.6 (4.5%) 541.2 (19.1%) 
Helsinki (FI)  43.2 (7.3%) 918.0 (25.7%) 788.6 (27.0%) 
Oslo (NO1) 28.8 (4.9%) 844.6 (23.7%) 1581.6 (38.3%) 
Stockholm (SE)  518.2 (87.8%) 1645.1 (46.1%) 1115.5 (13.1%) 
Total  590.2 3569.2 4126.4 
Number of 
trades  
7 48 62 
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Table 7-3 shows the OTC volume traded for the first three trading periods. The 
number in brackets is the percentage of the total volume traded for each season. As 
expected, the volume traded is highest for the Winter 2 2001 contracts which have a 
longer trading period. The majority of the contracts traded are referred to Helsinki and 
Oslo. Most of the Winter 1 and Summer 2001 contracts are referred to Stockholm. No 
contracts referred to Copenhagen are traded OTC. The traded volume and the number 
of trades have increased during all trading periods, but more data are needed to reach 
a conclusion about liquidity. Accumulated volumes for the CfDs at Nord Pool were 
not reported on the exchange’s Web page. The volume traded on Nord Pool’s 
financial market is approximately one third of the total volume of cleared power, 
while the OTC volume constitutes the rest. Including the power cleared via Nord 
Pool, a total power volume of 2770 TWh was handled by the exchange in 2001. This 
is approximately seven times the yearly physical power delivery. 
7.7  Pricing analysis 
This section analyzes the prices of the contracts with the technical information in 
Table 7-4. The CfD referred to Eastern Denmark was introduced March 23, 2001. 
June 15, 2001 yearly contracts were introduced with a trading period extending to 
December 21, 2001. 
 
Based on the available information from Nord Pool we analyzed how the CfDs 
were priced in the respective periods. The average traded prices and the standard 
deviations are calculated in Table 7-5. 
 
The prices of Winter 1 2001 contracts are relatively stable with small standard 
deviation. The Århus contract has the highest prices and the Oslo contract the lowest 
prices (negative prices). This is in contrast to the prices of the Summer 2001 contracts 
which are relatively stable until the new year, when they decrease to a new level. The 
standard deviations for these contracts are relatively high and have the same order of 
magnitude as the contract prices. On average the Århus contract has the highest prices 
and the Oslo contract the lowest prices. The Winter 2 2001 contract prices start at a 
relatively high level and stabilize at a lower level in the spring and summer. The 
standard deviation for these contracts is of the same order of magnitude as the 
contract prices. On average the Helsinki contract has the highest prices while the 
Århus contract has the lowest prices. The prices of the Winter 1 2002 contracts, they 
start at a relatively low level and increase towards the end of the trading period. The 
standard deviation is as high as for the preceding contracts. On average the 
Copenhagen contract has the highest prices and the Århus contract the lowest prices. 
The next seasonal contract Summer 2002 has prices in line with the Summer 2001 
contracts. The Copenhagen contract however has increased over 480% in price and 
the Århus contract has increased 33% in price. The standard deviation relative to the 
absolute value has decreased for all contracts except Oslo. The next seasonal contract 
Winter 2 2002 has prices that have increased (except Oslo) relative to Winter 2 2001. 
The Copenhagen contract especially shows a substantial increase. The standard 
deviation relative to the absolute value has decreased for all contracts. It is worth 
noting that the Århus contract has a high negative payoff. 
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Table 7-4. Product specification for the CfDs. 
 
Product-series Contract 
hours 
Trading period Settlement  period 
Århus (DK1), Helsinki (FI), 
Oslo (NO), Stockholm (SE) 
Winter 1 2001 
2879 
 
17.11-29.12.2000 01.01-30.04.2001 
Århus (DK1), Copenhagen (DK2), 
Helsinki (FI), Oslo (NO), 
Stockholm (SE) Summer 2001 
3672 17.11.2000-30.04.2001 01.05-30.09.2001 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE 
Winter 2 2001 
2209 02.01-28.09.2001 01.10-31.12.2001 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE  
Winter 1 2002 
2879 02.05-28.12.2001 01.01-30.04.2002 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE 
Summer 2002 
3672 01.10.2001-30.04.2002 01.05-30.09.2002 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE 
Winter 2 2002 
2209 02.01-30.09.2002 01.10-31.12.2002 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE  
Year 2002 
8760 15.06-21.12.2001 01.01-31.12.2002 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE 
Winter 1 2003 
2879 02.05.-30.12.2001 01.01-30.04.2003 
DK1, DK2, FI, NO, SE  
Summer 2003 
3672 01.10.2002-30.04.2003 01.05-30.09.2003 
 
The prices for the year 2002 contracts show the same trend as the Winter 1 2002 
contracts, with relatively low prices in the summer, and increases towards the end of 
the trading period. Generally the standard deviation for these contracts is less than the 
contract price itself, except for the Oslo contract. On average the Copenhagen contract 
has the highest prices and the Oslo contract the lowest prices.  
 
During winter 2002-03 there were high electricity prices which could affect the 
market’s expectation about transmission congestion. The data for the Winter 1 2003 
contracts show that the prices for all contracts differ from the other Winter 1 contracts 
studied. We observe that the Århus contract has a high negative payoff and standard 
deviation. Data for the seasonal contracts Århus and Copenhagen Summer 200394 
show a relative large decrease in price from the same season previous year. The other 
contracts show smaller changes and converge to a level around 2-4 NOK/MWh.  
 
The willingness to pay is highest for the Århus contract Summer 2002 followed by 
Winter 1 and Summer 2001. The Summer 2002 Copenhagen and Winter 2 2002 
contracts have the second highest willingness to pay. Conversely the lowest 
willingness to pay (negative) is for the Århus contract Winter 1 2003. It is also 
interesting that the Oslo contract has negative prices on average for all seasons in 
2001 and 2002 and for the year 2002. This means that the buyers of these contracts 
are receiving money for holding these contracts, but they have an obligation to pay the 
difference between the Oslo price and the System Price if it is negative during the 
delivery period. In the seasons Winter 1 2003 and Summer 2003 the Oslo contract has 
positive prices reflecting the drought in Norway with high area price during the winter 
2002-03. 
 
 
                                               
94
 Spot price data for the season Summer 2003 was not available at Nord Pool, except on a 
daily basis. 
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Table 7-5. Data concerning the prices of the CfDs analyzed and the value of the 
underlying asset. 
 
Winter 1 2001 (2879h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP)  
Århus  (DK1)  15.39 1.67 -4.55 
Helsinki  (FI)  10.44 0.61 -0.77 
Oslo  (NO1) -4.56 0.48 -0.16 
Stockholm (SE)  8.82 0.88 -0.19 
Summer 2001 (3672h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  15.09 14.69 9.05 
Copenhagen (DK2)  3.08 1.41 -3.18 
Helsinki  (FI)  6.62 5.02 -7.07 
Oslo  (NO1) -1.98 1.85 -0.25 
Stockholm  (SE)  3.61 4.02 -7.12 
Winter 2 2001 (2209h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  -1.57 4.21 7.85 
Copenhagen (DK2)  1.92 1.54 11.69 
Helsinki  (FI)  2.05 1.60 -1.25 
Oslo  (NO1) -0.67 0.83 -2.35 
Stockholm  (SE)  1.12 1.21 -1.25 
Winter 1 2002 (2879h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  -3.06 2.02 7.10 
Copenhagen (DK2)  4.78 4.15 15.33 
Helsinki  (FI)  2.86 1.46 1.01 
Oslo  (NO1) -0.30 0.45 -0.69 
Stockholm  (SE)  2.16 1.98 0.97 
Summer 2002 (3672h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  20.11 5.75 30.23 
Copenhagen (DK2)  17.86 5.71 21.30 
Helsinki  (FI)  5.89 1.86 15.51 
Oslo  (NO1) -1.26 1.26 -6.50 
Stockholm  (SE)  3.45 1.19 12.77 
Winter 2 2002 (2209h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  4.10 1.81 -100.34 
Copenhagen (DK2)  15.18 1.99 -5.25 
Helsinki  (FI)  4.65 0.74 -16.06 
Oslo  (NO1) -1.28 0.58 1.64 
Stockholm  (SE)  4.00 0.77 -1.72 
Year 2002 (8760h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  4.11 2.34 -10.25 
Copenhagen (DK2)  6.28 3.57 12.70 
Helsinki  (FI)  3.53 1.12 2.84 
Oslo  (NO1) -0.33 0.48 -2.49 
Stockholm  (SE)  2.22 1.26 5.29 
Winter 1 2003 (2879h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  -23.93 53.53 -70.50 
Copenhagen (DK2)  7.54 5.08 -6.76 
Helsinki  (FI)  4.25 3.53 -13.36 
Oslo  (NO1) 0.28 3.42 7.09 
Stockholm  (SE)  3.96 0.72 -7.60 
Summer 2003 (3672h) Average traded price (NOK/MWh) St. dev. Average of (AP-SP) 
Århus  (DK1)  -0.64 9.58  
Copenhagen (DK2)  6.95 5.81  
Helsinki  (FI)  2.68 3.86  
Oslo  (NO1) 3.70 2.65  
Stockholm  (SE)  3.00 1.91  
 
Another interesting issue to study is whether the contract prices are over or under 
the value of the underlying asset (i.e. the daily average of the area price minus the 
System Price during the delivery period). The calculations are shown in Table 7-5. 
The payoff from the contracts is equal to the difference between price differential 
(area price minus System Price) and the average traded price. The contracts with 
positive payoffs are shown in Table 7-6. 
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Table 7-6. Positive payoff contracts. 
 
Contract 
 
Payoff (NOK/MWh)  
Oslo (NO1) Winter 1 2001  4.40 
Oslo (NO1) Summer 2001  1.73 
Copenhagen (DK2) Winter 2 2001  9.77 
Århus (DK1) Winter 2 2001 9.42 
Copenhagen (DK2)  Winter 1 2002 10.55 
Århus (DK1) Winter 1 2002 10.16 
Århus  (DK1)  Summer 2002 10.12 
Copenhagen (DK2) Summer 2002  3.44 
Helsinki  (FI) Summer 2002  9.62 
Stockholm  (SE) Summer 2002  9.32 
Oslo  (NO1) Winter 2 2002 2.92 
Copenhagen (DK2)  Year 2002 6.42 
Stockholm  (SE)  Year 2002 3.07 
Oslo (NO1) Winter 1 2003 6.81 
 
Table 7-6 shows that there is a positive payoff from the Oslo contracts in the first 
two seasons, Winter 1 and Summer 2001, and for the seasons Winter 2 2002 and 
Winter 1 2003. The Copenhagen contract shows positive payoff for Winter 2 2001, 
Winter 1 and Summer 2002 and Year 2002. The Århus contract shows relative high 
positive payoff for Winter 2 2001, Winter 1 2002, and Summer 2002. For Summer 
2002 all contracts except Oslo have positive payoff. The yearly contract for 
Stockholm has a positive payoff. All other contracts have negative payoff on average 
(on average the forward price exceeds the spot price differential). 
 
As mentioned earlier this can be interpreted as a negative risk premium for the risk-
averse consumers (a forward market in contango). On the other hand a risk-averse 
generator would require a positive risk premium. The majority of our results are in 
accordance with the pricing of futures contracts at Nord Pool (Botterud et al., 2002), 
which also appear to be over-priced relative to the underlying asset. But for these 
contracts there is relatively little data.   
 
However, some contracts on average are under-priced. According to the risk 
premium theory, this implies a dominance of risk-averse generators or an excess 
supply of forward contracts. The Oslo contracts are referred to a hydropower area.  
The generators are paid the Oslo price (on average lower than the System Price) for 
their production, while their financial contracts are referred to the System Price. This 
indicates that a majority of risk-averse generators want to hedge their production in 
the forward market. 
 
The Århus (except year 2002) and Copenhagen prices have on average been above 
the System Price since the introduction of these spot areas at Nord Pool. The 
production in these areas is mainly thermal and the spot prices are relatively high. It is 
reasonable to assume that the generators are less concerned about hedging their 
production. A considerable exchange of power between the Nordic region and 
continental Europe may affect the area prices in Denmark through transmission 
congestion. Traded combinations of CfDs to hedge against the area price differentials 
could make it difficult to establish a direct link between the demand of a specific 
contract and the contract price. 
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All contracts in the season Summer 2002 except Oslo are under-priced. In this case 
the market was under-estimating the market value of transmission congestion. 
 
The trading price should reflect the prediction of the market regarding the price 
differential as defined in Equation (7.5) during the delivery period. Table 7-6 shows 
that the prices vary from the underlying asset. This is not surprising, because 
unforeseen shocks during the settlement period (e.g. unexpected constraints due to 
plant and line outages as well as relative demand in each region) are bound to occur. 
 
The underlying asset is also highly volatile, even more than the Area and System 
Prices themselves. The magnitude of the standard deviation is several times the 
magnitude of the price differential. Since the underlying asset is expected to be 
uncertain, the traded forward contract may have incorporated this uncertainty in the 
price. Parameters used to calculate the security requirements were changed in January 
2001, because they generally were too high. This affected the contracts referred to 
Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo and Århus. 
 
Forecasting transmission congestion is a difficult task. The information available to 
the market players is forecasts of the inflow, area prices and System Price. The 
reliability of these forecasts for a longer period than the closest weeks is relatively 
low. Since transmission congestion is highly dependent on the inflow situation (dry 
versus wet years), the hydrological balance in an area can be used as to measure the 
probability of congestion. Another analysis tool is the EMPS-model (Haugestad and 
Rismark, 1998), which is used for optimization and simulation of hydro-thermal 
systems with a considerable share of hydropower. The model takes into account 
transmission constraints and hydrological differences among major areas or regional 
subsystems. The objective is an optimal use of hydro resources in relation to future 
inflows, thermal generation, electricity demand and spot transactions within or 
between the areas. The weakness of the model is that its grid representation may be 
inaccurate. A precise description of the Nordic power system requires a model with 
frequently updated data. 
7.8 Policy issues 
Energy policy affects derivatives mainly through its impacts on the underlying 
commodity and transmission markets (Energy Information Administration, 2002). 
Electricity markets with large numbers of informed buyers and sellers, each with 
objectives of moving the commodity to where it is needed, support competitive prices. 
Derivatives for managing local price risks are then based on the overall market price 
with relatively small, predictable adjustments for moving the electricity to local users. 
Energy policy affects competitors’ access to transmission, the volatility of 
transmission charges, and therefore derivative markets. 
 
Efforts to reduce price volatility have focused on increasing both reserve 
production capacity and transmission capability. There has also been an effort to make 
real-time prices more visible to users to help limit the size and duration of price 
spikes. 
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Competitive electricity markets require competitive, reliable transmission markets. 
A network with sufficient capacity to supply high price areas stimulates competition. 
However, creating competitive transmission markets has proven difficult. Competitive 
transmission charges are the marginal cost of moving power. For example in the US 
(except in a few locations) transmission charges are currently set arbitrarily with no 
regard to the marginal cost. Many states actively discourage transmission of their 
cheap power to higher cost areas in neighboring states. The result is a fragmented 
market where trade does not create consistent electricity prices. 
 
Some barriers to the development of the electricity derivatives market are:  
• As a commodity, electricity has many unique aspects, including instantaneous 
delivery, non-storability, an interactive delivery system, and extreme price 
volatility. 
• The complexity of electricity spot markets is not conducive to common futures 
transactions. 
• There are also substantial problems with price transparency, modeling of 
derivative instruments, effective arbitrage, credit risk, and default risk. 
Because there are problems with the price models, innovative derivatives based on 
something other than the underlying energy spot price (e.g. weather derivatives, 
marketable emissions permits, and specialty insurance contracts) will be important in 
the future. Forward contracts using increasingly standardized terms are likely to be 
supplied in addition to futures contracts. 
 
 The Nordic region has a mature and liquid forward and futures market. There 
is confidence in Nord Pool that is owned by the Norwegian and Swedish TSOs. There 
has been 60-70% annual growth in the financial market in recent years (Nord Pool, 
2002c). The regulatory framework has been committed to facilitate trade and establish 
a liquid spot market. Nord Pool offers easy access to information and provides price 
transparency. Large industrial consumers and generation companies may therefore 
hedge their consumption/generation and decrease their risks. Nord Pool facilitates 
trade of CfDs to hedge against the price differences resulting from transmission 
congestion. The market prices of these contracts indicate the market’s expectation of 
transmission congestion. For long-term contracts it may provide information about the 
value of building a transmission line between two regions.  
 
Continental Europe’s electricity exchanges are less liquid and traders must rely 
more on OTC markets for hedging. To purchase physical transmission capacity, 
players may participate in cross-border auctions. In recent years, they have established 
as a method to allocate cross-border transmission capacity in cases where demand 
exceeds supply. The price of transmission capacity can be highly volatile (E.ON Netz, 
2003).  
 
The PJM and New York power markets have financial transmission rights. These 
forward contracts are purely financial and entitle the holders to a payment equal to the 
future difference in locational prices times the contractual power. The independent 
system operator issues these contracts, which are supposed to redistribute the 
congestion rents the system operator collects during congestion. In the Nordic market 
the CfDs have no connection to the congestion rent the system operator collects.  
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7.9  Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated how Nord Pool prices CfDs for the first eight trading 
periods. Based on a comparison between the trading prices of the contracts and the 
average of the seasonal area price minus the System Price during the settlement 
period, they appear to be over-priced on average ex post. The explanation may be the 
presence of a majority of risk-averse consumers who are willing to pay a risk 
premium for receiving the future price differential. If the price differential in a given 
area is positive, the consumers are penalized if they have purchased a forward 
contract related to the System Price. They are risk-averse if they pay for the contract 
at a price greater than the expected price differential. If the price differential is 
negative, generators are penalized, and they are risk-averse if they pay for a contract 
that is more expensive than the expected price differential (in absolute value).  
 
This work also considered contracts that were under-priced ex post. For the Oslo 
contracts this may be explained by the presence of a majority of risk-averse 
hydropower generators wanting to hedge their production in the forward market. The 
prices of the contracts depend on the inflow in the actual year which is an important 
factor in creating transmission congestion. Since every contract is referred to a season 
or a year, this makes the present amount of data limited. As far I am aware, this is the 
first survey of how CfDs have been priced. 
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8 A merchant mechanism for electricity transmission expansion95  
A merchant mechanism to expand electricity transmission is proposed which is 
based on long-term financial transmission rights (FTRs). Due to network loop flows, a 
change in network capacity might imply negative externalities on existing 
transmission property rights. The system operator thus needs a protocol for awarding 
incremental FTRs that maximize investors’ preferences, and preserves certain 
currently unallocated FTRs (or proxy awards) so as to maintain revenue adequacy. 
This chapter defines a proxy award as the best use of the current network along the 
same direction as the incremental awards. It then develops a bi-level programming 
model for allocation of long-term FTRs according to this rule and applies it to 
different network topologies. One finding is that simultaneous feasibility for a 
transmission expansion project crucially depends on the investor-preference and the 
proxy-preference parameters. Likewise, for a given amount of pre-existing FTRs and 
the larger the current capacity the greater the need to reserve some FTRs for possible 
negative externalities generated by the expansion changes. 
8.1  Introduction  
The analysis of incentives for electricity transmission expansion is not easy. 
Beyond economies of scale and cost sub-additivity externalities in electricity 
transmission are mainly due to “loop flows” that come up from complex network 
interactions.96 The effects of loop flows imply that transmission opportunity costs are 
a function of the marginal costs of energy at each location. Power costs and 
transmission costs depend on each other since they are simultaneously settled in 
electricity dispatch. Loop flows imply that certain transmission investments might 
have negative externalities on the capacity of other (perhaps distant) transmission 
links (see Bushnell and Stoft, 1997). Moreover, the addition of new transmission 
capacity can sometimes paradoxically decrease the total capacity of the network 
(Hogan, 2002a). 
 
The welfare effects of an increment in transmission capacity are analyzed by 
Léautier (2001). The welfare outcome of an expansion in the transmission grid 
depends on the weight in the welfare function of the generators’ profits relative to the 
consumers’ utility weight. Incumbent generators are not in general the best agents to 
carry out transmission expansion projects. Even though an increase in transmission 
capacity might allow them to engross their revenues due to increased access to new 
markets and higher transmission charges, such gains are usually overcome by the loss 
of their local market power.  
 
The literature on incentives for long-term expansion of the transmission network is 
scarce. The economic analysis of electricity markets has been reduced to short-run 
issues, and has typically assumed that transmission capacity is fixed (see Joskow and 
Tirole, 2003). However, transmission capacity is random in nature, and it jointly 
depends on generation investment. 
 
The way to solve transmission congestion in the short-run is well known. In a 
power flow model, the price of transmission congestion is determined by the 
                                               
95
 I am grateful for comments from William Hogan and Ross Baldick. 
96
 See Joskow and Tirole (2000), and Léautier (2001). 
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difference in locational prices (see Hogan, 1992, 2002b). Yet, there is no consensus 
with respect to the method to attract investment to finance the long-term expansion of 
the transmission network, so as to reconcile the dual opposite incentives to congest 
the network in the short-run, and to expand it in the long-run. Incentive structures 
proposed to promote transmission investment range from a “merchant” mechanism, 
based on long-term financial transmission rights (LTFTRs) auctions (as in Hogan, 
2002a), to regulatory mechanisms that charge the transmission firm the social cost of 
transmission congestion (see Léautier 2000, Vogelsang, 2001, and Joskow and Tirole, 
2002). 
 
In practice, regulation has been used in the United Kingdom and Norway to 
promote transmission expansion, while a combination of planning and auctions of 
long-term transmission rights has been tried in the Northeast of the U.S. A mixture of 
regulatory mechanisms and merchant incentives is alternatively used in the Australian 
market. 
 
This chapter develops a merchant model to attract investment to small-scale97 
electricity transmission projects based on LTFTRs auctions. Locational prices give 
market players incentives to initiate transmission investments. FTRs provide 
transmission property rights, since they hedge the market player against future price 
differences. The model further develops basic conditions under which FTRs and 
locational pricing provide incentives for long-term investment in the transmission 
network.   
 
In meshed networks, a change in network capacity might imply negative 
externalities on transmission property rights. Then, in the process of allocation of 
incremental FTRs, the system operator has to reserve certain unallocated FTRs so that 
the revenue adequacy of the transmission system is preserved. In order to deal with 
this issue, we develop a bi-level programming model for allocation of long-term FTRs 
and apply it to different network topologies. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 carries out an analytical 
review on the relevant literature on electricity transmission expansion. Section 8.3 
develops the model. This first introduces FTRs and the feasibility rule, and then 
addresses the rationale for FTR allocation and efficient investments. It then develops 
general optimality conditions as well. Section 8.4 carries out applications of the model 
to a radial line, and to a three-node network. Finally, section 8.5 gives the concluding 
comments. 
8.2 Literature review 
Among the hypotheses on structures for transmission investment, we have the 
market-power hypothesis, the incentive-regulation hypothesis, and the long-run 
financial-transmission-right hypothesis. The first approach seeks to derive optimal 
transmission expansion from the power-market structure of power generators, and 
takes into account the conjectures of each generator regarding other generators’ 
marginal costs due to the expansion (Sheffrin and Wolak, 2001, Wolak, 2000, and 
                                               
97
 Small-scale can be interpreted in various ways. For example investments in proper 
maintenance and upgrades increase thermal line limits without changing the power transfer 
distribution factors (PTDFs). Here the discussion is including investments with no or small 
scale to returns that may change the PTDFs. 
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California ISO and London Economics International, 2003). The generators’ bidding 
behavior is estimated before and after a transmission upgrade, and a real-option 
analysis is used to derive the net present value of transmission and generation projects 
together with the computation of their joint probability.  
 
The model shows that there are few benefits of transmission expansion until added 
capacity surpasses a certain threshold that, in turn, is determined by the possibility of 
induced congestion by the strategic behavior of generators with market power. The 
generation market structure then determines when transmission expansion yield 
benefits. Additionally, many small upgrades of the transmission grid result to be 
preferable to large greenfield projects when cost uncertainty is added to the model. 
 
The contribution of this method is that it models the existing interdependence of 
the transmission investment and generation investment within a transportation model 
with no network loop flows. However, as pointed out by Hogan (2002b), the use of a 
transportation model in the electricity sector is inadequate since it does not deal with 
discontinuities in transmission capacity implied by the multidimensional character of 
a meshed network. 
 
The second method for transmission expansion is a regulatory alternative that 
relies on a “Transco” that simultaneously runs system operation and owns the 
transmission network. The Transco is regulated through benchmark regulation or 
price regulation so as to provide it with incentives to invest in the development of the 
grid, while avoiding congestion. Léautier (2000), Grande and Wangesteen (2000), and 
Harvard Electricity Policy Group (2002) discuss mechanisms that compare the 
Transco performance with a measure of welfare loss due to its activities. Joskow and 
Tirole (2002) propose a surplus-based mechanism to reward the Transco according to 
the redispatch costs avoided by the expansion, so that the Transco faces the complete 
social cost of transmission congestion. 
 
Another regulatory alternative is a two-part tariff cap proposed by Vogelsang 
(2001) that solves the opposite incentives to congest the existing transmission grid in 
the short-run, and to expand it in the long-run. Incentives for investment in expansion 
of the network are achieved through the rebalancing of the fixed part and the variable 
part of the tariff. This method tries to deepen into the analysis of the cost and 
production functions for transmission services, which are not very well understood in 
the economics literature. Nonetheless, to achieve this goal Vogelsang needs to define 
an output (or throughput) for the Transco. As argued in the FTR literature (Bushnell 
and Stoft, 1997; Hogan, 2002a; Hogan, 2002b), this task is very difficult since the 
physical flow through a meshed transmission network cannot be traced. 
 
The third approach is a “merchant” one based on LTFTR auctions by an 
independent system operator (ISO). This method deals with loop-flow externalities in 
that, to proceed with line expansions, the investor pays for the negative externalities it 
generates. To restore feasibility, the investor has to buy back sufficient transmission 
rights from those who hold them initially. This is the core of an LTFTR auction (see 
Hogan, 2002a). 
 
Joskow and Tirole (2003) criticize the LTFTR approach. They argue that the 
efficiency results of the short-run version of the FTR model rely on perfect-
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competition assumptions, which are not real for transmission networks. Moreover, 
defining an operational FTR auction is technically difficult98 and, according to these 
authors, the FTR analysis is static (a contradiction with the dynamics of transmission 
investment). Joskow and Tirole analyze the implications of eliminating the perfect 
competition assumptions of the FTR model. 
 
First, market power and vertical integration might impede the success of FTR 
auctions. Prices will not reflect the marginal cost of production in regions with 
transmission constraints. Generators in constrained regions will then withdraw 
capacity in order to increase their prices, and will overestimate the cost-saving gains 
from investments in transmission.99  
 
Second, lumpiness in transmission investment makes the total value paid to 
investors through FTRs less than the social surplus created. The large and lumpy 
nature of major transmission upgrades requires long-term contracts before making the 
investment, or temporal property rights for the incremental investment. 
 
Third, contingencies in electricity transmission impede the merchant approach to 
really solve the loop-flow problem. Moreover, existing transmission capacity and 
incremental capacity are stochastic. Even in a radial line, realized capacity could be 
less than expected capacity and the revenue-adequacy condition would not be met. 
Even more, the initial feasible FTR set can depend on random exogenous variables. 
 
Fourth, an expansion in transmission capacity might negatively affect social 
welfare (as shown by Bushnell and Stoft, 1997).  
 
Finally, there is a “moral hazard in teams” problem. This arises due to the 
separation of transmission ownership and system operation in the FTR model. For 
instance, an outage can be claimed to be the consequence of poor maintenance (by the 
transmission owner) or of negligent dispatch (by the system operator).100 
Additionally, there is no perfect coordination of interdependent investments in 
generation and transmission, and stochastic changes in supply and demand conditions 
imply uncertain nodal prices. Likewise, there is no equal access to investment 
                                               
98
 No restructured electricity sector in the world has adopted a pure merchant approach 
towards transmission expansion. Australia has implemented a mixture of regulated and 
merchant approaches (see Littlechild, 2003). Pope and Harvey (2002) propose LTFTR 
auctions for the New York ISO to provide a hedge against congestion costs. Gribik et al. 
(2002) propose an auction method based on the physical characteristics (capacity and 
admittance) of a transmission network. 
99
 Generators can exert local power when the transmission network is congested. (See 
Bushnell, 1999, Bushnell and Stoft, 1997, Joskow and Tirole, 2000, Oren,1997, Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1983, Chao and Peck, 1997, Gilbert, Neuhoff, and Newbury, 2002, Cardell, 
Hitt, and Hogan, 1997, Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft, 1998, Wolfram, 1998, and Bushnell 
and Wolak, 1999). There may be cases where transmission expansion FTRs mitigate market 
power such as when a generator builds a line to a high price region and creates new capacity. 
100
 An example is the power outage of August 15, 2003, in the Northeast of the US, which 
affected six control areas (Ontario, Quebec, Midwest, PJM, New England, and New York) and 
more than 20 million consumers. A 9-second transmission grid technical and operational 
problem caused a cascade effect, which shut down 61000 MW generation capacity. After the 
event there were several ”finger pointings” among system operators of different areas, and 
transmission providers. 
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opportunities since only the incumbent can efficiently carry out deepening 
transmission investments. 
 
Hogan (2003) responds to the above criticisms by arguing that LTFTRs only grant 
efficient outcomes under lack of market power, and non-lumpy marginal expansions 
of the transmission network. Hogan argues that regulation has an important role in 
fostering large and lumpy projects, and in mitigating market power abuses. 
 
As argued by Pérez-Arriaga et al. (1995), revenues from nodal prices only recover 
25% of total costs. LTFTRs should then be complemented with a fixed-price structure 
or, as in Rubio-Odériz and Pérez-Arriaga (2000) a complementary charge that allows 
the recovery of fixed costs.101 This is recognized by Hogan (1999b) who argues that 
complete reliance on market incentives for transmission investment is undesirable. 
Rather, Hogan (2003) argues that merchant and regulated transmission investments 
might be combined so that regulated transmission investment is limited to projects 
where investment is large relative to market size, and lumpy so that it only makes 
sense as a single project as opposed as to many incremental small projects. 
 
Hogan also responds to contingency concerns.102 On the one hand, only those 
contingencies outside the control of the system operator could lead to revenue 
inadequacy of FTRs, but such cases are rare and do not represent the most important 
contingency conditions. On the other hand, most of remaining contingencies are 
foreseen in a security-constrained dispatch of a meshed network with loops and 
parallel paths. If one of “n” transmission facilities is lost, the remaining power flows 
would still be feasible in an “n-1” contingency constrained dispatch.  
 
Hogan (2003) also assumes that agency problems and information asymmetries 
are part of an institutional structure of the electricity industry where the ISO is 
separated from transmission ownership and where market players are decentralized. 
However, he claims that the main issue on transmission investment is the decision of 
the boundary between merchant and regulated transmission expansion projects. He 
states that asymmetric information should not necessarily affect such a boundary.  
 
Hogan (2002a) finally analyzes the implications of loop flows on transmission 
investment raised by Bushnell and Stoft (1997). He analytically provides some 
general axioms to properly define LTFTRs so as to deal with negative externalities 
implied by loop flows. The next section presents a model that develops the general 
analytical framework proposed by Hogan (2002a). 
8.3 The model 
    Assume an institutional structure where there are various established agents 
(generators, Gridcos, marketers, etc.) interested in the transmission grid expansion. 
Agents do not have market power in their respective market or, at least, there are in 
place effective market-power mitigation measures.103 Also assume that transmission 
                                               
101
 In the US, transmission fixed costs are recovered through a regulated fixed charge, even 
in those systems that are based on locational pricing and FTRs. This charge is usually 
regulated through cost of service. 
102
 See Hogan Hogan (2002b) and Hogan (2003). 
103
 In fact, market power mitigation may be a major motive for transmission investment. A 
generator located outside a load pocket might want to access the high price region inside the 
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projects are incrementally small (relative to the total network) and non-lumpy so that 
the project does not imply a relatively large change in locational price differences. 
However, although projects are small, they might change or not the power transfer 
distribution factors (PTDFs) of the network.104 
 
Under an initial condition of non-fully allocation of FTRs in the grid, the 
auctioning of incremental LTFTRs should satisfy the following basic criteria in order 
to deal with possible negative externalities associated with the expansion 
1. An LTFTR increment must keep being simultaneously feasible (feasibility rule). 
2. An LTFTR increment remains simultaneously feasible given that certain currently 
unallocated rights (or proxy awards) are preserved. 
3. Investors should maximize their objective function (maximum value). 
4. The LTFTR awarding process should apply both for decreases and increases in the 
grid capacity (symmetry). 
Hogan explains that defining proxy awards is a difficult task. We next address this 
issue in a formal way in the context of an auction model designed to attract 
investment for transmission expansion. 
8.3.1 The power flow model and proxy awards 
Consider the following economic dispatch model:105 
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where d  and g  are load and generation at the different locations. The variable Y  
represents the real power bus net loads, including the swing bus S ( ( , )T T
s
Y Y Y= ). B(d-
g) is the net benefit function,106 and τ  is a unity column vector, (1,1,...,1).Tτ =  All 
                                                                                                                                       
pocket. Building a new line would mitigate market power if it creates new economic capacity 
(see Joskow and Tirole, 2000). 
104
 Examples of projects that do not change PTDFs include proper maintenance and 
upgrades (e.g. low sag wires), and the capacity expansion of a radial line or of a single line in 
a three-node network. Such investments could be rewarded with flowgate rights in the 
incremental capacity without affecting the existing FTR holders (it is assumed however that 
only FTRs are issued). In a large-scale meshed network the change in PTDFs may not be as 
substantial as in a three-node network. However, the auction problem is non-convex and non-
linear, and a global optimum might not be ensured. Only a local optimum might be found 
through sequential quadratic programming. 
105
 Hogan (2002b) shows that the economic dispatch model can be extended to a market 
equilibrium model where the ISO produces transmission services, power dispatch, and spot-
market coordination, while consumers have a concave utility function that depends on net 
loads, and on the level of consumption of other goods. 
106
 Function B is typically a measure of welfare, such as the difference between consumer 
surplus and generation costs (see Hogan, 2002b) 
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other parameters are represented in the control variable u. The objective Equation 
(8.1) includes the maximization of benefit to loads and the minimization of generation 
costs. Equation (8.2) denotes the net load as the difference between load and 
generation. Equation (8.3) is a loss balance constraint where ( , )L Y u  denotes the 
losses in the network. In Equation (8.4) ( , )K Y u , is a vector of power flows in the 
lines, which are subject to transmission capacity limits. The corresponding multipliers 
or shadow prices for the constraints are ( , , )
ref tranP λ λ  for net loads, reference bus 
energy (or loss balance) and transmission constraints, respectively.107  
 
The locational prices P are the marginal generation cost or the marginal benefit of 
demand, which in turn equals the reference price of energy plus the marginal cost of 
losses and congestion. With the optimal solution ),,,( **** uYgd and the associated 
shadow prices, we have the vector of locational prices as: 
 
* * * * * *( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )T T Tref ref Y tran YP C g B d L Y u K Y uλ τ λ λ= ∇ = ∇ = + ∇ + ∇                       (8.5)                                                                                           
 
If losses108 are ignored, only the energy price at the reference bus and the marginal 
cost of congestion contribute to set the locational price. 
 
FTR obligations109 hedge market players against differences in locational prices 
caused by transmission congestion.110 FTRs are provided by an ISO, and are assumed 
to redistribute the congestion rents. The payoff from these rights is given by: 
 
( )j i ijFTR P P Q= −
                                                                                                     (8.6)        
 
where Pj is the price at location j, Pi is the price at location i, and Qij is the directed 
quantity from point i to point j specified in the FTR. The FTR payoffs can take 
negative, positive or zero values. 
 
A set of FTRs is said to be simultaneously feasible if the associated set of net loads 
is simultaneously feasible, that is if the net loads satisfy the loss balance and 
transmission capacity constraints as well as the power flow equations given by: 
 
                                               
107
 When security constraints are taken into account (n-1 criterion) this is a large-scale 
problem, and it prices anticipated contingencies through the security-constrained economic 
dispatch. In operations the n-1 criterion can be relaxed on radial paths, however, doing the 
same in the FTR auction of large-scale meshed networks may result in revenue inadequacy. 
The n-1 criterion is not used in this work. 
108
 In the PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland) market design, the locational prices 
are defined without respect to losses (DC load flow), while in New York the locational prices 
are calculated based on an AC network with marginal losses. 
109
 FTRs could be options with a payoff equal to max( j i(  - ) ijP P Q ,0). Then a negative price 
difference would result in zero payoff. 
110
 See Hogan (1992). 
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where ∑
k
f
kt is the set of point-to-point obligations.
111
 
 
If the set of FTRs is simultaneously feasible and the system constraints are 
convex,112 then the FTRs satisfy the revenue adequacy condition in the sense that 
equilibrium payments collected by the ISO through economic dispatch will be greater 
than or equal to payments required under the FTR forward obligations.113 
 
Assume now that there are investments in new transmission capacity. The 
associated set of new FTRs for transmission expansion has to satisfy the simultaneous 
feasibility rule too. That is, the new and old FTRs have to be simultaneously feasible 
after the system expansion. Assume that T is the current partial allocation of long-
term FTRs, then by assumption it is feasible ( ( , ) 0KT u ≤ ). Let a  be the scalar amount of 
incremental FTR awards, and ˆt the scalar amount of proxy awards. Furthermore let δ  
be directional vector114 such that aδ  is the MW amount of incremental FTR awards, 
and ˆtδ  is the MW amount of proxy awards between different locations. Any 
incremental FTR award aδ  should comply with feasibility rule in the expanded grid. 
Hence we must have ( , ) 0K T a uδ+ + ≤ . 
 
When certain currently unallocated rights (proxy awards) δtˆ
 
in the existing grid 
must be preserved, combined with existing rights they sum up to δtT ˆ+ .115 Then the 
expanded grid K+ should also satisfy simultaneous feasibility so that ( , ) 0K T a uδ+ + ≤  and 
ˆ( , ) 0K T t a uδ δ+ + + ≤
 for incremental awards .aδ
 
 
A question then arises regarding the way to best define proxy awards. One 
possibility is to define them as the “best use” of the current network along the same 
direction as the incremental awards.116 This includes both positive and negative 
                                               
111
 The set of point-to-point obligations can be decomposed into a set of balanced and 
unbalanced (injection of energy) obligations (see Hogan 2002b). 
112
 This has been demonstrated for lossless networks by Hogan (1992), extended to quadratic 
losses by Bushnell and Stoft (1996), and further generalized to smooth nonlinear constraints 
by Hogan (2000). As shown by Philpott and Pritchard (2004) negative locational prices may 
cause revenue inadequacy. Moreover, in the general case of an AC or DC formulation the 
transmission constraints must be convex to ensure revenue adequacy (O'Neill et al., 2002; 
Philpott and Pritchard, 2004). 
113
 Revenue adequacy is the financial counterpart of the physical concept of availability of 
transmission capacity (see Hogan, 2002a). 
114
 Each element in the directional vector represents an FTR between two locations and the 
directional vector may have many elements representing combinations of FTRs. 
115
 Proxy awards are then currently unallocated FTRs in the pre-existing network that 
basically facilitate the allocation of incremental FTRs and help to preserve revenue adequacy 
by reserving capacity for hedges in the expanded network 
116
 Another possibility would be to define every possible use of the current grid as a proxy 
award. However, this would imply that any investment beyond a radial line would be 
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incremental FTR awards. The best use in a three-node network may be thought of as a 
single incremental FTR in one direction or a combination of incremental FTRs 
defined by the directional vector δ , which the investor has preference for. Hogan 
(2002a) proposes two ways of defining “best use:” 
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In the preset proxy formulation the objective is to maximize the value (defined by 
prices p) of the proxy awards given the pre-existing FTRs, and the power flow 
constraints in the pre-expansion network. In the investor preference formulation the 
objective is to maximize the investor’s value (defined by the bid functions for 
different directions, ( )aβ δ ) of incremental FTR awards given the proxy and pre-
existing FTRs and the power flow constraints in the expanded network, while 
simultaneously calculating the minimum proxy scalar amount that satisfies the power 
flow constraints in the pre-expansion network. 
 
We will use the first definition as a proxy protocol. We can now analyze the way to 
use this protocol to carry out an allocation of LTFTRs that stimulates investment in 
transmission. 
8.3.2 The auction model  
Assume the preset proxy rule is used to derive prices that maximize the investor 
preference )( δβ a for an award of a  MWs of FTRs in direction δ . We then have the 
following auction maximization problem: 
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precluded, and that incremental award of FTRs might require adding capacity to every link on 
every path of a meshed network. 
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In this model, the investor’s preference is maximized subject to the simultaneous 
feasibility conditions, and the best use protocol. We add a constraint on the norm of 
the directional vector to preclude the trivial case 0δ = . We want to explore if such an 
auction model approach can produce acceptable proxy and incremental awards. We 
next analyze this issue within a framework that ignores losses, and utilizes a DC-load 
approximation. 
 
The auction model is a nonlinear optimization problem of “bi-level” nature.117 
There are two optimization stages. Maximization is non-myopic since the result of the 
lower problem (first stage) depends on the direction chosen in the upper problem 
(second stage).118 Bi-level problems are solved by first transforming the lower 
problem (i.e. the allocation of proxy awards) into to a set of Kuhn-Tucker equations 
that are subsequently substituted in the upper problem (i.e. the maximization of the 
investors’ preference). The model can then be understood as a Stackelberg problem 
although it is not intending to optimize the same type of objective function at each 
stage.119  
 
The Lagrangian (L) for the lower problem is: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( ( ))TL t tp K T tδ λ δ λ δ= − +
 
 
where Tλ is the Lagrange multiplier vector associated with transmission capacity on 
the respective transmission lines before the expansion. It is the Lagrange multiplier of 
the simultaneous feasibility restriction for proxy awards. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
are: 
 
ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( , , )0, 0
ˆ
ˆ( , , ) 0, 0T
L t L t
t
L t
δ λ δ λ
λ
δ λλ λλ
∂ ∂
= ≥
∂ ∂
∂
= ≥
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The transformed problem is then written as: 
 
ˆ, , ,
( )
. .
( ) 0, ( )
ˆ( ) 0, ( )
a t
Max a
s t
K T a
K T t a
δ λ
β δ
δ ω
δ δ γ
+
+
+ ≤
+ + ≤
 
ˆ( , , ) 0, ( )
ˆ
L t
t
δ λ θ∂ =
∂
 
                                               
117
 See Shimizu et al. (1997). 
118
 The model could also be interpreted as having multiple periods. Although a discount factor 
is not explicitly included in the model, it is included in the investor’s preference parameter b. 
119
 Other examples in the economics literature where an upper level maximization takes the 
optimality conditions of another problem as constraints are given in Mirrlees (1971), Brito and 
Oakland (1977), and Rosellón (2000). 
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ˆ( , , ) 0, ( )T L t δ λλ ζλ
∂
=
∂
                                                                       (8.10) 
ˆ( , , ) 0, ( )L t δ λ ελ
∂ ≥
∂
 
1, ( )
0, ( )
0 ( )
a
δ ϕ
κ
λ pi
=
≥
≥
 
 
where , , , , , ,ω γ θ ζ ε ϕ κ  and pi  are Lagrange multipliers associated with each 
constraint. More specifically, ω  is the shadow price of the simultaneous feasibility 
restriction for existing and incremental FTRs; γ  is the shadow price of the 
simultaneous feasibility restriction for existing FTRs, proxy awards and incremental 
FTRs; εςθ ,,  are the shadow prices of the restriction on optimal proxy FTRs; ,ϕ κ  
are the shadow prices of the non-negativity constraints for a and λ , respectively; and 
pi  is the shadow price of the unit restriction on δ . 
 
The Lagrangian of the auction problem is: 
 
ˆ( , , , , ) ( ) ( ( ))
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ˆ
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(8.11) 
where ( , , , , , , , )ω γ θ ζ ε ϕ κ piΩ =  denotes the vector of Lagrange multipliers. Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the upper problem are: 
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(8.12)
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                                    (8.13) 
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       (8.14)
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(8.26) 
0, 0,T aκ κ= ≥
                                                                 
 
(8.27) 
0, 0Tpi λ pi= ≥
                                                                                 
 
(8.28) 
 
The constraint 
ˆ( , , ) 0L t δ λλ
∂
=
∂ is redundant when the preset proxy preference (p) is 
non-zero, since it is a sub-gradient of the constraint 
ˆ( , , ) 0T L t δ λλ λ
∂
=
∂ , and ε  is 
therefore zero when p is non-zero. We show in a later example that θ  and ϕ  are zero 
because the associated constraints are redundant. The binding constraint in the lower 
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level problem is 
ˆ( , , ) 0T L t δ λλ λ
∂
=
∂ , since some transmission constraints are fully 
utilized by proxy awards.  
 
This is a nonlinear and non-convex problem, and its solution depends on the initial 
value of the bid parameter (b), the current partial allocation (T), and the topology of 
the network prior to and after the expansion.120 A general solution method utilizing 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions would be through checking which of the constraints are 
binding.121  One way to identify the active inequality constraints is the active set 
method.122 This chapter solves the problem in detail for different network topologies, 
including a radial line and a three-node network. 
8.4 Numerical results 
8.4.1 Radial line 
Let us first analyze a radial transmission line that is expanded as in Figure 8-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1.  An expanded line and its feasible expansion. 
 
The corresponding optimization problem is: 
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δ
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δ δ
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δ
++ + ≤
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(8.29)
                                               
120
 According to Shimizu et al. (1997), the necessary optimality conditions for this problem are 
satisfied. The objective function and the constraints are differentiable functions in the region 
bounded by the constraints. A local optimal solution and Kuhn-Tucker vectors then exist. 
121
 There are other methods available such as transformation methods (penalty and 
multiplier), and non-transformation methods (feasible and infeasible). See Shimizu et al. 
(1997). 
122
 This method considers a tentative list of constraints that are assumed to be binding. This is 
a working list, and consists of the indices of binding constraints at the current iteration. 
Because this list may not be the solution list, the list is modified either by adding another 
constraint to the list or by removing one from the list. Geometrically, the active set method 
tends to step around the boundary defined by the inequality constraints. See Nash and Sofer 
(1988). 
1-2 FTRs 
1
 
 
Feasible expansion 
1 2C
+
      
C
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where 12C  is the transmission capacity of the network before the expansion, +12C
 
is the 
transmission capacity of the network after the expansion, and 12b  is the investor 
preference. The first order conditions of the lower maximization problem can then be 
added as constraints to the upper problem: 
 
12
12 12
ˆ, , ,
12 12 12
12 12 12 12
12 12 12
12 12 12
. .
ˆ
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a t
Max b a
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                                                                                              (8.30) 
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    Since the grid is being expanded, the constraint on simultaneous feasibility of 
incremental FTRs +≤+ 121212 CaT δ  is non-binding. The solution to this problem provides 
the values for the decision variables, and shadow prices123 112 =δ , because the 
network is being expanded. Additionally, 12b=γ , which implies that the higher the 
value of the investor-preference parameter 12b  the more the investor values post-
expansion transmission capacity (its marginal valuation of transmission capacity 
increases with the bid value). 
 
Similarly, we get 12p=λ
 
which implies that the higher the value of the preset 
proxy preference parameter p12 the higher marginal valuation of pre-expansion 
transmission capacity. Other results are 0θ = , 121212 // pbp == γζ  and ε  = 0. This 
was expected since only one restriction for the lower problem is binding because the 
two other are redundant. The value of the binding Lagrange multiplier equals the ratio 
between the investor’s bid value and the preset proxy parameter. 
 
It also follows that 0=ϕ  which is to be expected because the directional vector 
δ is non-zero. Furthermore, 12 12ˆt C T= − , which means that for given existing rights 
the higher the current capacity the larger the need for reserving some proxy FTRs for 
possible negative externalities generated by the expansion. Proxy awards are 
auctioned as a hedge against externalities generated by the expanded network.  
 
We finally get 12121212 ˆ CCtTCa −=−−= ++ , which shows that the optimal amount of 
additional MWs of FTRs in direction δ
 
directly depends on the amount of capacity 
expansion. Transmission capacity is fully utilized by proxy awards (in the pre-
expansion network), and by incremental FTRs (in the expanded network). Likewise, 
the investor receives a reward equal to the MW amount of new transmission capacity 
that it creates. 
                                               
123
 The mathematical derivation of these values is presented in the appendix. 
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8.4.2 Three-node network with expansion of one of the links 
We can now consider a three-node network example from Hogan (2002a) where 
there is an expansion of line 1-3. The network is illustrated in Figure 8-2 and the 
feasible expansion FTR set in Figure 8-3. 
 
900 MW Max
to 1000 MW
1 3
2
900 MW Max200 MW Max
 
 
Figure 8-2. Three-node network with expansion in one line. 
 
The expansion problem for a three-node network with identical links and FTRs 
between buses 1-3 and 2-3 (we assume no mitigating FTRs) is formulated as: 
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The numerical factors (i.e. 1/3 and 2/3) in the power flow constraints are the power 
transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) and the appendix shows how to calculate them. 
In Figure 8-3 the pre-existing FTRs in the direction 1-3 do not use the full capacity of 
the pre-expansion network. The preference is for FTRs in the direction 1-3 for 
transmission expansion and the proxy FTRs use the “rest” of the capacity in the 
existing network. As seen from Figure 8-3 the maximum amount of proxy and 
incremental FTRs in the direction 1-3 that can be obtained is 1200, and corresponds to 
the point where the 1-3 and 1-2 transmission capacity constraints intersect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-3. Feasible expansion FTR set. 
 
 
In solving this problem, we get:124 
 
                                               
124
 The detailed mathematical derivation of solutions to program Equation (8.31) is presented 
in the appendix. 
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 (8.37)
 
where 1 2andγ γ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with transmission capacity on 
the lines 1-3 and 1-2, respectively, in the expanded network, and ζ  is the multiplier 
associated with the Kuhn-Tucker condition regarding transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion network for the line 1-3. This line has the Lagrange multiplier λ  associated 
with it before expansion. So as to characterize the solution to the model, we now 
calculate the Lagrange multipliers and decision variables for particular parameter 
values. In particular, the solution for the allocation presented in Figure 8-3 is found 
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and the following parameters are assumed: bid values, preset proxy preferences and 
pre-existing amount of FTRs: 
 
13 23
13 23
13 23
60, 10,
70, 10,
900, 500
b b
p p
T T
= =
= =
= =
 
 
From these parameters the marginal value of transmission capacity on line 1-3 and 
line 1-2 is found to be 1 76.53γ =  and 2 17.14γ = , respectively. Thus, the investor 
values transmission capacity on line 1-3 more than on line 1-2. We find that the 
product of the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier and the transmission capacity multiplier for the 
line 1-3 is 81.43ζλ = . 
 
Likewise, the values of the decision variables are calculated as: 
 
13 230.949, 0.316
ˆ 180.71, 135.5t a
δ δ= =
= =
 
 
The MW amount of awarded proxy FTRs in the direction 1-3 is 13ˆ 171.5tδ = , and the 
amount of awarded incremental FTRs is 13 128.6aδ = . Similarly, the amount of proxy 
awards in direction 2-3 is 23ˆ 57.1tδ = , and the amount of awarded incremental FTRs is 
23 42.9aδ = . The solution is indicated by the red and blue lines in Figure 8-3 and 
consists of both pre-existing, proxy and incremental FTR awards amounting to 
13 13 13
ˆ 1200T t aδ δ+ + =
 
and 23 23 23ˆ 600T t aδ δ+ + = . The allocation of incremental FTRs 
is maximized because the model takes into account that line 1-3 is expanded. 
 
Both the proxy and incremental FTRs exhaust transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion and expanded grid, respectively. The proxy FTRs help allocating 
incremental FTRs by preserving capacity in the pre-expansion network, which results 
in an allocation of incremental FTRs amounting to the new transmission capacity 
created.125 The proxy awards are transmission congestion hedges that can be 
auctioned to electricity market players in the expanded network. 126 
8.4.3 Three-node network with two parallel links in one of the interfaces after 
the expansion 
We can now turn to the same three-node network as in the preceding section where 
there is an expansion of interface 2-3 with a second link. The network is illustrated in 
Figure 8-4 and the feasible expansion FTR set in Figure 8-5. 
                                               
125
 The new capacity created is defined by the scalar amount of incremental awards times the 
directional vector. 
126
 Whenever there is an institutional restriction to issue LTFTRs there will be an additional 
(expected congestion) constraint to the model. A proxy for the shadow price of such a 
constraint would be reflected by the preferences of the investor that carries out the expansion 
project (assuming risk neutrality and a price taking behavior). The proxy award model takes 
the “linear” incremental and proxy FTR trajectories to the after-expansion equilibrium point in 
the ex-post FTR feasible set to ensure the minimum shadow value of the constraint. 
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Figure 8-4. Three-node network with expansion of one of the interfaces. 
 
The network expansion problem for identical links and FTRs between buses 1-3 
and 2-3 is formulated as: 
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Figure 8-5. Feasible expansion FTR set. 
 
The insertion of a new link in the interface 2-3 changes the impedances and the 
flow throughout the network and this expands and contracts the set of feasible FTRs 
as illustrated in Figure 8-5. The pre-existing FTRs do not use the full capacity of the 
pre-expansion network. The preference is for FTRs in the direction 2-3 for 
transmission expansion and the proxy FTRs use the “rest” of the capacity in the 
existing network. As seen from Figure 8-5 the maximum amount of proxy and 
incremental FTRs in the direction 2-3 that can be obtained is 2000, and corresponds to 
the point where the 2-1 and 2-3 transmission capacity constraints intersect.  
 
In solving this problem, we get:127 
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 
+ − + + 
 
  (8.40)             
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 The detailed mathematical derivation of solutions to program Equation (8.38) is presented 
in the appendix. 
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δ
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23 23
4
1/ 22
3 4
2
3 4
( 1.2 )
0.4
( 0.8 2 / 3 0.2 )
( 0.4 1/ 3 0.4 )
C C
a
γ
γ ψη γ
γ ψη γ
+
−
= ⋅
− + − 
 
+ − + + 
  
                          
(8.41) 
 
 
 
 
}
23 13
3
23 23
23 13 23
21 13 23 23 23
23 13 23 23 13 23
23
( 2 )2.5
( 1.2 ) 1(1.2 0.4 0.8 )
( 0.4 0.2 ) 0.1( 1.2 ) 0.1(2.5 2 ) (1.2 0.4 0.8 )
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b b
C C
C T T
C T T C C
C T T C T T
b
γ
+
+
+


−
= ⋅
 
−
+ 
− − 
 + − −
− − 
− − − −  
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(8.42) 
23 23
23 13
23 13 23
4
23 23
23 13 23
( 1.2 ) ( 2 )(1.2 0.4 0.8 )
( 1.2 ) 1(1.2 0.4 0.8 )
C C b b
C T T
C C
C T T
γ
+
+
−
−
− −
=
 
−
+ 
− − 
 
 
 
(8.43)
 
23 23
3 4
23 13 23
23 23 13
23 13 23
( 1.2 )1.2 1 ( )(1.2 0.4 0.8 )
( 1.2 )3
(1.2 0.4 0.8 )
C C
C T T
C C b
C T T
ψη γ γ
+
+
 
−
= + ⋅ − 
− − 
−
−
− −
  
 
            (8.44) 
where 3 4andγ γ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with transmission capacity on 
the lines 2-3 and 2-1 in the expanded network, respectively. ψ  is the multiplier 
associated with the Kuhn-Tucker condition of transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion network for line 2-3. This line has the Lagrange multiplier η  associated 
with it before expansion. So as to characterize the solution to the model, we now 
calculate the Lagrange multipliers and decision variables for particular parameter 
values. In particular, the solution for the allocation presented in Figure 8-5 is found 
and the following parameters are assumed: bid values, preset proxy preferences and 
pre-existing amount of FTRs: 
 
13 23
13 23
13 23
10, 60,
10, 60,
1000, 500
b b
p p
T T
= =
= =
= =
 
 
From these parameters the marginal value of transmission capacity on line 2-3 and 
line 2-1 is found to be 3 70.6γ =  and 4 28.8γ = , respectively. Thus the investor values 
transmission capacity on line 2-3 more than on line 2-1. We find that the product of 
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the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier and the transmission capacity multiplier for the line 2-3 is 
102ψη = . 
 
Likewise, the values of the decision variables are calculated as: 
 
13 230.316, 0.949
ˆ 442.72, 1138.42t a
δ δ= − =
= =
 
 
The MW amount of awarded proxy FTRs in the direction 1-3 is 13ˆ 139.9tδ = − , and the 
amount of awarded incremental FTRs is 13 359.74aδ = − . Similarly, the amount of 
proxy awards in direction 2-3 is 23ˆ 420.14tδ = , and the amount of awarded 
incremental FTRs is 23 1081.36aδ = . The solution is indicated by the large dot in 
Figure 8-5 and consists of both pre-existing and incremental FTR awards amounting 
to 13 13 640.26T aδ+ =
 
and 23 23 1581.4T aδ+ = .  The allocation of incremental 1-3 FTRs 
is minimized because the model takes into account that line 2-3 is expanded, and 
some of the pre-existing FTRs become infeasible after the expansion.  
8.4.4 Three-node network with two links  
We now look at a three-node network example from Bushnell and Stoft (1997) where 
there is an expansion of line 1-2. The network is illustrated in Figure 8-6 and the 
feasible expansion FTR set in Figure 8-7 
 
900 MW Max
1 3
2
900 MW Max200 MW Max
 
Figure 8-6.  Three-node network with expansion of line 1-2. 
 
The network expansion problem for identical links and FTRs between buses 1-3 
and 2-3 is formulated as: 
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13 13 23 23 13
13 13 13 23 23 23 13
13 13 23 23 23
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a t
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T t a T t a C
T a T a C
T t a T t a C
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δ δ
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
+
+ + + ≤
+ + + + + ≤
+ + + ≤
+ + + + + ≤
 
                                                      
(8.45)
 
13 13 23 23 12
13 13 13 23 23 23 12
1 1( ) ( )
3 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
3 3
T a T a C
T t a T t a C
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
+ − + ≤
+ + − + + ≤
 
13 13 23 23 21
13 13 13 23 23 23 21
1 1( ) ( )
3 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
3 3
T a T a C
T t a T t a C
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
− + + + ≤
− + + + + + ≤
 
{ }13 13 23 23
13 13 13
23 23 23
ˆ( ) arg max ( )
( )
( )
1
0
t
t t p p
T t C
T t C
a
δ δ δ
δ
δ
δ
∈ +
+ ≤
+ ≤
=
≥
 
 
 
In Figure 8-7 the pre-existing FTRs in the direction 2-3 do not use the full 
capacity of the pre-expansion network and become infeasible after inserting line 1-
2. The preference is for FTRs in the direction 1-3 for transmission expansion. As 
seen from Figure 8-7 the maximum amount of proxy and incremental FTRs in the 
direction 1-3 that can be obtained is 1100, and corresponds to the point where the 1-
3 and 1-2 transmission capacity constraints intersect.  
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Figure 8-7. Feasible expansion FTR set. 
 
 
In solving this problem, we get:128 
 
( )
( )
1 2
13 1/ 22 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
23 1/ 22 2
1 2 1 2
(1/ 3 1/ 3 )
(2 / 3 1/ 3 ) (1/ 3 1/ 3 )
(2 / 3 1/ 3 )
(2 / 3 1/ 3 ) (1/ 3 1/ 3 )
γ γδ
γ γ ζλ γ γ
γ γ ζλδ
γ γ ζλ γ γ
−
=
+ − + −
− + −
=
+ − + −
 
12
13
13 13
13
( )
ˆ
C
a
C T
t
δ
δ
=
−
=
 
13 23 2
1
( ( / 3 1/ 3))
(2 / 3 / 3)
b Bb B
B
γγ + + −=
+
 
[
]
2 13
2
23
1 (1 3 2 )(1 )
( 3 2 )
b A B A AB
B AB A
b B AB B A A B
γ = + − − −
− − +
+ + − − −
 
1 13 23(1 ) ( )A A b bζλ γ= + − +  
with 
                                               
128
 The detailed mathematical derivation of solutions to program Equation (8.45) is presented 
in the appendix. 
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13 13
13 12 23
13 13
( )
( 2 )1
(1 ) ( )
CA
C T
C C TB
A C T
=
−
− −
=
+ −
 
 
where 1 2andγ γ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with transmission capacity on 
the lines 1-3 and 1-2, respectively, in the expanded network, and ζ  is the multiplier 
associated with the Kuhn-Tucker condition regarding transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion network for the line 1-3. This line has the Lagrange multiplier λ  associated 
with it before expansion. So as to characterize the solution to the model, we now 
calculate the Lagrange multipliers and decision variables for particular parameter 
values. In particular, the solution for the allocation presented in Figure 8-7 is found 
and the following parameters are assumed: bid values, preset proxy preferences and 
pre-existing amount of FTRs:  
 
13 23
13 23
13 23
40, 10,
60, 10,
100, 800
b b
p p
T T
= =
= =
= =
 
 
From these parameters we find that the marginal value of transmission capacity on 
line 1-3 and line 1-2 is 1 39.6γ =  and 2 33.6γ = , respectively. Thus the investor values 
transmission capacity on line 1-3 more than on line 1-2. We find that the product of 
the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier and the transmission capacity multiplier for the line 1-3 is 
37.ζλ =
 
 
Likewise, the values of the decision variables are calculated as: 
 
13 230.958, 0.287
ˆ 835, 208t a
δ δ= = −
= =
 
 
The MW amount of awarded proxy FTRs in the direction 1-3 is 13ˆ 800tδ = , and the 
amount of awarded incremental FTRs is 13 200.aδ =  The amount of incremental 1-3 
FTRs corresponds to the new transmission capacity on line 1-2 that the investor has 
created. There is also an allocation of proxy FTRs such that the full capacity of line 1-
3 is utilized. Similarly, the amount of proxy awards in direction 2-3 is 23ˆ 240tδ = − , 
and the amount of awarded incremental FTRs is 23 60.aδ = −  The amount of 
incremental 2-3 FTRs is minimized and corresponds to 20% of the reduction (300) in 
pre-existing FTRs. The incremental 2-3 awards are mitigating FTRs, and are 
necessary to restore feasibility. The investor is responsible for additional counterflows 
so that it pays back for the negative externalities it creates. The solution is indicated 
by the black arrow in Figure 8-7 and consists of both pre-existing and incremental 
FTR awards amounting to 13 13 23 23300 and 740.T a T aδ δ+ = + =  The allocation of 
incremental 2-3 FTRs is minimized because the model takes into account that line 1-2 
is expanded, and some of the pre-existing FTRs become infeasible after the 
expansion.  
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This illustrates that the amount of incremental FTRs in the preference direction 
must be greater than zero such that feasibility is restored. Both the proxy and 
incremental FTRs exhaust transmission capacity in the pre-expansion and expanded 
grid, respectively. The proxy FTRs help allocating incremental FTRs by preserving 
capacity in the pre-expansion network, which results in an allocation of incremental 
FTRs amounting to the new transmission capacity created in 1-2 direction.129  
 
In the example provided by Bushnell and Stoft (1997), the investor with pre-
existing FTRs chooses the most profitable incremental FTR based on optimizing its 
final benefit. The investor is then awarded a mitigating incremental 1-2 FTR with 
associated power flows corresponding to the difference between the ex-ante and ex-
post optimal dispatches. The pre-existing FTRs correspond to the actual dispatch of 
the system and become infeasible after expanding line 1-2, and therefore a mitigating 
1-2 FTR130 is allocated so that feasibility is exactly restored (that is, the investor “pays 
back” for the negative externalities to other agents). There is no allocation of proxy 
awards because the pre-expansion network is fully allocated by FTRs before the 
expansion. The amount of incremental FTRs is minimized because they represent a 
negative value to the investor and decrease its revenues from the pre-existing FTRs. 
 
Bushnell and Stoft (1997) demonstrate that the increase in social welfare will be at 
least as large as the ex-post value of new contracts, when the FTRs initially match 
dispatch in the aggregate and new FTRs are allocated according to the feasibility rule. 
In particular, if social welfare is decreased by a transmission expansion, the investor 
will have to take FTRs with a negative value (If social welfare is increased there will 
be free riding). Some agents might still benefit from investments that reduce social 
welfare, whenever their own commercial interests improve to an extent that more than 
offsets the negative value of the new FTRs. This problem can be solved if it is 
required that FTRs are used by each agent as a perfect hedge for their net load. In 
such a case, FTRs allocated under the feasibility rule ensure that no one will benefit 
from an expansion that reduces welfare.  
 
The proxy award mechanism implies nonnegative effects on welfare in the sense 
that future investments in the grid cannot reduce the welfare of aggregate use for FTR 
holders. The reason is that simultaneous feasibility is guaranteed before and after the 
enhancement project so that revenue adequacy is also guaranteed after expansion. 
Only those non-hedged agents in the spot market might be exposed to rent transfers. 
Therefore, the proxy award mechanism presented in this chapter emphasizes the value 
of hedging. 
 
Although apparently similar, the mechanism and its implications on welfare are 
rather different to those in the Bushnell and Stoft (1997) model. Bushnell and Stoft 
analyze the welfare implications of transmission expansion given match of dispatch 
both in the aggregate and individually. In our model, it is assumed unallocated FTRs 
both before and after the expansion, so that there is no match of dispatch. 
                                               
129
 Note that this result will depend on the network interactions. In some cases the amount of 
incremental FTRs in the preference direction will differ from the new capacity created on a 
specific line. However, it will always amount to the new capacity created as defined by the 
scalar amount of incremental FTRs times the directional vector. 
130
 The incremental 1-2 FTR can be decomposed into a 1-3 FTR and a 3-2 FTR 
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Additionally, Bushnell and Stoft explicitly define loads, locational prices, and 
generation costs so that the effects on welfare are measured as the change in net 
generation costs. In contrast, this work does not define a net benefit function of the 
users of the grid in terms of prices, generation costs or income from loads. 
Alternatively, the presented model maximizes the investors’ objective function in 
terms of incremental FTRs. 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
A merchant mechanism is proposed to expand electricity transmission. Proxy 
awards (or reserved FTRs) are a fundamental part of this mechanism. They have been 
defined according to the best use of the current network along the same direction of 
the incremental expansion. The incremental FTR awards are allocated according to 
the investor preferences, and depend on the initial partial allocation of FTRs and 
network topology before and after expansion.  
 
The examples used showed that the internalization of possible negative 
externalities caused by potential expansion is possible according to the rule proposed 
by Hogan (2002a): allocation of FTRs before (proxy FTRs) and after (incremental 
FTRs) the expansion is in the same direction and according to the feasibility rule. 
Under these circumstances, the investor will have the proper incentives to invest in 
transmission expansion in its preference direction given by its bid parameters. 
Likewise, the larger the existing current capacity the greater the number of FTRs that 
must be reserved in order to deal with potential negative externalities depending on 
post network topology. 
 
The mechanism of long-term FTRs is basically a way to hedge market players 
from long-run nodal price fluctuations by providing them with the necessary property 
transmission rights. The main purpose of the four basic axioms that support our model 
(feasibility rule, proxy awards, maximum value and symmetry) were to define property 
rights for increased transmission investment according to the preset proxy rule. 
However, the general implications on welfare and incentives for gaming are still an 
open research question. Another “axiom” might be needed to deal with these last 
issues. 
 
Although this model is specifically designed to deal with loop flows, and the 
security-constrained version of the model can take care of contingency concerns, this 
proposed mechanism is to be applied to expansions where the locational price 
difference does not vanish totally. LTFTRs are efficient under non-lumpy marginal 
expansions of the transmission network, and lack of market power. Regulation has 
then an important complementary role in fostering large and lumpy projects where 
investment is large relative to market size, and in mitigating market power. Since 
revenues from nodal prices only recover a small part of total costs, LTFTRs must be 
complemented with a regulated framework that allows the recovery of fixed costs. 
The challenge is to effectively combine merchant and regulated transmission 
investments or, as Hogan (2003) puts it, to establish a rule in practice for drawing a 
line between merchant and regulated investments. 
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Appendix 
 
Solution of program Equation (8.29) 
 
The Lagrangian of the problem is: 
 
12 12 12 12 12 12
12 12 12 12 12 12
2
12 12 12 12
ˆ ˆ( , , , , ) ( ( ) )
ˆ( ) ( ( ))
ˆ( ) (1 )
L a t b a C T a t
p C T t
C T t a
δ λ δ γ δ
θ δ λδ ζ λ δ
ε δ ϕ δ κ piλ
+Ω = + − − +
− − − − −
+ − − + − + +
            
 
 
(8.46)
 
where , , , , , ,γ θ ζ ε ϕ κ  and pi  are the multipliers associated with the respective 
constraints. 
 
At optimality the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
 
 
12
12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , ) 0,L a t b
a
δ λ δ γδ∂ Ω = − =
∂
                                      
(8.47) 
12
12 12
12
12
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ 2 0,
L a t
ab t a p
t t
δ λ γ λ θδ
λζ ε δ ϕ
∂ Ω
= − + − −
∂
+ − − =
   
 
(8.48) 
12
12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , ) 0,
ˆ
L a t
t
δ λ γδ λζδ εδ∂ Ω = − + − =
∂
                          
(8.49) 
12
12 12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ( ) 0,L a t C T tδ λ δ θ δ ζλ
∂ Ω
= − − − =
∂
                  
(8.50) 
12
12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ( ( ) ) 0,L a t C T a tδ λ δ
γ
+∂ Ω
= − − + =
∂
                    
(8.51) 
12
12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , ) ( ) 0,L a t pδ λ δ λδ
θ
∂ Ω
= − − =
∂
                                
(8.52) 
12
12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ( ) 0,L a t C T tδ λ λ δζ
∂ Ω
= − − − =
∂
 
12
12 12 12
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ( ) 0,L a t C T tδ λ δ
ε
∂ Ω
= − − =
∂
                             
(8.53) 
 
(8.54) 
 
212
12
ˆ( , , , , ) (1 ) 0,L a t δ λ δ
ϕ
∂ Ω
= − =
∂
                                             
   (8.55)
 
12
ˆ( , , , , ) 0, 0,L a t aδ λ κ
κ
∂ Ω
= > =
∂
                                                       
  (8.56)
 
12
ˆ( , , , , ) 0, 0,L a t δ λ λ pi
pi
∂ Ω
= > =
∂
                                                     
  (8.57)
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, 0γ ε ≥      (8.58)
 
 
Equation (8.55) gives 112 =δ . Equation (8.47) gives 12b=γ . Equation (8.52) gives 
12p=λ , Equation (8.49) 121212 // pbp == γζ  (ε  is zero because the constraint is 
redundant), and Equation (8.50) 0.θ =  From this it follows (Equation (8.48)) that 
0=ϕ
 Furthermore Equation (8.53) gives 12 12ˆ .t C T= −
 
Equation (8.51) implies that 
12121212
ˆ CCtTCa −=−−= ++ . 
 
Solution of program Equation (8.31) 
 
The Lagrangian of the problem is: 
 
13 13 23 23
1 13 13 13 23 23
2 12 13 13 23 23
13 13 13 23 23
2
13 13 13 23 23 13
ˆ( , , , , ) ( )
2 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
3 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ))
3 3
2 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ( ) ( )))
3 3
2 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( )) (1
3 3
L a t a b b
C T t a T t a
C T t a T t a
C T t T t
C T t T t
δ λ δ δ
γ δ δ
γ δ δ
ζ λ δ δ
ε δ δ ϕ δ
+
Ω = +
+ − + + − + +
+ − + + + + +
− − + − +
+ − + − + + − 223 ) aδ κ piλ− + +
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (8.59)
 
 
where 1 2andγ γ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with transmission capacity on 
the lines 1-3 and 1-2 in the expanded network, respectively. ζ  is the multiplier 
associated with the Kuhn-Tucker condition of transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion network for line 1-3. This line has the Lagrange multiplier λ  associated 
with it before expansion. ε  is the investor’s marginal value of transmission capacity 
in the pre-expansion network when allocating incremental FTRs. The normalization 
condition has the multiplier ϕ  and the non-negativity conditions have the associated 
multipliers κ  and pi . The first order conditions are: 
 
 
13 13 23 23 13 23 1
13 23 2
ˆ( , , , , ) 2 1( ) ( )
3 3
1 1( ) 0,
3 3
L a t b b
a
δ λ δ δ δ δ γ
δ δ γ
∂ Ω
= + − +
∂
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  (8.60) 
13 1 2
13
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ˆ( , , , , ) 2 1
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3 3
2 2
ˆ ˆ 2 0,
3 3
L a t
ab t a t a
t t
δ λ γ γδ
ζλ ε ϕδ
∂ Ω
= − + − +
∂
+ − − =
 
     (8.61) 
 166                               A merchant mechanism for electricity transmission expansion  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
23 1 2
23
23
ˆ( , , , , ) 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
3 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ 2 0,
3 3
L a t
ab t a t a
t t
δ λ γ γδ
ζλ ε ϕδ
∂ Ω
= − + + +
∂
+ − − =
 
     (8.62) 
13 23 1 13 23 2
13 23 13 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 2 1 1 1( ) ( )
ˆ 3 3 3 3
2 1 2 1( ) ( ) 0,
3 3 3 3
L a t
t
δ λ δ δ γ δ δ γ
δ δ ζλ δ δ ε
∂ Ω
= − + − −
∂
+ + − + =
 
 
(8.63) 
13 13 13
23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 2
ˆ( ( )
3
1
ˆ( )) 0,
3
L a t C T t
T t
δ λ ζ δλ
δ
∂ Ω
= − − +
∂
− + =
  
     (8.64) 
13 13 13
1
23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 2
ˆ( ( ) )
3
1
ˆ( ( ) ) 0,
3
L a t C T t a
T t a
δ λ δ
γ
δ
+∂ Ω
= − + +
∂
− + + =
 
     (8.65) 
12 13 13
2
23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 1
ˆ( ( ) )
3
1
ˆ( ( ) ) 0,
3
L a t C T t a
T t a
δ λ δ
γ
δ
∂ Ω
= − + +
∂
+ + + =
 
     (8.66) 
13 13 13
23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 2
ˆ( ( )
3
1
ˆ( )) 0,
3
L a t C T t
T t
δ λ λ δζ
δ
∂ Ω
= − − +
∂
− + =
 
13 13 13 23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 2 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( )) 0,
3 3
L a t C T t T tδ λ δ δ
ε
∂ Ω
= − + − + =
∂
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2 2
13 23
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ϕ
∂ Ω
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ˆ( , , , , ) 0, 0,L a t aδ λ κ
κ
∂ Ω
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∂
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ˆ( , , , , ) 0, 0,L a t δ λ λ pi
pi
∂ Ω
= > =
∂
                                                       
 
                              (8.71)
 
 
In this program ε
 
is zero because the constraint is redundant. The solution for the 
first order conditions is given by: 
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
− − − +

− −
− − − +
 
 
 
(13 132 13 23
12 13 23
12 13 23 13 23
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3( ) 2(1/ 3 2 / 3 )(2 )
( 1/ 3 1/ 3 ) 2( )
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C C b b
C C T
C T T b b b
C T T
γ
+
+
+
−
= − ⋅
− +
 
− + + 
+ −  
− −  
                        
 
  
12 13 23
1 2
13 13 23
( 1/ 3 1/ 3 )
( 2 / 3 1/ 3 )
C T T
C T T
ζλ γ γ
+
− +
= + ⋅
− −
 
 
 
Solution of program Equation (8.38) 
 
The Lagrangian of the problem is: 
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13 13 23 23
3 23 13 13 23 23
4 21 13 13 23 23
23 13 13 23 23
2 23 13 13 23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( 0.4( ( ) ) 0.8( ( ) )
ˆ ˆ( 0.4( ( ) ) 0.2( ( ) ))
1 2
ˆ ˆ( ( ( ) ( )))
3 3
1 2
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( ))
3 3
(
L a t a b b
C T t a T t a
C T t a T t a
C T t T t
C T t T t
δ η δ δ
γ δ δ
γ δ δ
ψ η δ δ
ε δ δ
ϕ
+
Ω = + +
+ − + + − + +
+ + + + − + +
− − + − +
+ − + − +
+ 2 213 231 ) aδ δ κ ρη− − + +
                                               (8.72)
 
 
where 3 4andγ γ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with transmission capacity on 
the lines 2-3 and 2-1 in the expanded network, respectively. ψ  is the multiplier 
associated with the Kuhn-Tucker condition of transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion network for line 2-3. This line has the Lagrange multiplier η  associated 
with it before expansion. 2ε  is the investor’s marginal value of transmission capacity 
on line 2-3 in the pre-expansion network when allocating incremental FTRs. The 
normalization condition has the multiplier ϕ  and the non-negativity conditions have 
the associated multipliers κ  and ρ . The first order conditions are: 
13 13 23 23 13 23 3
13 23 4
ˆ( , , , , ) ( ) (0.4 0.8 )
( 0.4 0.2 ) 0,
L a t b b
a
δ η δ δ δ δ γ
δ δ γ
∂ Ω
= + − +
∂
− − + =
 
                           (8.73)
 
13 3 4
13
2 13
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ ˆ0.4( ) 0.4( )
1 1
ˆ ˆ 2 0,
3 3
L a t
ab t a t a
t t
δ η γ γδ
ψη ε ϕδ
∂ Ω
= − + + +
∂
+ − − =
 
                               (8.74) 
23 3 4
23
2 23
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ ˆ0.8( ) 0.2( )
2 2
ˆ ˆ 2 0,
3 3
L a t
ab t a t a
t t
δ η γ γδ
ψη ε ϕδ
∂ Ω
= − + − +
∂
+ − − =
 
                              (8.75) 
13 23 3
13 23 4 13 23
13 23 2
ˆ( , , , , ) (0.4 0.8 )
ˆ
1 2( 0.4 0.2 ) ( )
3 3
1 2( ) 0,
3 3
L a t
t
δ η δ δ γ
δ δ γ δ δ ψη
δ δ ε
∂ Ω
= − +
∂
− − + + +
− + =
 
                           (8.76)
 
23 13 13
23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 1
ˆ( ( )
3
2
ˆ( )) 0,
3
L a t C T t
T t
δ η ψ δ
η
δ
∂ Ω
= − − +
∂
− + =
 
                           (8.77) 
23 13 13
3
23 23
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ0.4( ( ) )
ˆ0.8( ( ) ) 0,
L a t C T t a
T t a
δ η δ
γ
δ
+∂ Ω
= − + +
∂
− + + =
 
                          (8.78) 
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21 13 13
4
23 23
ˆ( , , , , )
ˆ0.4( ( ) )
ˆ0.2( ( ) ) 0,
L a t C T t a
T t a
δ η δ
γ
δ
∂ Ω
= + + +
∂
− + + =
 
                             (8.79) 
23 13 13
23 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 1
ˆ( ( )
3
2
ˆ( )) 0,
3
L a t C T t
T t
δ η η δ
ψ
δ
∂ Ω
= − − +
∂
− + =
 
                             (8.80) 
13 13 13 23 23
2
ˆ( , , , , ) 2 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ( )) 0,
3 3
L a t C T t T tδ η δ δ
ε
∂ Ω
= − + − + =
∂
 
                                     (8.81) 
2 2
13 23
ˆ( , , , , ) 1 0,L a t δ η δ δ
ϕ
∂ Ω
= − − =
∂
 
                                    (8.82) 
ˆ( , , , , ) 0, 0,L a t aδ η κ
κ
∂ Ω
= > =
∂
 
 
                                    (8.83) 
 
ˆ( , , , , ) 0, 0,L a t δ η η ρ
ρ
∂ Ω
= > =
∂
 
 
                                     (8.84) 
 
The solution for the first order conditions is given by: 
 
3 4
13 1/ 22
3 4
2
3 4
3 4
23 1/ 22
3 4
2
3 4
( 0.8 2 / 3 0.2 )
,
( 0.8 2 / 3 0.2 )
( 0.4 1/ 3 0.4 )
( 0.4 1/ 3 0.4 )
( 0.8 2 / 3 0.2 )
( 0.4 1/ 3 0.4 )
γ ψη γδ
γ ψη γ
γ ψη γ
γ ψη γδ
γ ψη γ
γ ψη γ
− − + −
=
− + − 
 
+ − + + 
− + +
=
− + − 
 
+ − + + 
 
 
                             
23 13 23
4
1/ 22
3 4
2
3 4
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C T T
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γ ψη γ
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− −
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Solution of program Equation (8.45)  
 
The Lagrangian of the problem is: 
 
13 13 23 23
1 13 13 13 23 23
2 12 13 13 23 23
13 13 13
ˆ( , , , , ) ( )
2 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ))
3 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ))
3 3
ˆ( ( ( ))
L a t a b b
C T t a T t a
C T t a T t a
C T t
δ λ δ δ
γ δ δ
γ δ δ
ζ λ δ
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+ − + + − + +
+ − + + + + +
− − +
                                                   
(8.85) 
13 13 13
2 2
13 23
ˆ( ( ))
(1 )
C T t
a
ε δ
ϕ δ δ κ piλ
+ − +
+ − − + +
 
 
 
where 1 2andγ γ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with transmission capacity on 
the lines 1-3 and 1-2 in the expanded network, respectively. ζ  is the multiplier 
associated with the Kuhn-Tucker condition of transmission capacity in the pre-
expansion network for line 1-3. This line has the Lagrange multiplier λ  associated 
with it before expansion. ε  is the investor’s marginal value of transmission capacity 
in the pre-expansion network when allocating incremental FTRs. The normalization 
condition has the multiplier ϕ  and the non-negativity conditions have the associated 
multipliers κ  and pi . The first order conditions are: 
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 (8.97)                                                       
  
The solution for the first order conditions is given by: 
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The power transfer distribution factors 
 
This appendix derives the power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs) for the three-
node network with two parallel lines, and where all lines have identical reactance. The 
net injection (or net generation) of power at each bus is denoted Pi. We have the 
following relationship between the net injection, the power flows Pij and phase angles 
iθ : 
)(1 ji
j j ij
iji
x
PP θθ −== ∑ ∑  
where ijx is the line inductive reactance in per unit. 
 
We can write the power flow equations as: 
 
1 1
2 2
3 3
2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2
P
P
P
θ
θ
θ
− −    
    
= − −    
    
− −    
 
 
The matrix is called the susceptance matrix. The matrix is singular, but by 
declaring one of the buses to have a phase angle of zero and eliminating its row and 
column from the matrix, the reactance matrix can be obtained by inversion.  The 
resulting equation then gives the bus angles as a function of the bus injection:  
 
2 2
3 3
2 / 3 1/ 3
1/ 3 2 / 3
P
P
θ
θ
    
=    
    
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The PTDF is the fraction of the amount of a transaction from one node to another 
node that flows over a given line. PTDFij,mn is the fraction of a transaction from node 
m to node n that flows over a transmission line connecting node i and node j. The 
equation for the PTDF is: 
 
ij
jninjmim
mnij
x
xxxx
PTDF
+−−
=
,
 
 
where xij is the reactance of the transmission line connecting node i and node j and xim 
is the entry in the ith row and the mth column of the bus reactance matrix. Utilizing the 
formula for the specific example network in Figure 8-2 gives: 
 
12,13 1/ 3PTDF = , 13,13 2 / 3PTDF = , 23,13 1/ 3PTDF = , 
12,23 1/ 3PTDF = − , 13,23 1/ 3PTDF = , 23,23 2 / 3PTDF =  
21,13 1/ 3PTDF = − , 21,23 1/ 3PTDF =  
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9 Provision of financial transmission rights131 
This chapter studies the risks faced by the providers of financial transmission rights 
(FTRs). The introduction of FTRs in different systems in the USA must be viewed in 
relationship to the organization of the market. Often, private players own the central 
grid, while an independent system operator (ISO) operates the grid. The revenues 
from transmission congestion collected in the day-ahead and balancing markets 
should give the ISO sufficient revenues to cover the costs associated with providing 
FTRs. This can be ensured if the issued FTRs fulfil the simultaneous feasibility test 
described by Hogan. This test on a three-node network is studied under different 
assumptions to find the maximum volumes which can be sold, including contingency 
constraints. Next the feasibility test is analyzed when taking into account the proceeds 
from the FTR auction, and demonstrates that a higher volume might be issued. We 
introduce uncertainty under different scenarios for locational prices and calculate the 
maximum provided volumes. As a tool for risk management, the provider of the FTRs 
can use the Value at Risk approach. Finally, the provision of FTRs by private parties 
is discussed. 
9.1 Introduction 
Transmission rights are needed to hedge long-distance forward trading. If they are 
well designed, they will minimize forward-trading risks (Stoft, 2002). If no such 
instruments are available, trading will be inhibited. An optimal schedule may result in 
loads that are located far from generators and create counterflows between loads and 
generators that are netted out before the actual schedule. Using financial transmission 
rights means that transmission costs will net out and every load and generator will pay 
and be paid as if it had traded locally.  
 
An independent system operator (ISO) can provide financial transmission rights 
(FTRs) as long as the payments to the FTR holders are less than or equal to the rents 
the ISO receives from transmission congestion (in the day-ahead and balancing 
markets). To calculate whether the volume of issued FTRs is feasible, a model 
network is used that is supposed to represent the actual network. If the network is an 
inaccurate description or there are unexpected contingencies or outages (of 
transmission lines or facilities) the ISO can run into financial revenue shortfall risks. 
On the other hand, a private party does not have to perform this feasibility calculation. 
As long as it can cover its expenses in the long-run, it can undertake the risk of 
overselling FTRs.  
 
An element that is not taken into account in the feasibility calculation by the ISO is 
the proceeds from the FTR auction, which add to the congestion rent. Higher proceeds 
from the FTR auction will allow the provider to sell higher volumes. If the party is a 
generator it may have the ability to sell the largest volume of FTRs, since it can affect 
the generation output and thereby the local spot prices. In most FTR markets, the 
proceeds from the FTR auctions are distributed to the transmission owners. However, 
we propose that it is possible to use the proceeds to fund the payments to FTR 
holders, including merchant transmission investors. In this case, we need a separate 
revenue stream as for example a tax on energy to pay for the capital of the 
                                               
131
 I am grateful for comments from Professor Ross Baldick. 
 176                                                                Provision of financial transmission rights  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
transmission system. Likewise, a transmission investor might want the proceeds from 
the auction to pay off the capital. 
9.2 Financial transmission rights 
An FTR (Hogan, 1992 and 2003) entitles its owner to be paid the price difference 
between two locations (buses) times the contract quantity over a specified time period. 
This payment will net out any price risk associated with using that path (i.e. paying 
congestion fees) if the contract quantity matches the quantity traded. Such payments 
will be made to the owner of the right regardless of the owner’s actual usage of the 
transmission system. The payments under this right are therefore independent of the 
owner’s physical use of the grid. Even if the congestion risk is hedged, traders will 
still be exposed to locational price signals and should still be able to make efficient 
choices for production and consumption. The mathematical formulation for the payoff 
for the FTR is: 
 
FTR = (Pj -Pi) Qij                       (9.1) 
 
where Pj is the bus price at location j, Pi is the bus price at location i and Qij is the 
directed quantity specified in the FTR from point i to point j. The payoff of the FTR is 
only dependent on the bus prices, not on the power flow, and it may be positive, zero 
or negative. An FTR may be acquired by purchasing it in auctions, secondary markets 
or by investing in transmission lines. Typically, an ISO would provide FTRs through 
an auction held periodically, or by an initial allocation. After the initial allocation, the 
FTRs could be traded through secondary markets. 
 
Locational prices are required before an FTR can be defined. These depend on 
congestion and may depend on losses. FTRs are typically forward contracts that are 
settled in the day-ahead market. The locational prices that they are settled against will 
change during the specified contract period, so the value of the total payment is 
calculated by averaging a series of fluctuating locational bus prices.  
 
FTRs can be designated as one-way options in which case the holder is not 
responsible for negative payments. The mathematical formulation is: 
 
FTR_option = max ( (Pj -Pi) Qij ,0)                                 (9.2) 
 
Payments from an option are non-negative, and the option will have a clearing price 
greater than or equal to the price of an FTR obligation. 
 
If the objective is to fully and efficiently utilize the network, schedules that create 
counterflows are necessary because they relieve congestion. In the presence of 
counterflows, options issued by the ISO will not allow full hedging. For a more 
thorough introduction to the FTR concept we refer to Hogan (1992 and 2003). 
9.3 The simultaneous feasibility test 
In general, the ISO can issue more obligations than options if all FTRs are defined 
as options. The reason is that obligations will allow the ISO to assume that 
counterflows will either be provided by the FTR holders or the holders will pay the 
ISO for the negative value of the right. By using options the ISO cannot assume that 
counterflows will be provided, nor will it receive any payments from the rights holder. 
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For these reasons, parties should be willing to pay more for options than obligations. 
Ideally, both options and obligations could be provided by the ISO and the market 
could sort out the mix of rights it found to be most useful, given the market 
transactions each party wished to pursue. 
 
An important consideration in defining FTRs is that they fulfill the feasibility 
condition. If this is the case, revenue sufficiency is ensured and the congestion rent is 
sufficient to cover the payments to the FTR holders. The feasible set of FTRs is any 
set of FTRs that corresponds to a feasible power flow. A feasible power flow is one 
that does not violate the power transmission limit of any line.132 Other sets are 
infeasible (Stoft, 2002). The set of FTRs to be issued is often restricted to be any 
feasible set. Restricting FTRs by restricting the sum of the corresponding power flows 
automatically accounts for counterflows, so trade will not be restricted except because 
of physical limitations. If a full set of FTRs is to be issued, then traders are allowed to 
purchase any feasible set of FTRs (Stoft, 2002). 
 
Traders often prefer FTRs that cannot have negative values, such as options. 
Options make revenue sufficiency more difficult to guarantee without severely 
restricting the sale of FTRs. The set of financial options that ensures revenue 
sufficiency must therefore be smaller than the feasible set of FTR obligations. 
 
Hogan and Pope (2001) demonstrate that for FTR obligations, options or a 
combination of both, the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) ensures that the implied 
power flows ( )K y from the contracts satisfy all system constraints (in the example 
below, the transmission capacity limits): 
 
( )K y C≤                                            (9.3)
                      
where y is the vector of net loads on the system and C  is the vector of transmission 
line capacities. In a DC load flow approximation )( yK can be linearized to 
* * *( ) ( ) ( )( )K y K y K y y y≈ + ∇ −  where *y  is an operating point and *( )K y∇  equals 
the matrix of shift factors133 H. The matrix H includes negative contributions due to 
counterflows. It is assumed that * 0y = and * *( ) 0K y Hy= =  resulting in HyyK ≈)( . 
Furthermore, { }fmnQ  is the set of FTR obligations and { }omnQ  is the set of FTR options. 
For options only positive congestion payments are made by the system operator. The 
SFT in the case of obligations is satisfied if and only if: 
 
1 ,
F
f
ijmn mn ij
mn
H Q C i j N≤ ≤ ≤∑                                                               (9.4)
                       
where the summation is across all obligations (F) issued between the buses in the 
network that contribute with a flow over the specified transmission line ij. Hijmn is the 
fraction of a transaction from bus m to bus n that flows over a transmission line 
connecting bus i and bus j. The maximum volume (Qo) of possible issued options in 
the case of a DC load flow approximation is determined by: 
                                               
132
 A lossless transmission network is assumed. 
133Also called power transfer distribution factors (PTDFs). 
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max(0, ) 1 ,
O
o
ijmn mn ij
mn
H Q C i j N≤ ≤ ≤∑                             (9.5)            
 
where the summation is across all options (O) issued between the buses in the 
network that contribute with a flow over the specified transmission line ij. The 
interpretation of the above equation is that counterflows from options must be ignored 
(i.e. negative shift factors) and only options with the same direction along the 
constraint are considered.  
 
A combination of FTR obligations and options satisfies the SFT when: 
 
max(0, ) 1 ,
F O
f o
ijmn mn ijmn mn ij
mn mn
H Q H Q C i j N+ ≤ ≤ ≤∑ ∑                                                  (9.6) 
 
ensuring sufficient payments to the system operator. The SFT is guaranteed by the 
convexity of the solution set. 
 
To carry out an SFT in a network we run an optimal power flow model without 
economic dispatch and check that no limits are violated. An FTR obligation134 
between two locations is described as a vector: 
 
(0,...., 1 ,....,1 ,...,0)f T
mn mn m n
FTR Q= −                                        (9.7)   
 
where f
mn
Q  is the amount of energy specified in the FTR. An FTR is then viewed as an 
injection (source) f
mn
Q of electricity at bus i and a withdrawal (sink) of f
mn
Q  at bus j.  
 
FTRs between different buses in a three-bus network can be allocated according to 
the generic transaction scheme shown in Table 9-1.  
 
Table 9-1. Generic transaction scheme describing FTRs. 
 
Bus Injection/source Withdrawal/sink 
1 )( 1312 ff QQ +−  )( 3121 ff QQ +  
2 )( 2321 ff QQ +−  )( 3212 ff QQ +  
3 )( 3231 ff QQ +−  )( 2313 ff QQ +  
Total sink equals 
total source 
± )( 323121231312 ffffff QQQQQQ +++++  
 
To illustrate, an FTR of 10 units is assumed between buses 1-2. This FTR would 
have an injection component of 10 at bus 1 and a withdrawal component of 10 at bus 
2. Another FTR of 15 units between buses 1-3 would similarly have 15 units of 
injection and withdrawal. The total amount of injection would then be 25 units of 
injection at bus 1, 10 units of withdrawal at bus 2, and 15 units of withdrawal at bus 3. 
                                               
134
 No losses are assumed. 
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The total amount of injected power is 25 units equal to the total amount withdrawn, 
25 units. The amount of issued FTRs is feasible if no power flow limits are violated. 
9.4 Optimal power flow model 
We base our analysis on a lossless and linear DC-equivalent model with all 
interface-reactances equal to 1 as described in Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001). The 
model ignores losses. The mathematical formulation is: 
N:     the number of buses, 
K:    the number of transmission lines, 
Cij:    the capacity of the transmission line from i to j, 
Ll:    the set of directed arcs in a path going through the independent loop l  
   representing Kirchhoff’s loop rule, 
:diq     the quantity of real power consumed at bus i, 
:siq     the quantity of real power generated at bus i, 
iy :    the net load at bus i, 
( ) :d di ip q  the demand function of bus i, 
( ) :s si ip q   the supply function of bus i, 
 qij :    the power flow over the line from bus i to bus  j, 
:ZmP     the price in zone Zm. 
 
Then the objective becomes: 
 
1 0 0
max ( ) ( )
d s
i iq qN
d s
i i
i
p q dq p q dq
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=
                                            (9.13)                                   
 
The objective function in the model, Equation (9.8), is the total social welfare 
which in turn equals the sum of consumer surplus and generator surplus. Equation 
(9.9) represents Kirchhoff’s junction rules constituting N-1 independent equations. 
Equation (9.10) represents Kirchhoff’s loop rules with 1 1( ,..., )K NL L L − +=  being the set 
of independent loops, and Ll being the set of directed arcs in a path going through 
loop l. Equation (9.11) describes the energy conservation. Equation (9.12) describes 
the transmission capacity limits. Equation (9.13) calculates the bus prices. 
Alternatively, they can be found as the shadow prices of the Kirchhoff’s junction 
rules. In every bus (node) there are production and consumption facilities.  
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The real power flows from the buses will depend on the net supply at the 
respective buses. The decision variables in the model are the quantities produced and 
consumed and the bus prices. The variables are coupled through the supply and 
demand functions. The model can be used to perform the SFT. In this case supply and 
demand are fixed and the model calculates the associated power flows. The network 
considered is shown in Figure 9-1. 
 
The demand and cost functions are assumed to be quadratic, implying linear 
demand and supply. Demand in bus i is given pi = ai – biqi where p is the price at the 
actual bus and a and b are positive constants. Supply is given by pi = ciqi where c is a 
positive constant. We assume identical demand functions at every bus, and varying 
cost functions as shown in Table 9-2. 
 
Table 9-2. Parameters for the supply and demand functions. 
 
 
Consumption Supply Bus 
ai bi ci 
1 20 0.05 0.1 
2 20 0.05 0.2 
3 20 0.05 0.3 
 
Figure 9-1 and Figure 9-2 show the uncongested case and the congested case 
respectively. Maximum transmission capacity over interface 1-2 is 15. The other 
interfaces have transmission limits equal to 100. Because every interface consists of 
two lines, the capacity of each line is half of the total capacity. The reactance of each 
line equals 2, resulting in total interface reactance of 1 (two parallel lines). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-1. Economic dispatch in an uncongested three-bus network. 
 
1 
P1= 15.32 
3 
P3= 15.32 
 
2 
P2= 15.32 
q12 = 25.53 
q32 = 8.51 
 
Social surplus 
2809 
q13 = 34.04 
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Security constraints take into account the post-contingency flows that arise due to 
loss of lines or generators. The usual model is to use the n-1 criterion where the 
outage of one transmission line or one generator is considered.135  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-2. Economic dispatch when transmission congestion is present in a three-bus 
network. 
 
9.5 Numerical examples 
In the presence of losses and congestion, the net rents collected under a locational 
pricing model would be greater than the net payments to participants. This net 
revenue is referred to as the congestion rent. It is the difference between the sum of 
withdrawals ( diq ) and injections ( siq ) times the bus prices (Pi). The congestion rent 
(RC) can be stated mathematically for the three-bus network with no losses as: 
 
3 3
12 2 1 13 3 1 23 3 2
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 26d sC i i i i
i i
R q P q P q P P q P P q P P
= =
= − = − + − + − =∑ ∑                 (9.14)      
 
where qij is the power flow from bus i to bus j. The second equality would not hold if 
there were losses.  
9.5.1 Financial transmission right obligations 
The expected value of an FTR between buses i and j is given by the expected 
future congestion price between the buses. The maximum provided volume of one 
FTR is then found by assuming that the payment to the FTR holder equals the 
congestion rent: 
 
                                               
135Including simultaneous outage of several lines and/or generators would increase the 
computational burden.  
2 
P2= 15.93 
3 
P3= 15.36 
q12 = 15 =C12MAX 
q23 = 13.35 
 
Social surplus 
2799 
Cong. rent 26  
q13 = 28.35 
1 
P1= 14.78 
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Alternatively, we can formulate the maximum volume of FTR obligations between 
buses i-j connected by a congested line k in a three-bus network with identical 
reactance as:  
 
{ }3 min , 2
2
f
ij k ll
Q C C=                                                                          (9.16)
                                             
where kC is the maximum transmission capacity of the line between buses i-j, and lC  
is the maximum transmission capacity of each of the other lines in the network 
connecting buses i and j indirectly. The rule is determined by the impedance that is 
twice as high for the path 1-3-2 compared to path 1-2. Therefore 2/3 of the power 
takes the direct path from bus i to j and 1/3 the longer path. Generally, the shift factors 
can be found from the matrix of shift factors as illustrated in Figure 9-3 (see the 
appendix for how to calculate the shift factor matrix elements). FTR obligations 
between the buses i and j and the remaining bus (called an FTR obligation between 
buses m-n) will have a maximum issued volume equal to: 
 
13min ,
2
f
mn k ll
Q C C =  
 
                                                                                          (9.17)
                        
due to the shift factor 1/3. The simultaneous provision of several FTRs modifies this 
rule so that the congestion rent must be shared among several FTRs. The magnitude 
of the congestion rent and the implied FTR power flows determines the maximum 
volume of provided FTRs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-3. Some elements in the shift factor matrix. 
 
2 
Point of withdrawal 
3 
H1212 = 2/3, 
H1221 =- 2/3 
H3212 = 1/3, 
H3221 = -1/3 
H1312 = 1/3, 
H1321 = -1/3 
1 
Point of injection 
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We calculate the maximum volume of FTRs between different buses. First, we 
consider when the ISO issues FTRs between buses 1-2 in the network as shown in 
Figure 9-2. The maximum volume of FTR is calculated as: 
 
12 12
2 1
3 22.5( ) 2
f CRQ C
P P
= = =
−
                                                                                  (9.18)     
 
A smaller volume gives the ISO an excess revenue which could be redistributed 
according to a specified rule. However, if the ISO provides the same volume plus 22.5 
(total volume 45) in the opposite direction (from 2 to 1), the net directed power flow 
from 2 to 1 is 15 because the power flows cancel. In this situation, the ISO can issue 
any volume Q plus 22.5 as long as there is an equal volume Q in the opposite 
direction.  
 
Similarly, the maximum volume of FTRs between buses 1-3 can be calculated as: 
 
13 12
3 1
3 45.( )
f CRQ C
P P
= = =
−
                                                                                      (9.19)   
 
Another possibility is a simultaneous issue of FTRs between buses 1-2 and 1-3. 
The maximum volumes of FTRs are described as: 
 
12 2 1 13 3 1( ) ( )f f CQ P P Q P P R− + − =                                                             (9.20)
              
After rearranging the volume of FTRs between 1 and 2 this gives: 
 
13 3 1
12 13
2 1 2 1
( ) 22.5 0.5( ) ( )
f
f fCR Q P PQ Q
P P P P
−
= − = −
− −
                          (9.21)
          
The feasible space of FTRs is illustrated in Figure 9-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-4. The feasible space of FTRs 1-2 and 1-3. 
 
Similarly, the maximum volumes of FTRs between buses 1-2 and buses 3-2 are: 
 
1-2 
22.5 
1-3 45 
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32 2 3
12 32
2 1 2 1
( ) 22.5 0.5( ) ( )
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f fCR Q P PQ Q
P P P P
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= − = −
− −
                                                          (9.22) 
 
and between buses 1-2 and buses 2-3:  
 
23 3 2
12 23
2 1 2 1
( ) 22.5 0.5( ) ( )
f
f fCR Q P PQ Q
P P P P
−
= − = +
− −
.                                                         (9.23) 
 
The formula shows that increasing the volume of FTRs between buses 2-3 also 
increases the volume of FTRs between buses 1-2, due to counterflows. The feasible 
space of FTRs is illustrated in Figure 9-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-5. The feasible space of FTRs 1-2 and 2-3. 
 
9.5.2 Contingency constraints 
Contingency constraints limit the volume of issued FTRs. For example if we 
assume an outage of one line at the 1-2 interface, the remaining capacity will be 7.5 
units. The line reactance for line 1-2 is 2, due to the outage. The shift factor matrix 
elements change because of the new network topology. Examples are 1212 1/ 2H =
 
and 
1213 1/ 4H = . 
 
The congestion rent from the economic dispatch in this case will be 25.6, which is 
slightly lower than when the line is in service (26 units). The corresponding economic 
dispatch is shown in Figure 9-6.  
 
The constraint reduces the volume of FTR between buses 1-2 so that the ISO can 
issue to 15.0 or 33%. Similarly the maximum volumes of 1-2 and 1-3 FTRs utilizing 
the n-1 criterion are described as: 
 
13 3 1
12 13
2 1 2 1
( ) 15 0.5( ) ( )
f
f fCR Q P PQ Q
P P P P
−
= − = −
− −
                                                              (9.24)    
 
which is more restrictive than without contingency. 
2-3 200 
1-2 
22.5 
122.5 
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Figure 9-6. Economic dispatch when transmission congestion and one contingency are 
present in a three-bus network. 
 
Transpower New Zealand has excluded transmission lines with outages longer than 
2 days in a 30-day period in its network describing the SFT (Transpower, 2001). The 
outage of the remaining lines describing the network is equivalent to 7% of the 
duration of the FTRs. In our network example, a conservative criterion is that the 
outage of the 1-2 line is present only as long as the duration of the FTRs and hence 
the issued volume is 11.25. Usually outages are present for shorter times, and an 
optimistic upper bound is therefore 22.5 units. However, in optimal power flow 
models, the practice is to include security constraints and run a security-constrained 
economic dispatch. 
9.5.3 Financial transmission right options 
Provision of options will be more restrictive because they do not provide 
counterflows. Consider the case when the ISO issues options between buses 1-2 then 
the maximum volume, 22.5 units, will be the same as for obligations. If the ISO issues 
options in opposite directions between the same buses the maximum volume in each 
direction is still 22.5 units compared with obligations where a higher volume could be 
issued. The reason is that options do not provide counterflows and any possible 
exercise of options must be taken into account. In the above example, only one option 
is exercised at a time with an associated maximum volume of 22.5.  
 
Utilizing that options do not result in counterflows in the specific three-bus 
transmission network we get a relationship between 1-2 and 1-3 FTR options:136 
 
12 13
2 1 15
3 3
o oQ Q+ ≤                                                                         (9.25)
            
                                               
136
 The constraints on lines 1-3 and 2-3 are ignored since they are not binding. 
2 
P2= 16.23 
q23 = 13.14 
q12= 7.5 = C12MAX 
 
Social surplus 2789 
Congestion rent 25.6 
q13 = 28.14 
3 
P3= 15.37 
1 
P1= 14.52 
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and solving for 12
oQ  gives the maximum volume of options between buses 1-2: 
 
12 13 1322.5 0.5 , 45
o o oQ Q Q= − ≤                                                                            (9.26)  
  
Another possibility is to have options between buses 1-2 and 2-3. The relevant 
constraints are:  
 
12
2 15
3
oQ ≤  and   23
1 15
3
oQ ≤                                                                                      (9.27) 
 
since the options do not create any counterflows. The maximum volume for each 
option is: 
 
12 22.5
oQ =   and  23 45oQ =                                                                                        (9.28) 
 
which is lower than in the case of obligations. Combinations of obligations and 
options are also possible. For example, an obligation between buses 1-2 and an option 
between buses 2-3 is represented by the constraints:   
 
12
0
23 12
2 15
3
1 2 15.
3 3
f
f
Q
Q Q
≤
− ≤
                                                              (9.29)
            
The maximum volume of provided 1-2 obligations is the same as before: 22.5 
units. The maximum volume of 2-3 options is:  
 
0
23 12 max45 2 45 2 22.5 90
fQ Q= + = + ⋅ =                                                                       (9.30) 
 
which is also lower than in the case with only obligations. The 2-3 option would have 
zero payoff in the economic dispatch example in Figure 9-2 because the price 
difference between buses 3 and 2 is negative. When we take the security constraints 
into account, we get the maximum volume for a single obligation or option as 
specified in Table 9-3. Similarly, we can specify some maximum volume 
combinations of options and obligations in Table 9-4. The results demonstrate that the 
volume of issued options is more restrictive for some of the lines because they do not 
create counterflows. 
 
Table 9-3. The maximum volume of provided FTR obligations or options when only 
one FTR is issued. 
 
buses FTR 
obligation 
FTR 
option 
(n-1) 
criterion 
1-2 22.5 22.5 15 
1-3 45 45 30 
2-3 45 45 30 
3-2 45 45 30 
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Table 9-4. The maximum volume of provided FTRs when several FTRs are issued 
simultaneously. 
 
buses FTR obligation FTR option (n-1) criterion 
1-2 and 2-1 
obligation 
Any volume Q 
plus 22.5 in one 
direction as 
long as there is 
an equal 
volume Q in the 
opposite 
direction 
22.5 in both 
directions 
Any volume Q plus 15 in 
one direction as long as 
there is an equal volume Q 
in the opposite direction 
for obligations, 15.0 in 
both directions for options 
1-2 and 1-3 
obligation 
12 13
13
22.5 0.5
45
f f
f
Q Q
Q
= −
≤
 
12 13
13
22.5 0.5
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o o
o
Q Q
Q
= −
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12 3215 and 30
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1-2 obligation 
and 2-3 option 
12
23
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Q
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9.6 Expanding the feasible space of financial transmission rights  
Until now we have not taken the proceeds from the FTR auction into account when 
calculating the maximum volume issued. When they are considered, the formulas for 
maximum volume must be modified since there will be additional revenue from the 
FTR sales. The payments to the FTR holders must be less than or equal to the 
congestion rent and the proceeds from the FTR auction. We assume that the proceeds 
from the FTR auctions are related to the period when the FTRs are settled. This holds 
true for the auctions in the PJM market in the US. The general relationship between 
the payoff, the price and the maximum volume of a single FTR is described as: 
 
( )fij j i ij CQ P P p R− − =                                                                                               (9.31)
                               
where p  is the price of the FTR. RC is calculated from the bus prices and their 
associated net loads in the optimal power flow model. We first assume that the FTR 
prices are independent of the FTR volume issued. Consider the case when 
( ) 0j i ijP P p− − > . This occurs when the FTR prices are less than the price differential 
(i.e. the FTRs are under-priced). The greater ( )j i ijP P p− −  is, the smaller the 
maximum volume of FTRs, assuming everything else is equal. We understand that the 
relatively under-priced FTRs (the FTR price is small compared to the price 
differential) cause the ISO to issue a smaller volume because it is responsible for 
payments (i.e. price differentials) to FTR holders that are greater than the price for 
which they are sold. The reverse is true if ( ) 0j i ijP P p− − <  the selling price is greater 
than the price differential (i.e. the FTRs are over-priced). The volume provided is then 
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negative, meaning that the ISO profits on the provision of the FTRs. When the selling 
price equals the price differential, the maximum volume sold is undefined. The 
formula demonstrates that by taking into account the selling price it is possible to 
issue a higher FTR volume. This is demonstrated for obligations between buses 1-2 
and a selling price equal to the half of the price differential as: 
 
12
2 1 12
26 45( ) (1.15 0.5 1.15)
f CRQ
P P p
= = ≈
− − − ⋅
                                     (9.32) 
 
This is an increase in volume of 100% from 22.5 units. Similarly, the maximum 
volumes of FTRs between buses 1-2 and 1-3 are described by: 
 
12 2 1 12 13 3 1 13( ) ( )f f CQ P P p Q P P p R− − + − − =                           (9.33) 
 
where Qf is the volume of FTRs. After rearranging the volume of FTRs 1-2 as a 
function of FTRs between 1 and 3, and assuming that the selling price is equal to the 
half of the price differential between buses 1-2 this is: 
 
13 3 1 13
12 13
2 1 12 2 1 12
( ) 45 0.5 .( ) ( )
f
f fCR Q P P pQ Q
P P p P P p
− −
= − = −
− − − −
                                   (9.34)   
 
The expansion of the feasible space of FTRs is illustrated in Figure 9-7. These 
examples show that a higher volume of FTRs can be issued by taking into account the 
selling price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9-7. The feasible space of FTRs 1-2 and 1-3 taking into account the proceeds 
from the FTR auction. 
 
Next, we assume that the FTR price is linearly dependent on the volume issued: 
 
f
ij ijp a bQ= −                                                                                                 (9.35) 
 
where a and b are parameters that characterize the demand of FTRs. Substituting for 
the FTR price and solving for fijQ  gives: 
 
1-2 
1-3 
22.5
45 
45 
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Consider the special case j iP P a− = . The maximum willingness to pay equals the 
price differential. Then /fij CQ R b=  and may be more restrictive (depending on b) 
than when the price ijp  was considered to be independent of the volume issued. The 
exact condition when this holds true, is found by comparing the calculated volume 
with the price independent of volume (e.g. Equation (9.31)): 
 
 
2( )
/( ) .ijC C ij
C
a pR R a p b
b R
−
≥ − ⇒ ≤                                                                     (9.37) 
 
The key issue of the revenue adequacy test is to ensure that the implied power 
flows from an FTR do not exceed the transmission capacities. Due to the equivalence 
between this test and the formula for the feasible volume provided, it might be 
possible to modify the feasible FTR volume formulation for obligations: 
 
( ) , 1 ,
F
mn ij f
ijmn mn ij
mn C
p C
H Q C i j N
R
− ≤ ≤ ≤∑                                             (9.38) 
 
where pmn is the price of an FTR from bus m to bus n. To use this feasibility test in 
practice we first run the optimal power flow model to calculate RC for the network 
considered and then use the value found in the above formula. 
9.7 Uncertainty 
Until now, we have calculated the consequences of the FTR provision under 
deterministic conditions. Now we will introduce uncertainty by using the scenarios in 
Table 9-5, where we have calculated the expected bus price and the associated 
volatility. Bus 3 experiences the highest expected value and volatility. 137 
 
Table 9-5. The expected bus prices in three different scenarios. 
 
Scenarios/ 
Probability 
Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 
No congestion (NC) 
50% 
15.32 15.32 15.32 
Congestion line 1-2 
(C12) 30% 
14.78 15.93 15.36 
Congestion line 1-3 
(C13) 20% 
14.33 15.41 16.49 
Expected price 14.96 15.52 15.57 
Volatility 0.39 0.27 0.46 
 
 
 
                                               
137
 A measure of the uncertainty of the return on asset. 
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Table 9-6. The maximum volume of FTRs when only one FTR is issued under three 
different scenarios. 
 
Scenarios/ 
probability 
FTR 1-2 FTR 1-3 FTR 2-3 FTR 3-2 
NC 50% 22.5 45 45 45 
C12 30% 22.5 45 45 45 
C13 20% 45 22.5 45 45 
Expected 
volume 
27 40.5 45 45 
 
Table 9-6 shows the maximum volume of provided FTRs when only one FTR is 
issued under three different scenarios. The highest volume is issued between buses 2-
3 (because of a lower price differential) and the lowest volume between buses 1-2 (a 
higher price differential).  
 
An FTR provider facing uncertainty may use tools to measure the associated risks. 
One tool is the Value at Risk (VaR) approach. VaR is an attempt to provide a single 
number for management summarizing the total risk in a portfolio of assets (Hull, 
2003). The objective of the approach is to give a financial measure of the statement: 
”We are X% certain that we will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days.” The 
variable V is the VaR of the portfolio. It is usual to assume a confidence interval of 
95%, and a time horizon of up to one week. The changes in the asset prices are 
assumed to have a multivariate distribution138 and a mean of zero (at least 
approximately). Mathematically a linear model for the change in the daily value, ∆P, 
of a portfolio of N assets with an amount (or fraction) xi invested in asset i and with a 
daily return of ir∆ is formulated as: 
 
1
N
i i
i
P x r
=
∆ = ∆∑                                                                          (9.39) 
            
Only the mean and standard deviation of ∆P is necessary to calculate the VaR. To 
calculate the standard deviation of ∆P, we define iσ  as the daily volatility of the ith 
asset and ijρ  as the correlation coefficient between the returns on the asset i and j. The 
standard deviation is given by:  
 
∑∑
= =
=
N
i
N
j
jijiijP xx
1 1
2 σσρσ                                                                        (9.40) 
 
The standard deviation of the change over N days is NPσ  and the 95% VaR for 
an N-day time horizon is NPσ⋅65.1 . 
 
 
 
 
                                               
138To facilitate calculations it is assumed normal distributions. A new measure is conditional 
value at risk (CVaR) which is based on expectation of loss rather than the probability of it, and 
which does not require that the distribution is symmetric. 
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Table 9-7. Payments per unit to the FTR holders and total congestion rent under the 
different scenarios. 
 
FTR per unit 
payment 
FTR 1-2 FTR 1-3 FTR 2-3 Congestion 
rent 
NC 50% 0 0 0 0 
C12 30% 1.15 0.58 -0.57 26 
C13 20% 1.08 2.16 1.08 48.7 
Expected 
payment 
0.56 0.61 0.04 17.5 
Volatility 0.56 0.82 0.57 19.2 
 
Table 9-7 shows the payments per unit to the FTR holders and the total congestion 
rent under the different scenarios. FTRs between buses 1-3 are particular volatile. The 
congestion rent is highly volatile and with an expected revenue of 17.5 to the ISO. In 
Table 9-8 we calculated the payments of the FTR provider to FTR holders and VaR 
(excluding the congestion rent) under the provision of FTRs of 22.5 units between 
each of the buses (one at a time) 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3. The provider has the greatest risk 
exposure when it issues FTRs between buses 1-3 because the expected payments are 
highest in this case. The lowest payments are for FTRs between 2-3 due to 
counterflows that create a revenue to the provider in scenario C13. 
 
Table 9-8. The payments of the FTR provider and VaR under the provision of 22.5 
units FTRs between each of the buses 1-2, 1-3 and 2-3. 
 
FTR Payments Volatility of 
payments 
VaR 
1-2 12.6 0.56 11.67 
1-3 13.7 0.82 18.49 
2-3 0.9 0.57 0.85 
 
Table 9-9 shows the expected price differential correlation matrix with congestion 
under the different scenarios. The price differentials 1-2/2-3 exhibit low correlation 
(almost zero), while the price differentials 1-2/1-3 and 1-3/2-3 have a higher 
correlation. 
 
Table 9-9. Expected price differential correlation matrix with congestion under 
different scenarios. 
 
Correlation 
matrix 
1-2 1-3 2-3 
1-2 1.00    0.71   0.04 
1-3 0.71    1.00   0.73 
2-3 0.04    0.73   1.00 
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Table 9-10. VaR estimate of payments at 95% confidence level under different 
scenarios. 
 
Condition VaR 
Congestion with 1-2 (11.25 units)  5.83 
Congestion with 1-3 (11.25 units) 9.25 
Congestion with 2-3 (11.25 units) 0.43 
Congestion with 1-2 (11.25 units) 
and 1-3 FTRs (22.5 units) 
23.05 
Congestion with 1-2 (11.25 units) 
and 2-3 FTRs (22.5 units) 
5.93 
Congestion with 1-2 (45 units) and 
2-3 FTRs (45 units) 
23.62 
 
Table 9-10 shows the VaR estimate of payments at 95% confidence level under 
different provision scenarios without taking into account the auction proceeds. When 
a single FTR is issued the VaR is highest for 1-3 FTRs and lowest for 2-3 FTRs. The 
results demonstrate that the greater potential losses are realized when 1-2 and 1-3 
FTRs are issued (compared to identical volumes of 1-2 and 2-3 FTRs) because the 
payments of the provider to FTR holders are relatively high. Conversely, an identical 
combination of FTRs between buses 1-2 and 2-3 has a much lower VaR and it is 
possible to issue a higher volume at the same VaR. 
  
Table 9-11 and Table 9-12 show similar results when the auction proceeds are 
taken into account and assuming that FTR selling prices equal to the half of the price 
differential. However, because the payments are lower due to the auction proceeds 
from the FTRs, the VaR will be lower and so will the risk position of the provider. If 
the selling price is equal to the expected price differential the VaR will be zero. Its 
risk will completely offset by the revenue from selling FTRs.  
 
Table 9-11. The net positions of the provider under the provision of 22.5 units FTRs 
between each of the buses 1-2, 1-3 and 2-3, assuming selling prices equal to the half 
of the price differential. 
 
FTR Auction 
proceeds 
Payments Position Volatility of 
payments 
VaR 
1-2 6.3 12.6 6.3 0.56 5.84 
1-3 6.85 13.7 6.85 0.82 9.25 
2-3 0.45 0.9 0.45 0.57 0.43 
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Table 9-12. VaR estimate of payments at 95% confidence level, assuming selling 
prices equal to the half of the price differential. 
 
Condition VaR 
Congestion with 1-2 (11.25 units)  2.92 
Congestion with 1-3 (11.25 units) 4.62 
Congestion with 2-3 (11.25 units) 0.21 
Congestion with 1-2 (11.25 units) 
and 1-3 FTRs (22.5 units) 
11.51 
 
Congestion with 1-2 (11.25 units) 
and 2-3 FTRs (22.5 units) 
2.96 
Congestion with 1-2 (45 units) and 
2-3 FTRs (45 units) 
11.74 
 
9.8 Providers of financial transmission rights 
When a private party provides FTRs, it does not have to fulfill the SFT. If the 
private party can buy insurance in the market, it can over-sell FTRs compared to the 
ISO that issues FTRs satisfying the SFT. It may also charge a higher price if it is the 
only one providing FTRs. But, the private party does not receive any rents from 
transmission congestion (i.e. congestion rents), so in the long-run it must at least price 
its FTRs to cover the payments to the rights holders.  
 
Third parties may be able to run the market for hedging instruments at lower cost 
than the ISO. They could offer FTRs, for example, due to specialization and 
consequently greater expertise and/or economies of scale. Such financial instruments 
are a natural extension of the risk products of other industries and markets. A private 
party can hedge itself in the day-ahead or real-time locational price market of the ISO. 
For example, a generator in the position to produce valuable counterflows can safely 
sell private point-to-point FTRs as either options or obligations up to its expected 
generation capacity (assuming a radial line). These FTRs can be traded freely among 
traders whether or not those traders plan to schedule precisely the same point-to-point 
transactions, and they will have value because they are financial instruments that can 
be used for hedging. For real-time operations, the generator submits bids for its 
generation to the ISO. When counterflows are valuable so that the generator must pay 
out under the FTRs it provided, the local spot prices will be high and the generator 
will make money in the spot market. The traders holding the private issued FTRs will 
receive payments from the generator that will offset some or all of the congestion 
rents they must pay in the spot market.  
9.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated the key issues associated with the provision of FTR 
obligations and options. In particular, the ISO must conduct an analysis of revenue 
adequacy, because the maximum volume of FTRs (both obligations and options) will 
vary with the capacities and contingencies. In a three-bus network, the maximum 
volume associated with an issue of a single FTR is determined by the shift factor 
matrix elements and transmission line capacities. It has also shown the alternative 
relationship for the maximum volume, congestion rent and locational prices. Due to 
counterflows a higher volume of FTRs might be issued between certain buses. 
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Conversely, a lower volume of options than obligations must be issued because they 
do not create counterflows. This work has also taken into account the proceeds from 
the FTR auction and demonstrated that a higher volume might be issued. Uncertainty 
associated with congestion gave the ISO an uncertain cash flow, composed of the 
congestion rent and payments to the FTR holders. As a tool for risk management any 
provider could utilize the VaR approach. The VaR shows that the greatest potential 
loss occurs when FTRs with the highest expected payments are issued and the lowest 
when FTRs with the lowest expected payments are issued. Private parties would not 
have to fulfill the simultaneous feasibility test and might buy insurance in the market 
to hedge any risks associated with providing FTRs. 
 
Appendix 
 
This appendix derives the shift factor matrix elements (or PTDFs) for the three-bus 
network with identical lines. The net injection (or net generation) of power at each bus 
is given by Pi. The following relationship between the net injection, the power flows 
Pij and phase angles θi is: 
 
)(1 ji
j j ij
iji
x
PP θθ −== ∑ ∑
                                                                                   
(9.41) 
 
where ijx is the line inductive reactance in per unit. Furthermore, we can write power 
flow equations as: 
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(9.42) 
 
The matrix is called the susceptance matrix. The matrix is singular, but by 
declaring one of the buses to have a phase angle of zero and eliminating its row and 
column from the matrix, the reactance matrix can be obtained by inversion.  The 
resulting equation then gives the bus angles as a function of the bus injection:  
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(9.43) 
 
The shift factor matrix element is the fraction of the amount of a transaction from 
one bus to another that flows over a given line. Hijmn is the fraction of a transaction 
from bus m to bus n that flows over a transmission line connecting bus i and bus j. 
The equation for the H is: 
 
im jm in jn
ijmn
ij
x x x x
H
x
− − +
=
                                                                                       
(9.44) 
 
where xij is the reactance of the transmission line connecting bus i and bus j and xim is 
the entry in the ith row and the mth column of the bus reactance matrix. For example 
we find the following elements of H: 
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1212 2 / 3H = , 1213 1/ 3H = , 1223 1/ 3H = − , 
1313 2 / 3H = , 1323 1/ 3H = , 1312 1/ 3H =  
3232 2 / 3H = , 3213 1/ 3H = − , 3212 1/ 3H =  
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10 Effect of losses on area prices in the Norwegian electricity market 
This chapter contributes to the understanding of how bus and area prices are 
affected by losses and congestion. Recent papers have described area pricing to 
include bus prices that are equal within in a price area or zone. According to present 
Norwegian practice, the bus prices within a price area differ by an amount that is due 
to losses. We use a full AC optimal power flow model to illustrate this. Moreover, it is 
demonstrated that the combined effect of transmission congestion and losses may 
yield a substantial change in individual bus and area prices compared with a situation 
with no congestion or losses. 
10.1 Introduction 
This work assesses the simultaneous effects of transmission congestion and losses 
on the bus prices in an electricity market. A model for calculating area prices in the 
Norwegian market was developed in Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001). The authors used a 
linear DC model (assuming no losses) and modeled area pricing by requiring that all 
bus prices within a price area should equal. This does not reflect current practice in 
Norway. The nodal (or bus) prices differ by an amount that is due to losses. 
Furthermore, the grouping of buses belonging to the same area depends on both 
transmission congestion and losses. In this chapter we use MATPOWER 
(Zimmerman and Gan, 1997) and (Kristiansen, 2003b) to calculate the impact of 
losses on the bus and area prices and demonstrate that ignoring losses may lead to 
incorrect area prices and inefficient utilization of scarce transmission resources. 
10.2 Background 
 
The deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market started with the Energy Act 
in June 1990 and was effective from January 1991. Competition in generation and 
sales of electricity was introduced together with separation of distribution and 
transmission services. Electricity is traded at Nord Pool or bilaterally, while 
transmission services are provided by the main transmission system operator 
(Statnett) and is a regulated natural monopoly. Statnett defines geographical price 
areas within Norway based on predicted generation, load and transmission capacity. 
The price areas are used in the day-ahead market when transmission congestion is 
present. Statnett manages intra-area transmission congestion by purchasing 
(increasing generation or load) and selling (decreasing generation or load) electricity 
in the real-time market. For a further introduction to the Norwegian and Nordic 
electricity markets, the reader is referred to Nord Pool (2002a, 2002b and 2002c). 
 
The Norwegian transmission tariff for the central grid consists of both a variable 
and a residual term (Statnett, 2003). The purpose of the variable term is to contribute 
to optimum operation of the system. However, it might also have some impact on 
investment decisions. The residual term should have no (or minimal) impact on 
operation. The main purpose is to cover the residual cost without affecting operational 
decisions. The variable term in the tariff covers only 10-20% of the total grid costs. 
The remaining cost (80-90%) must be covered by the residual term.  
 
The variable term consists of both an energy charge associated with losses and a 
capacity or congestion fee associated with transmission congestion. The energy 
charge is based on marginal loss factors for every bus, while the capacity fee is 
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calculated as the difference between the area price and System Price (the 
unconstrained price for the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish power markets).  
 
The objective of the energy charge is to promote efficient utilization of the central 
grid. Furthermore, it should reflect the marginal losses in the power system caused by 
the players, and give incentives for adjustments in the short and long-run.   
 
At buses where there are both injections and withdrawals, marginal loss factors are 
symmetric. Currently there are 168 exchange points in the grid. The marginal loss 
factor is limited to ±10% and calculated six times annually (each factor has a duration 
of 8-20 weeks) and is differentiated between day and night (including weekends).  
 
The energy charge is calculated by multiplying the marginal loss factor in every 
injection or withdrawal point and the System Price. Therefore it represents the 
marginal costs associated with losses. 
 
Injections or withdrawals that have a relieving impact on the central grid contribute 
to a reduction of the losses. In such cases the marginal loss factor is negative and 
therefore the energy charge is negative. The user is then paid for injections or 
withdrawals. In regions with a high generation surplus there will be a relatively high 
positive marginal loss factor for injections and a corresponding negative marginal loss 
factor for withdrawals. 
 
Area pricing entails that several buses are grouped together and the price 
differentials between different areas are calculated by simplified models. In some 
versions of area pricing, the area prices are calculated by requiring that buses within 
the same area should have identical prices that equal the area price. However, this is 
not the case with area pricing in Norway. Here, the bus prices differ from the area 
price by an amount that is due to losses as illustrated by the formula:   
 
   · (1 )        i i ip AP ml= +                                                                                (10.1) 
 
where pi, APi, and mli are the bus price, area price, and marginal loss factor 
respectively. The marginal loss factor may be negative or positive. 
10.3 Methodology 
The Norwegian network is meshed and therefore a 3-bus network is used in our 
model simulations. As mentioned some zonal price models calculate the zonal prices 
by including a constraint that requires all bus prices within a zone to be equal. 
However, area pricing does not work like this in Norway and therefore an AC optimal 
power flow (OPF) is used to study the joint impact of losses and congestion on area 
prices. 
 
We first run a simulation for the entire 3-bus network with a transmission 
constraint on one line. At every bus there is either load or generation. The resulting 
prices will reflect the marginal costs of the generators that are not at their minimum or 
maximum output or the marginal benefit to load. The price at the swing bus will 
reflect its marginal cost. The other bus prices will differ because of transmission 
congestion and losses. As a benchmark a DC OPF is run and it demonstrates that the 
joint interaction of transmission congestion and losses have substantial impact. 
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In order to model area prices the network is divided in two areas and the exchange 
of power between the areas is modeled by introducing dummy buses with generation 
or load that represents export/import of power to the areas. In each area there is a 
swing bus that will reflect the marginal cost at that location. Bus prices within each 
area will differ because of losses. The price difference between the areas will equal 
the difference in the marginal costs of the swing buses. 
 
Figure 10-1 shows a 6-bus transmission network and two potential area divisions. 
The black arrow indicates a transmission constraint on line 1-4. This constraint will 
have different impacts on the bus prices in the two respective areas when it is binding. 
For example, the bus 6 price may be totally different when a DC or an AC OPF is run. 
The change depends on the per unit magnitude of resistance relative to reactance. 
Moreover, running a DC and an AC OPF may therefore result in different bus prices 
and any criterion based on grouping buses with similar bus prices into an area may 
lead to inefficiencies. How to analytically determine the grouping of buses in areas 
that give maximum social welfare is still an unresolved problem (Bjørndal and 
Jørnsten, 2001). The joint interaction of losses and transmission congestion must be 
taken into account as will be demonstrated, because bus prices may be different in the 
DC and AC cases. It may also lead to wrong incentives to electricity market players 
both in the short and long-run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10-1. Illustration of the transmission network with a transmission constraint on 
line 1-4. 
10.4 MATPOWER optimization 
In order to calculate the impacts of losses, MATPOWER was used to calculate the 
bus prices. The cost data are given in Table 10-1 where the cost functions are of type 
2
ic P  and P is generation output. In MATPOWER it is only possible to specify 
inelastic load data and we fixed the net loads as shown in Table 10-1. The focus is on 
the real or active power flows and net loads because there is no market for reactive 
32
6
41
5
Area 2Area 1
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power. In calculating the area prices, Equation (10.1) is not considered explicitly as a 
constraint in the model formulation. However, losses will be considered because an 
AC OPF is run.  
 
Assume that transmission capacity is constrained on line 1-2 with 27 MW 
(including both active and reactive power flows) in the network in Figure 10-2. An 
AC OPF was run for the system in Figure 10-2 with resistance 0.001 per unit and 
reactance 1 per unit. For the bus 3 with net load, zero active generation was forced by 
setting the upper generation capacity equal to zero. Buses 1 and 2 with net generation 
did not have any binding constraints on generation capacities. The results for the 
entire transmission network consisting of areas 1 and 2 are shown in Table 10-2. 
Likewise, a DC OPF was run to make a comparison of the effects of losses on the bus 
prices. The results are shown in Table 10-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10-2. Illustration of the transmission network with a transmission constraint on 
line 1-2. The real power flows between the two areas 1 and 2 are indicated. 
 
There are differences in bus prices when we compare the AC and DC OPF results. 
For example the bus 2 price increased with 0.98 $/MWh when ignoring losses. 
Likewise bus price 3 increased with 5.08 $/MWh. 
 
Additionally, we observe the joint interaction between transmission congestion and 
losses in the transmission network. The two adjacent buses 1 and 2 have a price 
differential of approximately 28.8 $/MWh. Similar results are obtained for buses 2 
and 3 (-14.2 $/MWh). Likewise, the 1 and 3 bus price difference is around 14.6 
$/MWh.  
Table 10-1. Parameters for cost functions and fixed load. 
 
Generation Bus Fixed load 
 ci 
1 0 0.1 
2 0 0.5 
3 200 0 
 
2
1
26.99 
115.71 
Area 2 Area 1 
Low marginal 
cost gen. 
High marginal 
cost gen. 
3 
Fixed load 
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Table 10-2. AC OPF results with fixed load. 
 
Bus Bus prices 
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
1 28.540 0 142.7 1-2 26.99 
2 57.371 0 57.37 1-3    115.71 
3 43.139 200 0 2-3 84.36 
Losses 
(MW) 
0.07     
 
Table 10-3. DC OPF results with fixed load. 
 
Bus Bus prices 
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
1 28.330 0 141.65 1-2 26.95 
2 58.351 0 58.35 1-3     114.70 
3 48.224 200 0 2-3 85.30 
Losses 
(MW) 
0     
 
10.4.1 Case 1 
To study the effects of losses and transmission congestion on area prices the 
system was divided in two: area 1 including bus 1, and area 2 including buses 2 and 3. 
The two lines 1-2 and 1-3 connecting these areas have 26.99 MW (real power) of flow 
from bus 1 to bus 2 (this is the constrained line) and 115.71 MW of flow from bus 1 
to bus 3. One simulation was run for each area. For area 1 two dummy buses were 
introduced: one with a load of 26.99 MW (equals the power flow from bus 1 to bus 2) 
and another with a load of 115.71 MW (equals the power flow from bus 1 to bus 3). 
Similarly, for area 2 a dummy bus was introduced with generation of 115.71 MW and 
a dummy bus with generation of 26.99 MW. The two areas are illustrated in Figure 
10-2.  
 
The simulation results are shown in Table 10-4 and Table 10-5. The reactive power 
flows are shown in Table 10-10 in the appendix. The same simulations are shown for 
the DC case in Table 10-6 and Table 10-7. We observe that the power flows are 
almost identical to those of the original transmission network. In area 1 the bus price 
is around 32.9 $/MWh. The bus prices in area 2 are around 57.3 $/MWh. The bus 
prices in the original transmission network, however, ranged from 28.5 to 57.4 
$/MWh. For area 1, the change in price at bus 1 is 4.4 $/MWh. Even more remarkable 
is the change in bus prices in area 2 from 43.1-57.4 $/MWh to around 57.3 $/MWh. 
The reason for these changes is that the generator at bus 1 in area 1  is the 
“incremental“ generator with a marginal cost of 1 12 =32.89 $ / MWh .c P⋅ ⋅  Likewise, 
the marginal cost of the generator at bus 2 which is the “incremental” generator is 
2 22 57.32 $ / MWh.c P⋅ ⋅ =  Within area 2 bus prices differ due to losses. We also 
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observe that the area prices in the AC case differ from those of the DC case. In area 1 
the price is approximately 32.9 $/MWh and 28.3 $/MWh in the AC and DC cases 
respectively. Likewise, the area price in area 2 is approximately 57.3 $/MWh and 58.4 
$/MWh in the AC and DC cases respectively. Hence, we see that we can get different 
area prices depending on whether a DC or an AC OPF is used. 
 
Table 10-4. AC OPF results case 1 for area 1. 
 
Bus Bus prices 
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
1 32.891 0 164.46 1-2 26.99 
Losses 
(MW) 
0.02   1-3 137.47 
 
Table 10-5. AC OPF results case 1 for area 2. 
 
Bus Bus prices 
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
2 57.318 0 57.32 2-3 84.31 
3 57.326 200 0 1-2      26.99 
Losses 
(MW) 
0.02   1-3   115.70 
 
Table 10-6. DC OPF results case 1 for area 1. 
 
Bus Bus prices 
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
1 28.33 0 141.65 1-2 26.95 
Losses 
(MW) 
0   1-3   114.70 
 
Table 10-7. DC OPF results case 1 for area 2. 
 
Bus Bus prices 
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
2 58.35 0 58.35 2-3 85.30 
3 58.35 200 0 1-2 26.95 
Losses 
(MW) 
0.0   1-3  114.70 
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10.4.2 Case 2 
We made another price area division to study the effects of area pricing as 
illustrated in Figure 10-3. The optimal power flow results are shown in Table 10-8 
and Table 10-9. The reactive power flows are shown in Table 10-11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10-3. Illustration of the transmission network with a transmission constraint on 
line 1-2. The real power flows between the two areas 1 and 2 are indicated. 
 
Table 10-8. AC OPF results case 2 for area 1. 
 
Bus Bus prices  
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
1 28.530 0 142.65 1-2  26.99 
3 28.535 200 0 1-3 115.66 
Losses 
(MW) 
0.02   2-3 84.35 
 
Table 10-9. AC OPF results case 2 for area 2. 
 
Bus Bus prices  
$/MWh 
Load 
MW 
Generation 
MW 
Flow MW 
2 57.377 0 57.38 1-2 26.99 
Losses 
(MW) 
0.01   2-3 84.37 
 
Under this area division bus 1 changed price from 32.9 $/MWh to 28.5 $/MWh. 
Likewise bus 2 price changed from 57.3 to 57.4 $/MWh. However, the bus 3 price 
decreased from 57.3 to 28.5 $/MWh. 
3
2
1
26.99
84.36
Area 2
Area 1
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10.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that taking into account the joint interaction of 
losses and transmission congestion may have significant impacts on the individual bus 
prices. The numerical results illustrate that the bus prices differ due to both 
transmission congestion and losses when there is a transmission constraint binding in 
the full transmission network. Moreover, running a DC and an AC OPF may have 
different impacts on the bus prices. The current practice for area pricing in Norway 
was illustrated and described. Numerical results illustrate that area prices may change 
substantially after regrouping the buses in different price areas or when using a DC 
OPF rather than an AC OPF. 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 10-10. AC OPF reactive power flow results case 1 for the total network (TN), 
area 1 (A1) and area 2 (A2). 
Flow (TN) 
MW 
(A1) 
MW 
(A2) 
MW 
1-2    0.84  0.60  
1-3 -140.65 15.82  
2-3 -144.04  17.58 
 
Table 10-11. AC OPF reactive power flow results case 2 for the total network (TN), 
area 1 (A1) and area 2 (A2) 
Flow (TN) 
MW 
(A1) 
MW 
(A2) 
MW 
1-2    0.84  0.66 -0.60 
1-3 -140.65  17.33  
2-3 -144.04  6.03 5.91 
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11 Financial risk management in the electric power industry  
This chapter describes a risk management tool for hydropower generators and its 
application to Norway’s second-largest generation company and largest electricity 
consumer, Norsk Hydro ASA.  The tool considers both operations scheduling and the 
utilization of financial contracts for risk management. Financial risks are accounted 
for by penalizing incomes below a reference income. The risk management problem is 
solved by a combination of stochastic dual dynamic programming and stochastic 
dynamic programming. Simulations demonstrate that lower income scenarios improve 
when risk aversion is introduced. 
11.1 Introduction 
 Deregulation of the Nordic power market has increased price uncertainty, and 
therefore stimulated a demand for risk management tools. Each generation company 
schedules by using self-dispatch at the power exchange (Nord Pool). Based on 
aggregate bids for purchases and sales, Nord Pool calculates the market clearing price 
for the spot market. The spot price is the reference price for the financial contract 
market. Nord Pool facilitates the trade of a wide range of contracts as futures, 
forwards, options, and Contracts for Differences (spatial risk hedging instruments). In 
the over-the-counter (OTC) market, bilateral contracts are traded. These may be 
forward contracts, options, or load factor contracts. System coordination, monitoring 
and operation of the Norwegian transmission network are the responsibility of the 
transmission system operator (Statnett). The Norwegian power market consists of 
99% hydropower with its associated uncertainty in inflows. Therefore stochastic 
optimization tools are utilized for long-term generation planning Fosso et al. (1999). 
The objective of these models is to find the optimal first-stage decision and simulate 
(forecast) optimal operation and income for the future. The most important risks that 
the Norwegian hydropower generators face are price uncertainty and quantity risks 
caused by uncertainty in inflows and demand. Risk management of both uncertainties 
is complex. Local area prices depend strongly on the precipitation and usually 
correlate with the local generation. There is also a correlation between the 
precipitation and temperature such that wet winters are warmer than normal. 
Hydropower generators with large reservoirs dominate the Nordic market resulting in 
a sequential dependence in spot price. All of these correlations must be managed by 
using an appropriate risk management tool. A model for integrated risk management 
of hydropower scheduling and contract management in a stochastic dynamic 
optimization framework has been developed by Mo et al. (2001a) and Mo and 
Gjelsvik (2001). Their model includes the possibility for future trading and use of 
reservoirs and futures contracts as risk management tools. The model’s objective is to 
utilize a time separable utility function to characterize the risk attitude of the 
company. The solution methodology is a combination of stochastic dual dynamic 
programming (SDDP) (Pereira, 1989) and stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) 
(Gjelsvik et al., 1999).  
 
The latest version of the model accounts for the modeling of the spot price 
extremes and the long-term uncertainty of futures prices. As mentioned in Gjelsvik et 
al. (1999) it suggests less trading when dynamic hedging139 is allowed. The test results 
                                               
139
 Dynamic hedging is a strategy that involves rebalancing hedge positions as market 
conditions change. 
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also demonstrated that the reservoir discharge strategy depends upon the company’s 
utility function. An increased penalty term gives a more risk-averse operation of the 
reservoir. The tests showed that it is possible to reduce the risk considerably without 
reducing the expected income to the same extent. It implies that the income optimum 
is relatively flat. Gjelsvik et al. (1999) demonstrated that the results are highly 
sensitive to the internal price model used in the optimization. This resulted in the 
development of the price model described in Mo et al. (2001b). This chapter describes 
the testing of the improved model on the power system of Norway’s second-largest 
generation company. 
11.2 The model 
The model has been developed by Mo et al. (2001a) and is an extension of an 
existing tool for medium-term hydropower scheduling described in Gjelsvik et al. 
(1999), where new state variables are introduced to account for future trading. An 
overview of the model is presented in this section. The objective in the new model is 
to maximize the sum of net income from trading in the futures market, sales in the 
spot market and the value of the water at the end of the planning period, minus 
penalty terms for failing to fulfill income requirements. The penalty terms penalize 
progressively for incomes below a user-specified limit at the end of the period. The 
planning period is usually two or three years with a time resolution of one week. The 
spot price and inflow are assumed to be known at the beginning of the week. 
Generation, trading of standardized futures contracts and withdrawal of load factor 
contracts are decided in the beginning of the weeks.140 In Nord Pool the contracts are 
traded in one-week lots for the first 4-7 weeks.141 After this contracts are traded in 4-
week blocks and beyond one year in seasons. The market features are implemented in 
the model and the time resolution is dynamic, so that blocks are resolved into weeks 
and seasons are resolved into blocks as time passes, as in the actual market. Future 
contracts are delivered at a flat MW rate. The important calculated values are: 
• Generation schedules and marginal water values for each reservoir. 
• Trading schedules and marginal contract values for each standardized future 
contract (traded at Nord Pool). 
• Income forecasts that include a realistic measure of future uncertainty. 
 
Model definitions include: 
period:    the basic time step is one week so that a period may be one or more weeks 
planning period:   time from now up to the planning horizon (usually 2 to 3 years) 
        used in the model 
income period:     the period used for measuring income, usually annually 
k week in the planning period 
t week in the futures market (contract period), t > k 
N number of weeks in the planning period 
EP,v expectation operator applied to the distributions of price (P) and inflow (v) 
Sp(k) energy exchanged at spot market price in week k (GWh) 
P(k) average spot price in week k (NOK/MWh) 
Nprof number of income periods 
Pst(J) first week in income period J 
                                               
140
 The state variables describing reservoir levels, position in the futures market and 
accumulated income are referred to the beginning of the week. 
141
 This is referring to the financial market structure existing until fall 2003. 
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Psl(J) last week in income period J 
I(k,J) accumulated income for income period J in week  k (NOK) 
Pen() penalty function for failing to fulfill the income  
 requirements 
R(x(N) value of water remaining in week N (NOK),  
 estimate obtained from long-term scheduling 
S(k,t) sales committed in week k for future week t (GWh) 
K(k,t) purchase committed in week k for future week t (GWh) 
B(k,t) accumulated balance (sum of commitments) in week k for future week t  
           (GWh) 
pf(k,t) contract price in week k for delivery in future week t (NOK/MWh) 
∆p transaction costs (NOK/MWh) 
x(k) vector of reservoir levels in week k (Mm3) 
xmax(k) vector of maximum reservoir levels in week k (Mm3) 
xmin(k) vector of minimum reservoir levels in week k (Mm3) 
u(k) vector of discharges in week k (Mm3) 
umax(k) vector of maximum discharges in week k (Mm3) 
umin(k) vector of minimum discharges in week k (Mm3) 
C  matrix describing the system topology 
G() conversion function from discharge vector to generation (GWh) 
v(k) vector of inflows for week k (Mm3) 
vn(k)  normalized inflow vector in week k 
( )v kσ  standard deviation of inflow week k 
( )v kµ  expected inflow in week k 
( )v kε  noise-term which is normally distributed N(0,Ω) where Ω  is the covariance of  
the noise-term 
 A inflow matrix containing correlation in inflow between week k and k+1 
 
The objective function is: 
 
{ 1,
1 1 1
1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( , )( ( , ) )
( , )( ( , ) ) ( ), )) ( ( ))
prof
N N N
P v
k k t k
NN N
sl
k t k J=1
Max E Sp k P k K k t pf k t p
S k t pf k t p Pen(I(P J J R x N
−
= = = +
−
= = +
− + ∆

+ − ∆ − + 

∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑
                            (11.1)                                                                                                  
 
The water balance, reservoir and discharge constraints are: 
 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1,..,x k x k Cu k v k k N+ = − + =                                                           (11.2)                                                                  
min max( ) ( ) ( ) 1,..,x k x k x k k N≤ ≤ =                                                                     (11.3)                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
min max( ) ( ) ( ) 1,..,u k u k u k k N≤ ≤ =                                                                    (11.4)                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
The contract balance for any future week t is updated for every week in the planning 
period k: 
 
( 1, ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1,.., 1B k t B k t K k t S k t k t+ = + − = −                                             (11.5)                                                                                                                                
 
The spot market balance equals: 
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( ) ( ( )) ( , ) 1,..,Sp k G u k B k k k N= + =                                                                (11.6)                    
 
Accumulated income caused by trading in the futures market (accounted as physical 
contracts) and income due to trading in the spot market are given by: 
 
(
( )
( ( ), 1)
( )
( ( ), 1)
( 1, ) ( , ) ( , )( ( , ) )
( , ) ( ( , ) ) 1,..,
sl
st
sl
st
P J
t max P J k
P J
t max P J k
I k J I k J S k t pf k t p
K k t pf k t p k N
= +
= +
+ = + − ∆
− + ∆ =
∑
∑
                                           (11.7)     
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) if ( ) ( )
st slI k J I k J Sp k P k P J k P J= + ≤ ≤                                                                                                        
 
The initial contract portfolio gives B(0,t) and I(0,J) for all t and J. Each load factor 
contract is modeled as a reservoir with a given initial energy amount and a power 
station efficiency of 1.0 and an upper MW rate. Equations (11.2) and (11.4) therefore 
apply. The inflow is zero except for the time of initialization or renewal. The model 
suggests the optimal use of existing load factor contracts, but does not give any 
decision support whether or not to enter into new load factor contracts. Accounting of 
futures contracts are as for physical contracts and affects which income states that are 
updated when trading occurs in week k for future week t. 
 
The penalty function describes the company’s risk attitude and corresponds to a 
utility function. It is illustrated in Figure 11-1. Incomes below a reference income (the 
company’s income target) in each income period are penalized in the objective 
function by subtracting a penalty cost. The cost is zero for incomes above the 
reference income. The penalty function must be defined by a reference income and 
marginal penalty (i.e. the slope of the function) for all income periods and may differ 
from one income period to another. It may also have two or more segments as 
illustrated in Figure 11-1. If the penalty function is subtracted from the income, the 
result is a utility function demonstrating that the company is risk neutral for incomes 
above a certain level. The penalty function is assumed to be convex and must be 
specified and calibrated by the user of the model. In this work incomes below the 25 
percentile are penalized with different marginal penalties. Only two segments are 
included in the penalty function. 
 
Hydropower plants have an infinite horizon and therefore a function that values the 
water at the end of the planning period is needed. The function is constructed from an 
aggregated long-term model system and is a function of total storage. 
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Figure 11-1. Example penalty function and the associated utility function for a risk 
averse agent. 
11.2.1 Inflow model 
Uncertainty is taken into account by assuming stochastic future spot market prices 
and inflows to reservoirs. The inflows to the reservoirs are modeled as a multivariable 
first order autoregressive model. Input data are historical inflows. The model 
described in Røtting and Gjelsvik (1992) introduces additional state variables to 
Equations (11.1)-(11.7). With a weekly resolution there will usually be a certain 
autocorrelation in the inflow, ( ).nv k  A simple model describing this is the lag-one 
autoregressive process. A normalized inflow model is used: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v n vv k k v k kσ µ= +                                                                                   (11.8)                                                                                                                                                    
)1()()1( ++⋅=+ kkvAkv vnn ε                                                  (11.9) 
 
A is the auto-regression matrix, and )1( +kvε is a stochastic term that is uncorrelated 
from one week to the next. With no auto-correlation )1()1( +=+ kkv vn ε . This inflow 
model is easily handled by the SDDP algorithm. The elements of A and the 
distribution of )1( +kvε  must be determined from the observed inflows. To apply the 
SDDP algorithm, a set of discrete inflow values is used at each week resulting in a 
finite number of possible reservoir sequences. Inflow series for regulated and 
unregulated inflows are treated similarly. 
11.2.2 Price model 
A first order discrete Markov price model is simple and applicable in a stochastic 
optimization framework. The price in one time step depends on the price in the 
previous time step. However, the Markov price model does not always capture all of 
the statistical properties of the price scenarios. In some cases it is observed that the 
mean reverting properties of the Markov model are stronger than what is observed for 
simulated extreme prices.  
 
The general price model structure is shown in Figure 11-2. For every time step, 
there is a given number of price nodes, ( )iP k . Transition probabilities ( )ijp k are 
linking the price nodes where ( )ijp k  is the probability that the price is ( 1)jP k +  at 
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time step k+1 given that it was ( )iP k at time step k. A process identifies what prices 
belong to the same node and estimates the transition probabilities from Norsk Hydro’s 
statistical price forecast (see Mo et al., 2001b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11-2. Price model structure. 
 
An important assumption is that the price of the futures contract equals the 
expected spot price in the delivery week t conditioned on the spot price in trading 
week k: 
 
( , ) ( ( ) | ( )).pf k t E P t P k=                                                                                       (11.10)                                                                                                                                                     
 
Here it is assumed that the futures market gives an unbiased estimate of the expected 
future spot market prices. The spot price model is used to compute the conditional 
probability distribution of ( , ) ( ( ) | ( ))pf k t E P t P k=  and therefore the futures market 
price at decision time step k and future delivery week t.  
 
In the forward market, prices of contracts with delivery up to several years ahead 
vary from week to week. To incorporate this, the price model has been expanded with 
new nodes and transition probabilities that model the probability of shifts in futures 
prices (Mo et al., 2001b). The price nodes consist of the original nodes and new nodes 
calculated as the original ones plus/minus a price shift. The new transition 
probabilities are calculated by combining the original ones and the probability of a 
price shift. The price shift model is symmetric with expected value zero so that the 
expected price of the original price model is unchanged. The improved price model is 
similar to a multi-factor price model. 
11.3 Solution methodology 
The model formulation in Equations (11.1)-(11.7) is a stochastic dynamic 
optimization problem. The solution methodology is a combination of SDDP (Pereira, 
1989) and SDP (Gjelsvik et al. 1999) adapted to the model extensions. There is no 
reduction of the state space, and a power system with many reservoirs and load factor 
contracts will have a substantial computational time. 
 
A system state vector in week k is defined as: 
 
( ) ( ), ( , 1),.., ( , ), ( ,1),... ( , ), ( ) TT profz k x k B k k B k N I k I k N P k = +                            (11.11)                                                                                                                                            
P1(k)
P2(k)
P3(k)
P4(k)
P5(k)
P2(k+1)
P3(k+1)
P4(k+1)
P5(k+1)
p12(k)
p25(k)
p13(k)
k k+1
Financial risk management in the electric power industry                                        211 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
and a decision vector as: 
 
]( ) ( ), ( , 1),...., ( , ), ( , 1),... ( , ) TTy k u k S k k S k N K k k K k N= + +                               (11.12)                                                                   
 
With these definitions the objective is written as: 
 
{ },
1
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ))
N
P v k
k
Max E L z k y k R z N
=
+∑                                                                 (11.13)                                                                                                         
 
where ( ( ), ( ))kL z k y k  is the immediate return from stage k, including penalties 
represented by Equation (11.1). Assuming that transition probabilities at stage k are 
independent of the previous states z(k-1), z(k-2), ..., the problem can be solved by 
dynamic programming. The Bellman recursion equation is: 
 
{ }
, 1( ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( 1))k P v k kz k E Max L z k y k z kα α += + +                                              (11.14)                                                                                                   
 
and is solved subject to Equations (11.2), (11.5), and (11.7) which define z(k+1), and 
to other relevant constraints. 1( ( 1))k z kα + +  is the expected future return function from 
state z(k+1) to a feasible final state in the optimum manner. For the last interval we 
have the relationship ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))N z N R z N Pen z Nα = + . The objective function in 
Equation (11.1) contains nonlinear terms, making it non-convex. To utilize a 
hyperplane (cuts142) representation of the future income ( ( ))k z kα , 5-7 discrete price 
levels are used. The methodology is analogous to traditional stochastic dynamic 
programming with respect to price state. The solution algorithm is iterative. Each 
main iteration consists of a backward recursion using Equation (11.14) where the 
strategy is updated for all weeks in the planning period and a forward simulation 
based on the last operating strategy (described by hyperplanes). As in the SDDP 
method sampling in the tree of outcomes is essential. SDDP differs from SDP in that 
expected future incomes are represented by hyperplanes and not tables. 
 
At each time step one builds a strategy given by hyperplanes in the “z-space.” The 
hyperplanes are represented as constraints of the type: 
 
( )
( ) jRkTjRkk
j
k
Tj
kk
kz
kz
111
1
1
1
11
)1(
.....................
)1(
+++
+++
≤+−
≤+−
γµα
γµα
                                                                                  (11.15)                                                                                                    
 
where 11 1....
j jR
k kµ µ+ +  and 11 1....j jRk kγ γ+ +  denote the coefficients that define the R hyperplanes 
representing the expected future income function at the price point ( )jP k . Moreover, 
z(k+1) includes all state variables except price. The vector µ  is the mean dual 
variable of some of the constraints in the sub-problem of  (11.14) while γ  is the right-
hand side constant in the cuts. 
                                               
142
 A set of linear constraints. 
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A single-transition sub-problem of Equation (11.14) under the assumption of a 
hyperplane representation together with the cuts Equation (11.15) and the respective 
constraints in Equations (11.2), (11.5), and (11.7) constitute a standard linear 
programming problem (with associated dual variables), which is easily solvable and 
gives the expected income in week k based on the hyperplanes in week k+1. In the 
backward recursion an upper limit on the income is obtained. To solve the single-
transition sub-problem, a relaxation procedure is utilized. This is an effective strategy 
if relatively few constraints are binding at optimality. In the sub-problem )(kx  is 
known while )1( +kx  in the cuts (Equation (11.15)) and the bounds Equation (11.3) 
can be eliminated by using Equation (11.2) as described in Røtting and Gjelsvik 
(1992). Bounds on the reservoirs are seldom binding and may be relaxed. Also when 
many cuts are present most of them may be relaxed. Thus, the number of iterations in 
the relaxation procedure is relatively small. 
 
The forward simulation is performed for all inflow and price scenarios. Optimal 
weekly generation is determined from the single-transition sub-problem, given inflow 
and price. The expected future income is calculated from the last backward iteration. 
The objective function is: 
 
{ }
, 1Income( ) ( ( 1))P v kE Max k z kα ++ +                                                                     (11.16)                                                                                    
 
The forward simulation gives possible non-optimal solutions that are used to calculate 
an indicative lower limit on expected future incomes. The same scenarios are 
simulated but with different state values. A cut generated for one reservoir and price 
level may be used by the other scenarios at the same price level because of the 
Markov assumption. The model includes a heuristic based on observed inflows in the 
forward simulation.    
 
Convergence may be obtained when the absolute value of the difference between 
the upper and lower limit is comparable to the standard deviation of the upper limit. 
However, in practice a specified number of iterations are carried out.  
11.4 Lagrange multipliers and marginal market signals 
The marginal cost values determined from this model cannot be directly compared 
to the market price when penalty functions are active. Let the Lagrange multipliers 
associated with the contract balance (Equation (11.5)) and the accumulated income 
due to trading in the futures market (Equation (11.7)) be ( , )B k tΠ  and 
( , )I k JΠ respectively. For a sale of contracts ( , ) 0S k t > a necessary condition is: 
 
( , ) ( ( , ) )(1 ( , ))B Ik t pf k t p k JΠ ≤ − ∆ + Π                                                                 (11.17)                                                                                                                              
or 
( , ) ( , ) /(1 ( , ))B Ipf k t k t k J p≥ Π + Π + ∆                                                                  (11.18)                                                                                              
 
Similarly for a purchase of contracts ( , ) 0K k t > , a necessary condition is: 
  
( , ) ( , ) /(1 ( , ))B Ipf k t k t k J p≤ Π + Π − ∆                                                                  (11.19)                                                                                     
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( , )I k JΠ  is called the income penalty multiplier associated with week k in the 
planning period and J is the index of the income period that contains week t. 
 
    Associate λ with the spot market balance (Equation (11.6)). To sell in the spot 
market we must have: 
 
( ) /(1 ( , ))IP k k Jλ≥ + Π                                                                                         (11.20)                                               
 
In the case ( , ) 0I k JΠ =  we find the usual condition for sales in the spot market. 
When the market price is higher than the water value, sales are suggested. When 
( , ) 0I k JΠ > , the Lagrange multiplier associated with the spot market balance (λ) is 
modified such that risk adjusted water values are obtained. 
11.5 Test system description 
Norway’s second-largest power producer, Norsk Hydro ASA operates 21 power 
stations and has ownership in 25 others. The total installed capacity is 1740 MW; the 
average annual generation is 8.6 TWh (11.3 TWh in 2000). Figure 11-3 shows the 
respective annually generation in the main five watercourses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11-3. Norsk Hydro’s annual total power generation. 
 
Norsk Hydro’s fictive contract portfolio consists of a flat sales contract with a 
volume of 8.76 TWh/year and a price of 21.49 EUR/MWh, and three load factor 
contracts with the specifications shown in Table 11-1. The load factor contracts span 
different income periods (i.e. the years 2001, 2002 and 2003) and seasons, which 
makes the problem complex to solve. The user of the model is free to specify the 
length of the contract durations. The model parameters are given in Table 11-2.  
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Table 11-1. Load factor contract specifications. 
 
LFC Period Price (EUR/MWh) Initial volume 
(GWh) 
Min 
volume 
(GWh) 
Max 
volume 
(GWh) 
1   44-78 22.08 491 0 491 
2   79-130 22.08 664 0 664 
3 131-156 22.08 332 0 332 
 Min rest    
volume  
(GWh) 
Max rest volume 
(GWh) 
Min 
withdrawal 
(GWh) 
Max 
withdrawal 
(GWh) 
 
1 0 0 0 15.288  
2 0 0 0 15.288  
3 0 0 0 15.288  
 
Table 11-2. Different parameters used in the model. 
 
Parameter  
Generation cost 5844160 EUR monthly 
Transaction cost 0.195 EUR/MWh 
Maximum weekly transaction 50 GWh/week 
Probability of price shift 0.1 
Value of price shift 0.481 EUR/MWh 
Initial contract balance in each week -168 GWh/week 
 
There are three income periods, one for the period, weeks 44-52 (the rest of year 
2001), and one each for weeks 53-104 (2002) and 105-156 (2003). The locked income 
in the futures market for each of the income periods is EUR 16.56, 102.26 and 102.40 
million, respectively. The value of the price shift was estimated from the seasonal 
forward Summer 2001 contract prices at Nord Pool in the period May 2 to December 
29, 2000. The average price of the forecast used in the simulations is shown in Figure 
11-4. The price forecast has 240 scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11-4. Average price forecast at week 44 used in the simulations (1 øre/kWh is 
approximately equal to 1.3 EUR/MWh). 
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11.6 Model studies 
The integrated risk management model calculates values used for making decisions 
today, such as discharge of water and hedging in the futures market. It also simulates 
forecasts for possible futures given by price scenarios and associated local inflow 
scenarios after the optimal strategy is found.  
 
The model has been run for five different cases for the penalty function. The 
penalty function is similar in all income periods. A marginal penalty of 1.0 means that 
if the expected income is EUR 100 million below the reference income, the company 
is charged a penalty of EUR 100 million. A two-segment penalty function is used with 
different marginal penalties or slopes corresponding to different risk preferences. 
 
Case 1: Risk neutral 
The base case is the risk neutral case. In this case it is unnecessary to optimize the 
generation and the contract portfolio simultaneously. 
 
Case 2: Risk-averse, marginal penalty 0.5 
In this case income results below the 25 percentile are penalized with marginal 
penalty 0.5. 
 
Case 3: Risk-averse, marginal penalty 1.0 
In this case income results below the 25 percentile are penalized with marginal 
penalty 1.0.  
 
Case 4: Risk-averse, marginal penalty 5.0 
In this case income results below the 25 percentile are penalized with marginal 
penalty 5.0.  
 
Case 5: Risk-averse, without dynamic hedging 
The penalty function is the same as in case 2 but trading in the futures market is not 
allowed. 
 
In each run the received income results for 240 different scenarios (with equal 
probability) are based on Norsk Hydro’s price forecast. The calculated expected 
income for each of the periods is shown in Table 11-3. The results for income period 
3 should not be overemphasized, since the planning period is rolling. Only the 
simulation results for weeks 1-52 are used in practice.  
 
The risk neutral case (case 1) has the highest expected total income, EUR 379.49 
million, followed by cases 2 and 5. The expected income does not change 
substantially in the different cases, so the optimum is relatively flat. The standard 
deviation for the first period has decreased by half the amount from the risk neutral 
case for all the other cases. The decrease is less in other periods; cases 4 and 5 show 
the most significant change. The end reservoir is highest for the risk neutral case and 
decreases with increasing risk aversion (except case 3). 
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Table 11-3. Simulated income (MEUR) for cases 1- 5. 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Average income period 1 28.61 30.25 31.93 30.92 31.83 
Std. dev. 8.85  4.86  5.40 4.96 4.86 
Average income period 2 140.70 139.98 136.35 142.11 140.96 
Std. dev. 25.81 22.46 19.60 20.60 21.56 
Average income period 3 130.78 130.46 129.72 126.68 130.03 
Std. dev. 29.70 27.73 26.40 25.69 23.51 
End reservoir 79.35 74.77 76.70 72.73 73.16 
Expected total income 379.49 375.44  374.68 372.43 375.31 
Min income period 1 3.03 23.04 25.12 24.91 23.05 
Min income period 2 85.54 88.13 109.09 107.89 96.09 
Min income period 3 43.77 26.01 10.62 25.51 75.18 
Max income period 1 43.79 42.86 46.01 43.34 43.90 
Max income period 2 208.86 207.06 199.26 205.94 205.15 
Max income period 3 221.50 221.31 217.22 211.66 217.25 
Expected trading income 0.00 -2.10 -1.42 -1.40 0.00 
Expected transaction cost 0.00  0.44  0.45  0.55 0.00 
Expected penalty 0.00  1.57 1.42 12.52 0.95 
 
Table 11-3 shows that the minimum income scenarios143 have improved in income 
periods 1 and 2. For income period 1, cases 3 and 4 show the most improvements: 
from EUR 3.03 million to about EUR 25.12 and EUR 24.91 million respectively. For 
income period 2, case 3 shows the best improvement of the minimum value from 
EUR 85.54 to EUR 109.09 million. In short all minimum income scenarios in income 
periods 1 and 2 have improved significantly from the risk neutral case, while the 
minimum income in period 3 decreased in most cases, except for case 5. The 
maximum income scenario in period 1 is highest in case 3, and in the other periods the 
maximum income scenario has the same order of magnitude in most of the cases. 
 
Table 11-4. Simulated generation (GWh) for all cases. 
 
Period Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Winter 2 2001 1840.4 1949.2 1935.6 1970.6 2001.7 
Winter 1 2002 3255.7 3150.1 3153.3 3134.8 3155.7 
Summer 2002 3912.0 3927.1 3916.9 4041.8 4018.1 
Winter 2 2002 2191.6 2254.3 2230.9 2263.3 2297.0 
Winter 1 2003 2966.3 2900.9 2877.1 2653.5 2783.8 
Summer 2003 3871.6 3939.9 3935.6 3997.1 3899.2 
Winter 2 2003 2371.5 2468.1 2488.9 2511.0 2500.4 
Total 20409.1 20589.5 20538.2 20572.1 20656.0 
 
The expected trading income (or loss) is lowest in case 3 (moderate penalty) and 
zero in cases 1 and 5 because there is no trading in the futures market. The transaction 
and penalty costs are highest in case 4. 
                                               
143
 The minimum income scenario is the value of the scenario with lowest income of the 240 
scenarios. 
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The hydropower generation in the different cases and periods is shown in Table 
11-4. The total generation is lowest in case 1 and highest in case 5. This is as expected 
because hedging is not allowed in case 5. The only way the producer can fulfill the 
income requirement is to use physical generation. With increasing risk aversion the 
generation in the period Winter 2 2001 is increasing relative to case 1. The reason is 
that when a penalty for failing to fulfill the income requirement is introduced, it is 
cheaper to use hydropower generation than hedging in the futures market to meet the 
budget for the year 2001. The results are more ambiguous for the other seasons.  
 
The income penalty multipliers for all runs are shown in Table 11-5. The 
multipliers are highest in the first period for cases 1-4, meaning that the model 
emphasizes the fulfillment of the income requirement more in this period compared to 
the other periods. 
 
Table 11-5. Income penalty multipliers for the initial week. 
 
 Income 
period 1 
Income 
period 2 
Income 
period 3 
Case 1 0 0   0 
Case 2 0.036   0.020   0.003 
Case 3    0.024   0.002   0.017 
Case 4    0.030   0.015   0.019 
Case 5   0.030   0.023   0.041 
 
 
  Table 11-6. Marginal water values and marginal values of load factor contracts 
(LFCs) in EUR/MWh in week 44 for all cases. 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Møsvann 19.09 20.77 20.05 20.73 18.40 
Middyrvann 20.52 20.88 21.45 19.65 18.82 
Votna 19.92 20.13 20.67 18.64 17.82 
Valldalen 19.49 19.53 20.21 17.51 19.90 
Røldalsvann 19.82 19.56 20.36 16.48 19.84 
Sandvann 21.49 22.81 21.99 20.82 22.35 
Tyinsjøen 19.12 19.45 19.92 17.99 18.44 
Øvre Herva 22.02 23.05 22.80 23.62 22.84 
Storevatn 21.59 23.08 22.63 22.96 22.65 
Herva 22.14 23.43 22.79 22.97 23.01 
Skålavatn 22.14 23.43 22.79 22.97 23.01 
Fellvann 19.16 20.04 19.46 16.79 18.40 
Sokumvann 18.33 19.39 18.76 15.61 17.61 
LFC 1 17.93 18.20 18.28 18.29 18.42 
LFC 2 17.13 17.44 17.40 17.35 17.48 
LFC 3 18.14 18.18 18.40 18.45 18.83 
 
The marginal risk adjusted water values and contract values for some of the most 
important reservoirs in Norsk Hydro’s total system in the initial week are shown in   
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Table 11-6. To use the marginal water values as a decision support tool, they must be 
divided by one plus the income penalty multipliers for income period 1.  
 
Table 11-7. Marginal future contract values (EUR/MWh) in week 44 all cases. 
 
Futures 
contracts 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Week 45 21.90 22.66 22.55 22.52 22.53 
Week 46 22.62 23.38 23.37 23.24 23.25 
Week 47 23.18 23.92 23.83 23.79 23.79 
Week 48 23.86 24.57 24.47 24.44 24.43 
Block 1 24.00 24.57 24.58 24.55 24.55 
Block 2 25.49 25.99 25.94 25.86 26.05 
Block 3 25.34 25.83 25.78 25.70 25.90 
Block 4 22.51 22.95 22.89 22.82 23.00 
Block 5 21.16 21.57 21.52 21.45 21.62 
Block 6 20.47 20.86 20.80 20.74 20.91 
Block 7 19.04 19.39 19.34 19.27 19.43 
Block 8 17.34 17.65 17.61 17.56 17.69 
Block 9 17.32 17.62 17.59 17.53 17.66 
Block 10 20.09 20.40 20.38 20.31 20.43 
Block 11 21.12 21.43 21.39 21.35 21.45 
Season 1 22.08 22.39 22.35 22.31 22.39 
Season 2 23.62 23.69 24.01 24.06 24.64 
Season 3 19.36 19.40 19.62 19.68 20.06 
Season 4 23.18 23.22 23.43 23.51 23.83 
 
   As for the marginal water values the marginal future contract values shown in 
Table 11-7 must be adjusted with an income penalty multiplier referred to the actual 
income period. Trading of futures contracts in the model occurs when the difference 
between the corrected marginal contract value and the market price for that specific 
futures contract exceeds the transaction cost. A positive difference indicates purchase; 
a negative difference indicates sale.  
 
The expected trade (sale) of futures contracts in the first week (week 44) for all 
future weeks is shown for all cases in Table 11-8. The trade is zero for all weeks in 
2002 and 2003, and is highest for cases 2 and 3 in the rest of the weeks in year 2001. 
When risk aversion and hedging are introduced, there is trade (sale) in the end of year 
2001.  
 
The withdrawal from the load factor contracts illustrated in Figure 11-5 shows that 
the withdrawal is typically high in periods with high prices (winter) and low in 
periods with low prices (summer). The withdrawal profiles for the different cases are 
relatively similar. 
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Table 11-8. Expected trade (sale GWh/week) for future weeks in the first week (week 
44), as function of future weeks for all cases. 
 
Futures 
contracts 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Week 45 21.90 22.66 22.55 22.52 22.53 
Week 46 22.62 23.38 23.37 23.24 23.25 
Week 47 23.18 23.92 23.83 23.79 23.79 
Week 48 23.86 24.57 24.47 24.44 24.43 
Block 1 24.00 24.57 24.58 24.55 24.55 
Block 2 25.49 25.99 25.94 25.86 26.05 
Block 3 25.34 25.83 25.78 25.70 25.90 
Block 4 22.51 22.95 22.89 22.82 23.00 
Block 5 21.16 21.57 21.52 21.45 21.62 
Block 6 20.47 20.86 20.80 20.74 20.91 
Block 7 19.04 19.39 19.34 19.27 19.43 
Block 8 17.34 17.65 17.61 17.56 17.69 
Block 9 17.32 17.62 17.59 17.53 17.66 
Block 10 20.09 20.40 20.38 20.31 20.43 
Block 11 21.12 21.43 21.39 21.35 21.45 
Season 1 22.08 22.39 22.35 22.31 22.39 
Season 2 23.62 23.69 24.01 24.06 24.64 
Season 3 19.36 19.40 19.62 19.68 20.06 
Season 4 23.18 23.22 23.43 23.51 23.83 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11-5. Simulated sum withdrawal from load factor contracts (GWh). 
 
11.7 Practical issues 
Practical issues should be given high priority when the system will be run in 
parallel with today’s risk management tools. The inputs for the model simulations on 
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Norsk Hydro’s total power system and portfolio are comprehensive. For the weekly 
runs, the following data are needed: reservoir levels; contract and income balance for 
the entire planning period; revision plans; options data; load factor contract data; and 
the weekly price forecast. A special program is used to extract the contract portfolio 
data from two databases. During testing it usually takes 1-2 hours to update all of the 
mentioned data. The running time for the model is about 15-20 hours on a 1 GHz 
CPU PC. 
11.8 Discussion and conclusions 
Our tests have demonstrated that it is possible to apply the model to realistic cases. 
The case results have shown that hydropower generation and trading in the futures 
market change with the risk aversion.  
 
In general we found that the expected income decreased with increasing penalty as 
we expected. The minimum income scenarios in the closest income periods are 
reduced when risk aversion is introduced. When no hedging in the futures market is 
allowed, the water is moved between the different time periods (seasons) to meet the 
income targets. 
 
The model gives risk adjusted water values as output and these can be used as a 
condition for sale in the spot market. Another result of the simulations is that the 
marginal contract values, when properly adjusted, can be used as signals for buying or 
selling in the futures market. 
 
The expected trading observed from week 44 occurs in weeks 45-52 of year 2001 
for the cases with risk aversion and hedging. Most of the withdrawals from the load 
factor contracts occur in the periods with high price, and the withdrawal profiles are 
relatively unaffected by risk aversion if the transaction costs are small (Mo and 
Gjelsvik, 2001).  
 
When dynamic hedging is introduced, the simulated income uncertainty is reduced 
and the model offers a more realistic forecast of the associated income for a portfolio 
of physical generation, futures contracts, and load factors contracts. An optimization 
of both physical generation and the contract portfolio is necessary because the 
information about reservoir levels and rest volumes gives signals about changes in 
future position and reduces inflow risks. 
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